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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 What is the appropriate legal response to “Order Without Law”?1 
That is, should laws change when private actors—for example, or-
ganizations, trade industries, and institutions—develop their own 
law through extralegal, or to be more accurate, nonlegal customs and 
practices? At first glance, this question might seem analogous to a 
tree falling in the forest. When private actors opt out of legal en-
forcement mechanisms, such as court enforcement of tort or contract, 
there is no invitation for law to act; therefore, the content of the legal 
rule not chosen appears moot. Recent empirical scholarship exploring 
nonlegal systems, whether it is focused on cattle ranchers in Shasta 
County2 or diamond merchants in New York City,3 often relies on a 
                                                                                                                      
 1. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1994).  
 2. Id. at Part I. 
 3. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Barak D. Richman, Community 
Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York (Sept. 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Busi-
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premise that “[l]aw simply [does] not matter in a community with 
well developed norms.”4 
 But what happens when law needs no invitation? Often, the deci-
sion to opt out of criminal and civil enforcement schemes does not 
rest in the hands of the private actors who have created nonlegal 
sanctions governing the same behavior. Within the context of mul-
titiered enforcement, is opting out an all or nothing proposition? How 
can law avoid its inherent sovereign nature of trumping that which 
nonlegal actors have created and, instead, augment, supplement, or 
complement these delicate private systems?  
 This Article offers a case study5 of the nonlegal sanctions used to 
police the kosher food industry6 and explores appropriate multitiered 
enforcement solutions in the face of partial opt out. There are three 
tiers of enforcement that aim to prevent fraud within the kosher food 
industry. At the base level are private actors—organizations, indi-
viduals affiliated with the industry in a variety of ways, and an en-
tire subindustry of certification intermediaries—who monitor, dis-
seminate information, and sanction to solve the problems of misin-
formation, misrepresentation, and fraud in the kosher food industry 
(Tier One). Next, consumers and other industry participants can turn 
to private law enforcement primarily in contract, tort, and trademark 
law (Tier Two). Third, state and local governments can prosecute 
fraudulent actors either under general consumer protection laws or 
                                                                                                                      
ness), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (last modified Oct. 1, 
2003) (click on discussion papers; scroll down to or click on 2002; click on #384). 
 4. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to 
the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1286 (1997).  
 5. Much of the data contained within this Article was obtained via a series of inter-
views with industry insiders or participants. Based on preliminary data gathering, seven 
kosher supervising agencies (KSAs), ranging in size from small to large, and five other in-
dividuals otherwise connected to the kosher food industry (each fell into one or more of 
these categories: food scientist, kosher consumer watchdog, expert among kosher proxy us-
ers, attorney who prosecuted kosher fraud for the State) were approached to be inter-
viewed. Due to the market dominance of several groups or individuals among many, a ran-
dom selection likely would have produced skewed results. The agencies and individuals 
were chosen based on their ability to represent a variety of perspectives. Though it is al-
ways possible that the interviewees have their own biases, the diversity of opinions solic-
ited aimed to minimize this risk. Representatives from four of the seven KSAs and four of 
the five selected other individuals were actually interviewed for a total of eight interviews. 
Together, the interviewees have spent over one hundred years working within or studying 
the kosher food industry. For anonymity reasons, these sources have been given credit for 
the appropriate information in a general manner. Inquiries about this information should 
be directed to the author, who has more information about the interviews, the methodology 
employed, and data gathered on file. 
 6. The term kosher food industry is used within this Article to refer to a collective 
group of individuals, organizations, and corporations, including: (1) manufacturers, whole-
salers, retailers, caterers, and butchers engaged in the production and preparation of ko-
sher food; (2) certification intermediaries, also known as kosher supervising agencies 
(KSAs); (3) consumer watchdog groups; and (4) individual consumers who intentionally set 
out to buy kosher food.  
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under special criminal and civil statutes, also known as kosher fraud 
statutes, that specifically protect consumers from fraud in the kosher 
food industry (Tier Three). 
 While one interesting question is how to understand, explain, and 
eventually harness the powers of the social norms that allow for ro-
bust Tier One enforcement,7 this Article primarily focuses on the of-
ten ignored flip side of this question: How should law (in this case 
Tier Three, which unlike Tier Two, leaves little room for opt out) best 
respond to these nonlegal schemes? 
 In an ideal world, there is a constant dialogue between law as an 
institution and the populace it purports to govern as the two attempt 
to find equilibrium.8 Changes in the law may upset the balance these 
private actors have established.9 At the same time, though, legal ad-
aptations might be a necessary, or at least an appropriate, response 
to augment or counter the behavior of nonlegal systems.  
 The kosher food industry is at a crossroads of legal change since 
the kosher fraud statutes that comprise part of the Tier Three en-
forcement recently have been declared unconstitutional.10 Unfortu-
nately, scholars studying these statutes and methods of solving the 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Indeed this question has been the focus for much of the law and social norm 
movement. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 8 (2000) (positing that “many le-
gal rules are best understood as efforts to harness the independent regulatory power of so-
cial norms”); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694 (1996) 
(arguing that “the lawmaker’s role is to find community norms, apply the structural test, 
and enforce the norms that pass the test”); Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociol-
ogy: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2478 (1997) (“By focusing on how 
law can be used to regulate norms, the new deterrence scholarship can be used to identify 
morally acceptable and politically feasible alternatives to the severe punishments that 
dominate contemporary criminal law.”); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, 
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340-42 (1997) (listing recent studies of so-
cial norms and offering a theory for legal regulation of norms); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s 
Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231 (2000) (demonstrating how legal rules can change norms 
about pollution).  
 8. For a discussion of how multitiered government levels have produced such a dia-
logue in the human rights context, see Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitu-
tional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 245, 249-53 (2001).  
 9. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1997) (describing 
“norm cascades” where a societal “tipping point” is reached and new norms emerge); POS-
NER, supra note 7, at 8. 
 10. See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir. 
2002) (invalidating the New York kosher fraud statute); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher 
Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1346 (4th Cir. 1995) (invalidating the Baltimore ordi-
nance); Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1366 (N.J. 1992) (invalidat-
ing the New Jersey regulations to the extent they imposed substantive religious standards 
for the preparation and maintenance of kosher foods). These decisions were based on the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also discussion 
infra Section III.C.2.(c). 
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Establishment Clause problem11 have done so without consideration 
of the alternative enforcement schemes: non-specialized criminal 
prosecution, private legal enforcement, and nonlegal sanctions. The 
pressing question is not how the kosher fraud law should change to 
avoid constitutional quandaries, but more importantly, whether the 
statutes are necessary or useful within the realm of multitiered en-
forcement options; if not, what legal response could best augment the 
existing regime created by various private actors without acciden-
tally undermining the incentives for and structure of the private or-
dering? 
 This Article offers a proposal to answer this question for the ko-
sher food industry that more accurately reflects the strengths and 
weaknesses of the nonlegal systems policing the industry. More im-
portantly, though, this Article’s analysis of the methods through 
which the kosher food industry combats fraud and mistake offers 
suggestions for participants in other specialized food markets (such 
as organic, allergy-safe, halal, and nongenetically modified), as well 
as for consumers in general, who seek to balance nonlegal and legal 
protection mechanisms. Beyond these applications, the kosher model 
can help build a general theory or template for how tort and criminal 
law should respond to enhance the efforts of nonlegal sanctions, 
rather than change them, and whether and to what extent entire 
communities or industries should be able to opt out of tort and crimi-
nal enforcement. 
 Section II provides relevant background information concerning 
the kosher food industry. It defines key aspects of what it means for 
food to be kosher and describes the market for kosher food and the 
kosher certification intermediaries upon which consumers rely. Sec-
tion III explains the three-tiered enforcement scheme that protects 
the consumers in this industry, and it presents an overview of the 
history, legal content, and constitutional challenges of the specialized 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are 
They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 28 (1992) (stating that although the Court 
has struggled to agree on a consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause, kosher 
fraud statues are a clear case of excessive entanglement of government and religion); 
Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass the Lemon Test? The Constitu-
tionality of Current and Proposed Statutes, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 337, 362-68 (1998) (also 
arguing excessive entanglement); Gerald F. Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 696 (1993) (proposing dis-
closure as a solution to the constitutional problem). But see Shelly R. Meacham, Answering 
to a Higher Source: Does the Establishment Clause Actually Restrict Kosher Regulations as 
Ran-Dav’s County Kosher Proclaims?, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 639, 641 (1994) (arguing that pro-
tecting consumers from fraud is a secular purpose and fits within the principles of Lemon); 
Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food For Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 998-1004 (1997) (arguing non-
endorsement); Catherine Beth Sullivan, Are Kosher Food Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 
21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201, 242-44 (1993) (noting that kosher fraud laws further a 
state interest). 
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kosher fraud statute. 
 Using the information provided in Sections II and III, Section IV 
offers an economic theory of what one would expect to see happen in 
the kosher food industry, given the enforcement system that exists, 
and indicates the degree to which industry field data substantiate 
the theory. Based on this analysis, Section IV proceeds to offer sug-
gestions for how law should respond in the face of the nonlegal moni-
toring efforts and sanctions. This Section contains a proposal for the 
kosher food industry that focuses on voluntary information sharing, 
with the state serving as the coordination solution central bank, and 
then comments on the utility of the kosher disclosure statute, a new 
form of Tier Three enforcement that has replaced the kosher fraud 
statute in New Jersey. 
 Section V provides several applications for this analysis beyond 
the kosher food industry, particularly within the emerging markets 
for halal, organic, nongenetically modified, and allergy-safe foods, 
and more generally as a model for understanding consumer protec-
tion law. Since each subindustry is unique, there is no single legal 
response or solution to apply across the board; instead, this Article 
offers a tripartite approach for analyzing consumer protection laws 
in the context of the inherent theoretical tension these regulations 
present. This Section suggests that many consumer groups seeking 
federal or state assistance ought to be wary of governmental stan-
dard setting as a primary means for establishing and regulating pri-
vate-market labeling. Instead, these groups might want to focus their 
energies on developing a strong legal framework that could support a 
private system of supervision and certification.  
 This Article concludes that preliminary efforts to discover the ap-
propriate legal response to nonlegal monitoring, certifying, sanction-
ing, and information sharing in circumstances that warrant partial 
opt out, like the kosher fraud case study, suggest the need for a 
metatheory that merges tort and criminal law theories of public in-
terest or social welfare policy with public choice and norm theory un-
derstandings of subsidization, consent, and opt out.  
II.   THE THREE CS OF KOSHER FOOD: CONTENTS, CERTIFIERS, AND 
CONSUMERS 
 What determines whether food is kosher? There are two ap-
proaches in answering this question, each correct in its own way. On 
one level, as a primary matter, food is kosher if it meets the stan-
dards that are laid out in the Hebrew Bible as the provisions of the 
Old Testament are interpreted by subsequent rabbinical authori-
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ties.12 These laws govern the nature of the food source as well as its 
preparation. Accordingly, kosher food is that food which has been 
prepared in accordance with the religious laws of kashrus.13  
 This raises the question how someone who observes the dietary 
laws of kashrus knows that the food she is eating is kosher. First of 
all, someone who seeks to eat only kosher food does not necessarily 
even know all of the complicated laws dictating what makes food ko-
sher. Indeed, the vast majority of consumers who intentionally par-
ticipate in the kosher food industry do not know the details of all the 
laws of kashrus. Furthermore, even if we imagine one who is knowl-
edgeable about these complicated laws, our source of food is often a 
local supermarket or restaurant and before that, a processing plant. 
While the discovery of preservatives and the ability to ship food by 
rail and plane have expanded the opportunities for consumers of 
food, the industrial age has also complicated the decisionmaking 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Orthodox Jews believe that at the time the Hebrew Bible (which consists of the 
five Books of Moses) was given on Mount Sinai (circa 1200 B.C.E.), Moses received both 
this written law and its interpretation instructions. See Halakhah, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
JUDAICA 1161 (Keter Publ’g House Ltd. 1971). These instructions were transmitted orally 
from generation to generation as chronicled in Pirkei Avot (“Ethics of the Fathers”). Id. at 
1162. Once invading enemies and exile threatened the Jewish people, this oral law was 
written down, so it would not be lost. Over the course of his lifetime (135-219 C.E.), Rabbi 
Judah ha-Nasi compiled and redacted the oral law in a codification known as the Mishnah. 
Id. at 1163. The Talmud is a written compilation of interpretations and syntheses of the 
Mishnah, presenting the Mishnaic text along with Rabbincal debates about its meaning 
that occurred between competing schools of thought in the years 220-470 C.E. Id. at 1163-
64. Later generations of Rabbinical authorities would offer codifications of or issue re-
sponsa on Jewish religious and civil law. Id. at 1165. The most accepted, comprehensive 
Orthodox source of codified Jewish Law used by observant Jews today is the Shulhan 
Arukh (literally “Set Table”), which was written by Rabbi Joseph Caro in the 1560s and 
commented on by Rabbi Moses Isserles in the 1570s. Id. at 1166. The Shulhan Arukh is di-
vided into four volumes: Orech Chaim (laws on prayer and holidays), Yoreh Deah (Jewish 
daily living—including charity, Torah study, and kashrus), Even Ha’ezer (marriage and 
divorce), and Choshen Mishpat (Jewish civil law). Id. Orthodox interpretation of Jewish 
law relies on a positivist framework; Rabbis do not make Jewish law. They find the rele-
vant law, some would argue from “a brooding omnipresence in the sky,” Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917), though more accurately described as the com-
mandments from God contained within Biblical text itself (particularly Leviticus and Deu-
teronomy, though also from other portions of the five Books of Moses) and the Talmud. 
They rely on the teachings of prior rabbinical authorities, in order to apply the law to a 
given set of circumstances. See Halakhah, supra, at 1165.  
 13. The term kashrus (KAH-shrus) is derived from the same Hebrew root as the word 
kosher. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1233 (1986); see Kashrut: Jewish Dietary Laws, American-Israeli Cooperative Exchange, 
Jewish Virtual Library, at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/kashrut. 
html (noting terms kashrut and kosher derived from Hebrew word “Kaf-Shin-Resh”). This 
is the Ashkenazic (Eastern-European Jewish) pronunciation of the word kashrut (kah-
SHRUTE). THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1046 (2nd ed. 
1987). For purposes of this Article, the Ashkenazic form of the word will be used, consider-
ing that is what the vast majority of kosher supervising agencies within the United States 
use. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification 
see supra note 5).  
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process for kosher consumers. How can a consumer be certain that 
the food she eats is kosher if she is not able to observe most of the 
production process?  
 As a result of these difficulties, there is an industry of rabbinical 
institutions and rabbis who act as certifiers. For a fee, they observe 
the production process in order to ensure that the food is kosher. 
Consumers who seek out processed kosher food look for an identify-
ing trademark or label from a certifier, such as an encircled K or U. 
Restaurants and other food establishments also must obtain certifi-
cation and often literally receive a certificate that potential custom-
ers can see.  
 Without certification, consumers have no way of knowing if food 
actually is kosher or not. If kosher food is prepared in a manufactur-
ing plant or restaurant, following all the laws of kashrus, but no cer-
tifier is there to observe it, is the food kosher at all? Technically, yes; 
but just like the falling tree in the forest that no one is around to 
hear, kosher consumers would have no way of knowing that the food 
is actually kosher. Effectively, then, for kosher consumers of 2003, 
what determines whether food is kosher is the existence (or lack) of 
certification by an appropriate person or institution. And so, a pri-
vate subindustry of supervision and certification exists to signal to 
consumers what food is kosher. 
 But one cannot fully understand this supervision and certification 
subindustry without knowledge of what makes food kosher. Accord-
ingly, this Section first presents a general overview of kashrus.14 The 
laws of kashrus can best be placed into three categories: (1) kosher 
versus nonkosher ingredients, (2) kosher preparation practices, and 
(3) impermissible combinations of food cooking and consumption. Af-
ter explaining these three categories in some detail, this Section then 
discusses the supervision and certification industry, which consists of 
parties educated about the laws of kashrus who obtain insider access 
to the food production process and offer consumers more certain an-
swers to the question whether food is kosher. Finally, since this Sec-
tion lays the foundation for a discussion about how the various legal 
and nonlegal remedies protect consumers, it concludes with a de-
scription of the various consumers who participate in the market for 
kosher food. 
                                                                                                                      
 14. This Article presents a general overview of principles and rules that are mostly, 
though not universally, accepted within the Orthodox community. Questions of kashrus 
are not always black and white, and one should be cautious not to confuse the religious 
significance placed on the laws with the notion that the laws themselves are rigid in their 
application. Given the context of this primer on kosher, some oversimplifications are inevi-
table. For a more complete look at kashrus, see RABBI E. EIDLITZ, IS IT KOSHER? ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF KOSHER FOODS FACTS & FALLACIES (1992). 
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A.   Defining Kosher 
 The Hebrew word kasher (kah-SHARE)—or kosher—means fit or 
proper.15 Kosher is a religious term of art that is used to describe a 
range of ritualistic objects, activities, or even a state-of-being.16 Ko-
sher, meaning acceptable or appropriate, has even crept into the 
English lexicon.17 
 Food is kosher when it meets the strict dictates of the laws of 
kashrus.18 While some people have attempted to offer reasons for 
these laws, such as the explanation that a kosher diet is healthier,19 
the laws of kashrus are considered laws for which no explanation is 
offered or should be needed.20 As such, this Article makes no effort to 
explore these after-the-fact justifications and simply presents an 
overview of the laws of kashrus to introduce what the kosher food in-
dustry is and how it functions. 
 The laws of kashrus require that kosher food: (1) come from a 
proper source—for example, meat from some animals, such as pork, 
is inherently nonkosher,21 (2) be prepared in a specific manner—for 
example, animals must be slaughtered in a particularized manner, 
and (3) not be combined improperly with food that might otherwise 
be considered kosher—for example, combining meat and milk.22 
While the public is more aware of the rules in the first and third 
categories (no pork, no cheeseburgers, etc.), the second category is ac-
tually the most prohibitive, since it prevents equipment and utensils 
                                                                                                                      
 15. SEYMOUR E. FREEDMAN, THE BOOK OF KASHRUTH: A TREASURY OF KOSHER FACTS 
AND FRAUDS xvii (1970). 
 16. See id.  
 17. Kosher is defined by Merriam-Webster as: “[S]anctioned by Jewish law; especially: 
ritually fit for use <kosher meat> . . . selling or serving food ritually fit according to Jewish 
law <a kosher restaurant> . . . being proper, acceptable, or satisfactory <kosher funding>.” 
Merriam-Webster OnLine (2002), at http://www.m-w.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). 
 18. This Article will identify the laws of kashrus in accordance with the Shulhan 
Arukh, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, and RABBI YACOV LIPSCHUTZ, 
KASHRUTH: A COMPREHENSIVE BACKGROUND AND REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES 
OF KASHRUTH (1988). 
 19. See Beth Laski, Keeping Kosher Becomes Chic: Demand for Quality Food Triggers 
Marketing Boom, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 1993, at L14; Jewish Mother’s Chicken Soup 
Decides to Go Kosher, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 9, 1987, at 10E (reporting that “a grow-
ing number of non-Jews concerned about health and nutrition” are eating kosher). But see 
Berman, supra note 11, at 5 (“[T]he Divine Torah did not come to heal bodies and seek 
their physical health, but to seek the health of the soul and to heal its diseases . . . .”) 
(quoting ISAAC ABRAVANEL, VAYIKRA [(COMMENTARY ON) LEVITICUS] 65).  
 20. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 16 (describing the commitment to kashrus as purely 
a matter of faith). For a presentation of perspectives on kashrus by various Jewish scholars 
of the past and present, see IRVING WELFELD, WHY KOSHER? AN ANTHOLOGY OF ANSWERS 
(1996).  
 21. Leviticus 11:3-8. 
 22. Kosher Consumer’s Union, Mini Course in Kashrus & the Basic Laws of Kashrus, 
at http://www.kosherconsumer.org/course.htm. (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).  
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from being used to prepare both kosher and nonkosher foods. Out-
lines of these rules will be detailed below. 
1.   Kosher Food Sources and Ingredients 
 Contrary to popular belief, most food in its purest form is kosher. 
Grains, vegetables, fruit, and nuts are all inherently kosher.23 The 
main limitations from the laws of kashrus apply to animal-sourced 
food. The animal kingdom is divided into three acceptable categories: 
meat, poultry, and fish. Within these groupings, there are different 
restrictions regarding (1) which animals are permissible, (2) which 
parts of permissible animals may not be consumed at all, and (3) 
what methods of preparation are required. The first two types of re-
strictions will be discussed briefly here, while the latter is included 
in Subsection II.A.2 below. 
(a)   Mammals 
The laws of kashrus limit the type of animal from which flesh 
(meat) can be eaten. In order for meat from a mammal to be kosher, 
the animal must have both split hooves (artiodactyls) and chew its 
cud (ruminants).24 Kosher dairy products, such as milk and cheese, 
must also come from a kosher animal-source.25 The cow is the most 
common source of kosher meat. Some other animals that fit in this 
category are goats, deer, sheep, giraffe, and bison. 
 The Bible identifies four animals that meet only one of the two 
necessary criteria, and, thus, no meat from one of these animals may 
be considered kosher.26 These animals are the camel, hyrax, hare (all 
lack split hooves), and most famously, the pig (does not chew its 
cud).27 As a result, no method of preparation can render pork kosher. 
Animals with neither sign, such as donkeys and horses, are also not 
                                                                                                                      
 23. But see EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 195-97 (detailing various inspection require-
ments for vegetables to ensure that no insects remain). Additionally, other non-kashrus re-
strictions may limit the ability to eat food from the ground, such as requirements for tith-
ing and a sabbatical year.  
 24. Deuteronomy 14:3-8; Leviticus 11:3; LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 17-18; Yoreh 
Deah, in SHULHAN ARUKH ch. 79 (Hebrew book utilized by the author.). 
 25. Modern rabbinic authorities disagree whether a Talmudic restriction prohibiting 
the consumption of milk produced outside the presence of an observant Jew (to prevent 
mixing the milk of nonkosher animals with milk from kosher animals) still applies within 
the United States, where milk production is heavily regulated to avoid impermissible adul-
teration. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 54-56. Milk that has been supervised is known as 
cholov yisrael; unsupervised milk is called cholov stam (ordinary milk). Interviews with 
various KSA representatives (Sept. – Oct. 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 
5); see Rabbi Moshe Heinemann, Cholev Yisroel: Does a Neshama Good, KASHRUS 
KURRENTS, The Star-K Online, at http://www.star-k.org/kashrus/kk-issues-cholovYisroel.htm 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2003).  
 26. Leviticus 11:4-7. 
 27. Id. 
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kosher. In addition, marine mammals, like porpoises and whales, are 
not kosher. 
 Some portions of otherwise kosher mammals are also forbidden. 
This includes the sciatic nerve and its attached blood vessels, some 
forbidden stomach fats, and also any blood.28 Due to the difficulty in 
extracting the sciatic nerve and the greater number of blood vessels 
in the hind quarters of most animals, many kosher butchers only use 
the top half of the mammal.29 Accordingly, kosher steaks are typi-
cally cut from the shoulder, rather than the nonkosher short loin, 
from which T-bone steaks customarily come. In order to avoid eating 
any blood, which is impermissible, kosher meat must be soaked and 
salted before it can be consumed.30 This procedure will be discussed 
below.  
(b)   Poultry or Fowl 
 Kosher poultry is limited to domestic fowl.31 Scavenging birds, 
such as eagles or ravens, are not permissible sources of food.32 Due to 
historical difficulties in applying the standard of what makes poultry 
kosher, rabbinic authorities declared that permitted fowl would be 
limited to a list of birds traditionally known to be kosher.33 The most 
well-known and consumed from this list are chicken, turkey, goose, 
and domestic duck.34 Since there is no definitive tradition about 
pheasant, wild ducks and geese, or pigeons, they may not be eaten.35 
Like in the context of beef, the blood from poultry is not considered to 
be kosher.36 
(c)   Fish, Marine Life, and Invertebrates 
 Any fish that has both fins and scales is kosher.37 Thus, the list of 
permissible fishes is quite lengthy; it includes tuna, salmon, trout, 
halibut, flounder, and sole, to name only a few popularly consumed 
types.38 Examples of nonkosher fishes and marine life are catfish, 
                                                                                                                      
 28. Genesis 32:32; Leviticus 3:17, 7:26-27; LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 26-30; 
SHULHAN ARUKH supra note 24, at ch. 65. 
 29. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 29-30. 
 30. Id. at 30-34; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 69-78. 
 31. Leviticus 11:13-19; LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 18-19; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra 
note 24, at ch. 82. 
 32. Leviticus 11:13-18. 
 33. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 18-19; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 82. 
 34. OK Kosher Certification, Meat, Diary, and Pareve, at http://www.okkosher.com/ 
Content.asp?ID=63 (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).  
 35. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 19. 
 36. Id. at 30; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 77. 
 37. Deuteronomy 14:9-10; Leviticus 11:9-12; LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 47; 
SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 83. 
 38. For a more comprehensive list, see LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 142-58. 
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blowfish, eels, rays, and sharks.39 Some fish, like swordfish and stur-
geon, have scales that are embedded in the skin. Many orthodox au-
thorities deem these fish not kosher.40 
 Shellfish and crustaceans, such as lobsters, shrimp, and oysters 
are not considered kosher.41 Insects, creepy-crawlers, arthropods 
generally, or other invertebrates are not kosher either.42 Some types 
of non-animal source food, such as leafy vegetables, must be carefully 
inspected to ensure that no insects remain.43 
2.   Kosher Food Preparation 
 The most complicated laws of kashrus dictate how food that is 
source-based, or ingredient, kosher must be prepared—or more im-
portantly, not prepared—in order to render the food kosher. These 
rules can best be sorted into two unrelated groupings: (1) those that 
apply to the preparation of animal-sourced food, and (2) those that 
apply rules of absorption and transference to cooked food and the 
cooking utensils employed.44 This latter category is the most compli-
cated and can act as the most restrictive of all the laws of kashrus. 
Again, what follows is merely a brief overview to put the need for su-
pervision and certification in its proper context. 
(a)   Preparing Animal-Sourced Food 
 Kosher meat and poultry must be ritually slaughtered by a 
trained slaughterer called a shochet (SHO-chet), who is required to 
sever the animal’s trachea and esophagus in one motion.45 This 
method ensures that the animal’s death is as quick as possible, and 
that the maximum amount of blood drains from the animal.46 The 
shochet uses a special sharp knife that must be free from all nicks to 
meet these two criteria and to minimize the animal’s pain.47 
 If a kosher animal, such as a cow or deer, dies on its own or is 
killed in any other manner (e.g., by rifle), its meat may not be con-
sumed.48 Once the animal is slaughtered, its organs must be free 
                                                                                                                      
 39. Id. at 158-60. 
 40. Id. There is some debate over whether these fish possess the appropriate signs. 
 41. Leviticus 11:20-31; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 84-85. 
 42. Leviticus 11:20-31.  
 43. See EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 195-97. Some rabbis recommend avoiding vegeta-
bles that present a near certainty that insects cannot be removed, such as brussel sprouts.  
 44. There are also laws prohibiting the consumption of various foods (including, but 
not limited to, bread and wine) prepared by non-Jews. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 67-70, 
74-76; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 112-13. 
 45. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 20. 
 46. Id. at chs. 6-10. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Leviticus 22:8. 
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from defects.49 Perforations in vital organs, such as the lungs, render 
the animal nonkosher.50 Within seventy-two hours of the slaughter, 
the meat must be soaked and salted to remove the blood.51  
(b)   Food and Utensil Absorption/Transference 
 For the purposes of the laws of kashrus, hot food is thought to be 
absorbed by the utensil in which it is cooked.52 As a result, utensils 
take on the character of the food placed in or upon them.53 Likewise, 
food takes on the character of the utensil.54 This is true for cutlery, 
pots, pans, ovens, and other cooking appliances. Think of what hap-
pens when hot spaghetti and tomato sauce are placed in a plastic 
container; the container will stain as the food is absorbed into the 
utensil. Or imagine that seafood is baked in an oven. Even a choco-
late cake baked immediately afterwards in the same oven will absorb 
some of that flavor. 
 There are special procedures that allow the nonkosher character 
to be removed from some utensils, based on the utensil material, un-
der the theory that the method of restoration should mirror the 
method of absorption. Thus, since it is the combination of heat and 
food that causes the initial absorption or transference, heat must be 
employed to reverse these effects. The two main procedures for mak-
ing a nonkosher utensil kosher, or in other words, kashering (KAH-
share-ing), are allowing the utensil to be surrounding by scalding 
water (used for cutlery and pots) or taking a blow torch to burn out 
the absorbed material (used for ovens).55 Only some materials, like 
stainless steel, can be kashered.56 Wood and ceramics can never be 
kashered.57 This is based on a traditional understanding that some 
materials either never release what they have absorbed or cannot 
safely be heated to an appropriate temperature to do so.58 
 Due to these rules, food that is kosher by the standards described 
above—for example, vegetables—can be rendered nonkosher by vir-
tue of how it is prepared. Imagine that carrots are cooked in a pan 
                                                                                                                      
 49. See LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 22.  
 50. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 29-60. The term “glatt kosher” refers to 
lungs that have been tested to make sure they have no impermissible adhesions. 
LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 22-24. This term has been misused to mean extrakosher. See 
id. at 24. For example, the phrase glatt kosher fish makes no sense; fish do not have lungs. 
 51. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 69-78. 
 52. Id. at chs. 87-111; LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 43-44. 
 53. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 87-111. 
 54. Id. 
 55. EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 68-71, 77-78. 
 56. Id. at 68. 
 57. Id. at 78. 
 58. See, e.g., Halacha Yomit, Different Methods of Kashering Utensils, at http://www. 
torah.net/sites/halachayomit/hagala.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).   
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that once cooked food that does not meet the laws of kashrus—for 
example, pork. While cooking hot pork, that pan absorbed the nonko-
sher character of the meat. Then, the heat from cooking the carrots 
releases that character into the vegetable and the pan transfers its 
nonkosher nature into them. Given the rules of absorption and trans-
ference, most hot food prepared in a nonkosher kitchen would not be 
kosher unless it happened to be prepared with utensils, pots, pans, 
and appliances that had either never been used or had only been 
used to prepare kosher food.59 The consequences of absorption and 
transference render many foods nonkosher even though they other-
wise contain purely kosher ingredients. 
 While the rules of absorption and transference apply to hot food, 
there are also several limitations that prevent the use of cold nonko-
sher utensils to prepare or contain cold kosher food. First, the nonko-
sher utensil must be washed between usage, otherwise it may still 
retain some nonkosher food matter.60 Beyond that, similar rules of 
absorption also apply to utensils that come into contact with cold, 
sharp, or spicy foods, such as onions, garlic, lemons, or pickles, be-
cause those foods are thought to transfer their flavors even when 
cold.61  
3.   Impermissible Food Combinations 
 Kashrus prohibits one from cooking or eating meat and dairy 
products together.62 This can affect food cultivation as well; for ex-
ample, many Orthodox Jews will not consume cheese made with 
animal-sourced rennet.63 Some Jews customarily wait for a period of 
time of one, three, or six hours, depending on their country of origin, 
after eating meat before eating dairy again.64 Similar customs impose 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 67-68; LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 43-44. Imple-
ments and utensils that have been used within twenty-four hours are treated differently 
than those that have not in certain contexts. EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 77-78. Thus, if 
someone makes an error, he should contact a rabbi and ask to see what leniencies might 
apply and not simply rely on a pronouncement from a general book on kashrus. See id. at 
68. 
 60. See EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 68. 
 61. Id.; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 96. 
 62. Exodus 34:26; SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at chs. 87-97. For an excellent de-
scriptive pictorial guide to illustrate these principles, see EHUD ROSENBERG, BA’SAR 
B’CHALAV (1988) (written in Hebrew). 
 63. LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 56-57. Merriam-Webster defines rennet as: “[T]he 
contents of the stomach of an unweaned animal and especially a calf . . . the lining mem-
brane of a stomach or one of its compartments (as the fourth of a ruminant) used for cur-
dling milk; also: a preparation of the stomach of animals used for this purpose.”  
Merriam-Webster OnLine (2002), at http://www.m-w.com (last visited Oct 9, 2003).  
 64. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 89. 
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waiting periods for eating meat after one has consumed hard cheeses 
too.65 
 Foods that are neither meat nor dairy are considered to be pareve 
or parve (PAH-rev).66 Fruits, vegetables, and grains are all pareve. 
Furthermore, even though they are animal-sourced, honey, fish, and 
eggs are all pareve.67 
 The rules of absorption and transference described above also ap-
ply to give utensils a meat or dairy character. Kosher meat may not 
be cooked in a pot that has already been used to cook dairy food, even 
if all the food in question is kosher by its ingredient nature.68 Accord-
ingly, those who strictly follow the laws of kashrus in their kitchens 
have two separate sets of dishes, pots, pans, and flatware: one for 
dairy and one for meat.69 
B.   The Supervision and Certification Industry 
 Prior to the twentieth century, Jews could observe the dietary 
laws of kashrus without much difficulty, due to the agrarian nature 
of society. Vegetables and grains were grown locally and sold in their 
original form. Tight-knit communities relied on a local shochet to 
slaughter meat and poultry according to the dictates of kashrus.70 
Dairy products were made from milk that was either obtained from 
the family-owned cow or from a local Jewish milkman.71 While self-
reliance posed some difficulties for Jewish communities, they had the 
power to control the steps of food production to ensure that all the 
food they consumed was kosher.  
 The world has changed between then and now. Food is a multibil-
lion dollar industry, and the kosher food industry is just one segment 
of it. Most of the food eaten by consumers in 2003 has been processed, 
refined, or canned; most of it has crossed many state lines and even 
some international borders before arriving at local groceries, super-
markets, catering halls, hotels, and restaurants. In some ways, these 
technological advances have allowed consumers to improve their di-
ets by introducing greater dietary variety while eliminating food-
related health hazards. At the same time, changes in the food indus-
try have created other health risks; within the United States, the 
threat of obesity and poor nutrition has replaced malnutrition. None-
                                                                                                                      
 65. See LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 43. 
 66. Id. at 44. 
 67. It is customary to eat fish and meat on separate plates with separate utensils. Id. 
at 50.  
 68. Id. at 43. 
 69. Id. at 43-44. 
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. Though fictitious, the community portrayed in “Fiddler on the Roof” bears strong 
resemblance to many Jewish communities of that era. FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (MGM 1971). 
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theless, food consumers—a group that includes basically every mem-
ber of society—can overcome this burden of success through edu-
cated, health-conscience decisionmaking.  
 These societal changes, though, present a hurdle for those who 
wish to eat a kosher diet.72 A consumer has no way of knowing ex-
actly what ingredients are contained in the food she buys. Though 
general consumer protection regulations aid the kosher consumer, 
they fall short of providing the information consumers need to know. 
For example, current federal labeling requirements do not require 
that all ingredients be identified.73 And even if all ingredients are 
known, the use of industrial-sized equipment in plants creates a lit-
any of transference or absorption kashrus difficulties—both between 
nonkosher and kosher products as well as between dairy and meat 
products. To give one specific illustration, if a company makes one 
line of products that are not kosher, no other food product made with 
the same machinery is kosher either. When that nonkosher food 
product is used as an ingredient in yet another food product at a dif-
ferent company’s plant, it can render any food coming out of that 
plant nonkosher as well.  
 Given these increasing difficulties, one might think that the mod-
ern kosher consumer is out of luck. The food industry offers greater 
variety, yet the increased reliance on mass production undercuts the 
kosher consumer’s options drastically. Fortunately for the kosher 
consumer, a subindustry of kosher supervision and certification has 
emerged to allow these consumers access to a greater amount and 
variety of food. This Section details the who, what, and how of kosher 
certification.  
1.   Who Certifies Kosher Food? 
 Individual rabbis or rabbinical organizations enter into agree-
ments with the owners of local food establishments as well as na-
tional food producers and processors.74 In exchange for a fee and ac-
cess to the production process, the rabbi or organization will super-
vise the process and certify that the food meets the requirements of 
kashrus.75 To avoid the temptation or appearance of corruption, Jew-
ish law mandates that the certifier not have an interest or stake in 
the business being certified.76 
                                                                                                                      
 72. See SAUL BERNSTEIN, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TORAH JEW 183-85 (1985) (de-
scribing the difficulties caused by the industrialization of food production). 
 73. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 342-343 (2002) (defin-
ing “adulterated” and “misbranded” food). 
 74. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Sept.-Oct. 2002) (for interview 
clarification see supra note 5).  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
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 Whether the food actually is kosher is determined based on the 
numerous requirements generally outlined above and several others 
not detailed. Food may or may not be kosher, and consumers have no 
ability to discern the truth. The supervisors and certifiers offer useful 
information to consumers as they declare that, based on their own 
observation of the food production and preparation process, the food 
meets the dictates of the laws of kashrus. Through various symbols, 
letters, or actual certificates, certifiers signal to consumers that they 
deem food kosher for consumption. 
 Though there are over three hundred registered kashrus symbols 
used by kosher supervision agencies (KSAs) in the United States,77 
several nationwide certifiers dominate the certification of manufac-
tured food. In some local markets, many rabbis and organizations 
compete for the ability to supervise and certify retailers who sell 
nonpackaged food—including restaurants, bakeries, caterers, and 
butcher shops.78 In other regions, one person or one organization mo-
nopolizes the supervision and certification process.79 The Section that 
follows explains how the symbols operate, which organizations play a 
significant role in shaping the supervision and certification land-
scape, what the certifiers actually do to ensure that the food is ko-
sher, and the role of competition among certifiers.  
(a)   Identifying Organizations and Symbols 
 Most KSAs have registered their trademarks with the United 
States Patent Office;80 the letter K, which appears on some products, 
cannot be trademarked and does not represent any specific KSA. The 
heavy-hitter in the supervision industry is the Kashruth Division of 
the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, a nonprofit 
organization that offers a host of Jewish communal services.81 This 
organization is better known by the name of its registered trade-
                                                                                                                      
 77. See Who’s Who in Kosher Supervision?, KASHRUS MAG., Nov. 1993, at 30, 30-42 
[hereinafter Who’s Who, Nov. 1993] (publishing a thirteen-page guide of 151 kosher super-
vision services worldwide); Who’s Who in Kosher Supervision?, KASHRUS MAG., Sept. 
1990, at 26, 26-32 (publishing a seven-page guide of the ninety-five acceptable Kosher su-
pervision services worldwide). The guide not only lacked the endorsement of any of the 
symbols, it provided the following disclaimer: “Some of the [supervision services] are not 
relied upon by most of the kosher world. Consult your rabbi for which symbols you should 
choose.” Id. 
 78. Berman, supra note 11, at 12.  
 79. Interviews with a KSA representative and market watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for in-
terview clarification see supra note 5).  
 80. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5). 
 81. Orthodox Union, About the Orthodox Union, at http://www.ou.org/about/ou.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2003). Some representative OU divisions are: the National Conference 
of Synagogue Youth, the Institute for Public Affairs, and the National Jewish Council for 
the Disabled. Id. For more information about the OU, see http://www.ou.org (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2003).  
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mark, the OU, which appears as .82 In the early 1920s, attempts to 
provide kosher endorsement were simply that—endorsements.83 
Some advertising agencies seeking Jewish consumers for the firms 
they represented would advertise that products sold were kosher.84 It 
was in this climate that the OU, which avoided entanglement with 
kashrus endorsement, first campaigned for kosher fraud statutes.85 
Recognizing that forcing kashrus conformity would be futile, though, 
the OU decided to provide supervision of kosher products as a non-
profit public service.86 
 The OU introduced its supervision and certification program in 
1924.87 Roughly seventy-five percent of the packaged kosher food 
found today on supermarket shelves is certified by the OU and bears 
its signature trademark.88 A market study approximated that nearly 
one half of the products on supermarket shelves in the northeastern 
United States are certified kosher.89 While these are loose estimates, 
it follows that in some regional markets, the OU certifies at least one 
third of the items one would find on any given shelf of a supermar-
ket! 
 Combined with the OU, three other KSAs dominate the supervi-
sion and certification industry. The three other largest certifiers are 
the Organized Kashrus Laboratories (OK), Star-K Kosher Certifica-
tion, and KOF-K Kosher Supervision. The OK began in 1935,90 the 
Star-K, based in Baltimore, in 1947,91 and the KOF-K, which oper-
                                                                                                                      
 82. EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 21. 
 83. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 184. 
 84. Id. at 184-85. 
 85. Id. at 185. 
 86. Id. Interestingly, the OU first planned to fund the supervision itself, rather than 
by charging clients, to avoid any conflict of interest. Id. Now, it might be more accurate to 
say that the kashruth division funds the majority of the other OU divisions. 
 87. Id. at 185-86. See also Orthodox Union Department of Public Relations, New 
Company and Plant Certifications Solidify Orthodox Union as Leader of the Kosher World 
(Jan. 17, 2001), at http://www.ou.org/oupr/2001/ouko01.htm [hereinafter Plant Certifica-
tions]. 
 88. Plant Certifications, supra note 87. OU Executive Rabbinic Coordinator Rabbi 
Moshe Elefant explained: 
“Anytime you find a product that has a certification other than the OU on it, 
chances are that at least three of the ingredients that went into the final prod-
uct were OU certified. For example, if you buy a chocolate chip cookie certified 
by another company, in all probability the vanilla flavoring, the chocolate chips, 
the raisins, the flour and the shortening have been certified by the OU.” 
Id. 
 89. Sue Fishkoff, Some Food for Thought: Kosher Is Latest US Fad, JERUSALEM POST, 
Jan. 26, 1993, at O7 (citing Menachem Lubinsky of Integrated Marketing Communica-
tions, which publishes the kosher trade newspaper for the kosher food industry). This or-
ganization is discussed infra at Section II.B.2.(b). 
 90. OK Kosher Certification, OK In Brief, at http://www.okkosher.com/Content. 
asp?ID=2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2003). 
 91. Avrom Pollak, A 25 Year Retrospective on Kashrus Kurrents, at http://www.star-
k.org/kashrus/kk-pres-kkretro.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003). See generally Star-K Kosher 
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ates from New Jersey, in 1968.92 The respective symbols these or-
ganizations use are , , and .93 According to some estimates, 
these organizations (the Big Four) certify ninety percent of the ko-
sher products on the market.94  
 Other certifiers tend to be more regionally limited in scope. For 
example, consumers in the Midwest are more likely to rely upon the 
trademark of the Chicago Rabbinical Council, which appears as the 
letters cRc in a triangle.95 North of the border, one would find the let-
ters COR in an oval, indicating the supervision and certification of 
the Kashrus Council of Canada.96 Some certification symbols show 
greater creativity in identifying their issuers; the Atlanta Kashruth 
Commission declares food kosher through the use of a peach contain-
ing the AKC initials.97  
 Because regional plants and distributors are constantly expanding 
to new markets, consumers in any of those locations may find pack-
aged products certified by any one of a great number of national, re-
gional, or local supervisors and certifiers. As a result, an educated 
consumer must either commit scores of symbols to memory, bring a 
list of the symbols to the grocery store along with his or her shopping 
list, or simply rely on a few of the more commonly known ones.  
 In addition, trademarks and other kosher certification symbols do 
not perform purely binary tasks delineating food as kosher (and 
through the absence of such symbols indicate nonkosher food). The 
certification symbol not only conveys the information about the KSA 
or individual certifying the food, but may also include more specific 
forms of notice to consumers. 
 Some of the more common pieces of information that organiza-
tions may provide include: The word pareve—occasionally identified 
with the letter p—can be used to identify the neutral category of food 
that is considered neither dairy nor meat.98 However since the letter 
P is more commonly used to depict food that is kosher for Passover, 
                                                                                                                      
Certification, Food Industry, at http://www.star-k.com/industry.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 
2003). 
 92. Kof-K Kosher Supervision, Home Page, at http://www.kof-k.com/index2.html (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2003). 
 93. Who’s Who, Nov. 1993, supra note 77, at 30. 
 94. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5). 
 95. Who’s Who, Nov. 1993, supra note 77, at 32 ( ). 
 96. Id. at 40 ( ); see also Kosher Supervision Guide, at http:// 
www.kashrusmagazine.com (last visited Dec. 9, 2003). 
 97. Atlanta Kashruth Commission, Kosher Symbols, at http://www.kosheratlanta.org/ 
koshersymbols.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) ( ). 
 98. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see su-
pra note 5).  
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many KSAs prefer to affix the pareve tag next to their mark to avoid 
confusion.99 KSAs may employ the letter D or word dairy to identify 
foods that are considered dairy under the laws of kashrus. Foods that 
contain meat products may have symbols that indicate meat as 
well.100 Some KSAs also use DE to identify a nondairy food product 
produced using equipment that has been previously utilized to manu-
facture dairy products.101 Currently, neither the tags themselves nor 
the nature of their usage is standardized between competing KSAs.  
(b)   What Certifiers Do 
 Certifying organizations are the eyes and ears of the kosher con-
sumer. They open up the otherwise closed food production and prepa-
ration processes, translating access into a stamp of approval. Yet, the 
certification process is not an easy one. Several steps must be taken 
from the time a manufacturer, restaurant, or bakery determines that 
it wants to have its food deemed kosher before it may retail kosher 
food to consumers. 
 At this point, it is important to identify a difference between food 
that is sold to consumers in packaged forms and food that is not. The 
former category refers to food typically found on supermarket 
shelves, and the various KSA symbols of kosher certification ordinar-
ily appear on the packaging or label. The latter includes food sold at 
bakeries, restaurants, and take-out stores. A letter of certification or 
an actual certificate is usually on the premises at the establishment 
that sells such kosher food. Many KSAs, including the Big Four, su-
pervise and certify both manufactured or processed food as well as 
food establishments.102 
 In most cases, the food manufacturer initiates the supervision and 
certification process.103 Sometimes, the desire for kosher certification 
is the response to direct appeals from consumers. In other instances, 
the manufacturer of a vertically integrated food product will ap-
proach another one lower on the food chain, so to speak, since it can-
not gain certification unless the earlier manufacturer does as well. 
Kosher certification proves profitable for many manufacturers be-
cause the increased sales offset any costs associated with the certifi-
                                                                                                                      
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. Food made with dairy equipment may not be eaten with a meat product. Some 
labels identify dairy that is cholov yisrael as opposed to stam. See Heinemann, supra note 
25.  
 102. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 103. Id. 
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cation process.104 On occasion, a certifier may initiate contact; the OU 
and many others, however, do not solicit clients.105  
 Once contact is made between certifier and manufacturer, the cer-
tifier must don its investigator hat to determine whether certification 
is a possibility. The manufacturer must supply detailed lists of all in-
gredients in a product (even those that are inert), all the cleaning 
agents used on machinery, all the steps of the manufacturing process 
(including suppliers), and all other products produced on the prem-
ises.106 Certification requires tracing the ingredients and identifying 
the original food source.107 Food and Drug Administration ingredient 
regulations are too lax for certifiers to be able to rely upon them be-
cause “artificial flavors” or “preservatives” are broad categories that 
require greater investigation.108 In addition, certifiers inspect hy-
giene, as insects can contaminate food, rendering it nonkosher.109 
 Once the investigation is complete, the certifier can either agree 
to supervise and certify the product, determine that certification is 
not possible, or require the manufacturer to make certain changes in 
ingredients or processes before certification.110 Assuming that certifi-
cation is a possibility, the certifier will enter into a contract with the 
manufacturer.111 This contract specifies that the manufacturer may 
not change ingredients, suppliers, or production processes without 
written consent of the certifier.112 In addition, the agreement spells 
out the amount of on-plant supervision that will be necessary.113 The 
                                                                                                                      
 104. See Y. Levy, “Kosher Brands” Have Added Value, Experts Say, KOSHER TODAY, 
Sept. 2001, at 1, available at http://www.koshertoday.com/kosher%20today%20archives/ 
2001/0901/All%20Text%20For%2092001.htm (last modified Dec. 28, 2001); see also Benja-
min N. Gutman, Ethical Eating: Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory Regime to Organic 
Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2362 (1999) (noting that “[t]he market for kosher food is . . . hot” 
with some estimating “the industry to be as large as $47 billion a year”); KosherQuest, Re-
liable Kosher Symbols, at http://www.kosherquest.org/html/Reliable_Kosher_Symbols. 
htm#KOSHER%20CERTIFICATION%20INTRODUCTION (last modified Mar. 5, 2001) 
(stating that “[t]he cost of certification to the manufacturer is minimal” within the Kosher 
Certification Introduction).  
 105. Interviews with various KSA representatives and a consumer watchdog (Fall 
2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). This does not mean that the KSAs do 
not advertise in any manner. The larger KSAs have booths at Kosherfest and the Kosher 
Trade Show, which may act as a form of “implied solicitation.”  
 106. EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 7. 
 107. Id. at 8. 
 108. The FDCA (and section 409 particularly) is aimed at general safety and the pre-
vention of adulterated food products. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 409, 
21 U.S.C. §§ 342-343 (2002). Thus, the imprecision of the regulations is related to its pri-
mary purpose. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the FDCA 
“is designed to ensure the safety of the food we eat by prohibiting the sale of food that is 
‘adulterated’”). 
 109. EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 8. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
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KSA will pay a qualified inspector to make continual visits to ensure 
that the manufacturer is complying with the original agreement, and 
that the food produced is kosher.114 
2. The Role of Competition and Policing Within the Certification 
Industry 
(a)   KSA Competition 
 KSAs charge fees in order to certify that food is kosher.115 Usually 
the size of the fee is a function of the cost of on-site inspection.116 At 
or below cost certification may be available when the facility being 
certified is a nonprofit, such as a nursing home or community center 
that provides meals.117 In rare instances, the fee may be a percentage 
of product profits.118 Though the largest organizations in the supervi-
sion and certification industry are often nonprofits and may be in-
volved in providing services beyond kosher food certification, the 
KSAs are still driven by the desire to run efficiently. 
 In some regional markets, competition between KSAs is fierce. 
For example, a restaurant owner in the New York metro area has 
more than a dozen choices of organizations or individuals ready to 
certify the kashrus of the food in her establishment. In contrast, par-
ticularly in regions with significantly fewer kosher consumers, a ko-
sher certifier may have either a real or virtual monopoly due to a 
lack of qualified and available individuals or organizations to serve 
as supervisors and certifiers. The monopoly rent extracted by the cer-
tifier raises the cost to kosher consumers in that market and can 
serve to deter local retailers from seeking kosher certification in the 
first place.119 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 9. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Regional monopolies only exist for establishments that prepare kosher food on the 
premises, which requires full-time local supervision. Stories, as well as rumors, abound 
about retailers and vendors who fail in attempts to obtain supervision and certification in 
regions with a small number of consumers who exclusively eat kosher. It is difficult to de-
termine whether these failures are simply a perfectly functioning market—that is, there is 
simply too little demand to support a kosher establishment—or due to anticompetitive as-
pects within the kosher food industry in those regions. It is not clear that there is any dif-
ference in the rate of supervision and certification of food establishments within different 
markets; rather in smaller communities, the failures might simply be more likely to be 
known. It should be noted that occasionally, Jewish business ethics law can limit options 
as well, since Jewish law forbids an individual from opening a competing business that is 
likely to destroy a competitor. AARON LEVINE, FREE ENTERPRISE AND JEWISH LAW: 
ASPECTS OF JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS 4-32 (Norman Lamm ed., 1980) (discussing monop-
oly and restraint of trade differences and also offering an economic analysis of the Jewish 
position on ruinous competition). 
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 At first glance, it would seem that consumers of kosher food would 
be better served by a plethora of competing KSAs that would compete 
not only on pricing but also on the kashrus standards used. Some 
consumers of kosher food might prefer to purchase food supervised 
by a KSA that offers greater (or less) scrutiny than another KSA 
would. The proliferation of KSAs might indicate that robust competi-
tion exists or at least is possible. At the same time, the continued 
domination of the Big Four suggests a different reality.  
 Consumers relying on the certification industry face two informa-
tion-based shortcomings: (1) they are limited by their ability to recall 
and process KSA symbols and background information, and (2) the 
KSAs do not release the exact standards they use in the certification 
process.120 The strength of certifying symbols and statements are in 
the notice they provide to consumers about who says the food is ko-
sher. The reputation of the certifier is at the core of this signaling 
device.  
 The market for supervision and certification has few formal barri-
ers to entry; nothing would prevent a group of law professors from 
registering a trademark (for example, the Casebook-K) and market-
ing this symbol to food manufacturers and retailers, seeking compen-
sation for the use of the mark on food labels and in store windows.121 
The value of certification, though, is directly related to the reliable 
reputation of the supervisor and certifier within the community of 
kosher consumers. And it is unlikely as a practical matter that this 
community of consumers would choose to rely on pronouncements by 
legal academics about the kosher quality or lack thereof of their food. 
Reputation is obtained not only through demonstrated truthfulness 
(one would think law professors might be a truthful group)122 but 
more importantly through accomplishments that demonstrate kash-
rus expertise, such as rabbinical ordination. It should be noted that 
the state, as an entity, is akin to a group of law professors—truthful 
at best with no relevant kashrus expertise—which might be why few 
have argued that the state should be involved in the supervision or 
certification of kosher foods.123  
 An inherent limitation on competition is that once the volume of 
certifiers is too numerous for consumers to recognize who is the crea-
tor of a particular certification, the method of signaling through cer-
                                                                                                                      
 120. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
 121. It is important to point out that while anyone may enter the supervision and certi-
fication business, kosher fraud laws might limit how any such KSA can use the term ko-
sher. 
 122. Compare the opinions of other law professors, students, etc. 
 123. But see the “Kosher From Florida” logo program sponsored by the Florida De-
partment of Agriculture and Consumer Services, available at http://www.fl-ag.com/kosher/ 
kosherff.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). 
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tification becomes meaningless. Rather than take the time to learn 
each new symbol and the distinctions between a picture of two tab-
lets with a K, a picture of a Torah with a K,124 or a picture of a case-
book with a K, some consumers have developed the short-cut of sim-
ply relying on the old reliables in the certification industry—namely 
the Big Four (OU, OK, Star-K, and KOF-K).125 
 Further complicating the equation is that while competition be-
tween certifiers occurs in the kashrus standards imposed, the actual 
standards are not divulged to consumers or even entirely to compet-
ing KSAs.126 At the same time, KSAs do not withhold the information 
either.127 That is, they will respond to specific inquiries by other 
KSAs and consumers seeking information about the standards used 
in the supervision and certification of a particular product.128 This 
odd dichotomy exists because the standards KSAs use often are cli-
ent-specific and depend on confidential information about the client 
(automated processes, supply sourcing and scheduling, etc.).129 Even 
internally, most KSAs do not create a written document defining the 
general standards used.130 
 One KSA may grant certification to someone employing a given 
production process, while another KSA might find the process objec-
tionable. Manufacturers and retailers may prefer lax kashrus stan-
dards that allow them to cut costs and do not require submission to 
quite as many future inspections; yet at the same time, they realize 
that many consumers and other KSAs prefer stricter standards. Due 
to vertical product integration, a manufacturer who wishes to sell his 
                                                                                                                      
 124. Observe the KSA marks printed below (these examples are actually larger than 
what would appear on a food label). The first is the “Scroll K,” the mark of the Vaad 
Hakashrus of Denver, which predominantly certifies products and establishments in the 
Rocky Mountain region. The Scroll K/Vaad Hakashrus of Denver, Homepage, at http:// 
www.arcpac.net/Vaad/default.html (updated Jan. 2000). The second is the “Sefer Torah-
Kasher” used by the Vaad Harabbonim of Flatbush, which mostly certifies products and 
establishments in New York City. KosherQuest, Reliable Kosher Symbols, at 
http://www.kosherquest.org/html/Reliable_Kosher_Symbols.htm (last modified Mar. 5, 
2001). The third is the “Tablet K,” issued by Rabbi Saffra of Lawrence, New York. KASHRUS 
MAGAZINE Online, 2001 Kosher Supervision Guide, at http://www.kashrusmagazine.com/ 
ksg/nyc/nyc_metro.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). While all three marks can be found on 
products marketed nationally, only the first two certifications are deemed reputable by 
mainstream Orthodox Jews. See KosherQuest, supra. The last is a mark for the “K-
asebook” certification that does not exist. 
    
 125. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumers (Fall 2002) (for in-
terview clarification see supra note 5).  
 126. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
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or her product to another manufacturer who is supervised by a 
stricter KSA must choose supervision and certification from a KSA 
that the stricter one will be able to rely on.131 This vertical integra-
tion problem also allows the larger KSAs, especially the Big Four, to 
pressure smaller KSAs to accept their standards or lose the business 
altogether.132  
 In an ideal market, a variety of standards would emerge as de-
termined by the level of strictness desired by consumers. Consumers 
would be informed as to which certifiers employ what standards and 
could tailor their purchases accordingly. In reality, due to the vertical 
integration problem and the fact that consumers lack adequate in-
formation about standards, some KSAs aim to cast the broadest net 
possible, creating a race to the strictest standard of kashrus.133 But 
other KSAs tend toward the opposite extreme: having very few stan-
dards at all. (Consumers are not likely to know the level of standards 
used simply by viewing a symbol declaring a food product kosher.) 
The world of certification can be divided on the binary metric of those 
KSAs accepted by the Jewish Orthodox mainstream (and acceptable 
to the Big Four) and those deemed not acceptable.134 The former 
category certifies the vast majority of kosher food products; the latter 
includes the vast majority of KSAs with registered symbols.135 To the 
extent KSAs release information about the standards they use, there 
do not appear to be many KSAs using in between standards of kash-
rus certification.136 
                                                                                                                      
 131. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Yes, Kosher Agencies Are Tougher, KOSHER TODAY, May 1997, available at 
http://www.koshertoday.com/kosher%20today%20archives/1997/0597/Yes,%20Kosher%20A
gencies%20Are%20Tougher.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2000). The author stated: 
Industry sources note that agencies have been toughening standards for the 
better part of the last decade. The Orthodox Union, OU, the nation’s largest 
certifier is leading the pack, but the organization’s leaders have repeatedly 
pointed out that the mass marketing of kosher and demands by consumers for 
tougher standards are the leading reasons for the changes.  
Id. 
 134. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5). One interviewee declared that around seventy 
percent of KSAs are not considered to be in the mainstream. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. Two possible exceptions are the Triangle K and Half-Moon K. Id. (The reputa-
bility of these certifiers is questioned within the Orthodox community for reasons that fo-
cus on details of kashrus that are well beyond the scope of this Article). Other jurisdictions, 
such as Israel and some European countries (like England), feature more diverse stan-
dards of kashrus certification. Id. The comparatively monolithic nature of kashrus certifi-
cation within the United States might be a result of how the presence of and appeal to 
secular law shaped the norm enforcement structure. Id. 
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(b)   Who Polices the Certification Industry? 
 Most of the certification industry relies on self-policing methods, 
with KSAs monitoring the usage of their own symbols. KSAs regu-
larly receive calls from other certifiers and consumers seeking infor-
mation about the status of food products that bear that KSA’s certifi-
cation symbol.137 Through this process, they can discover instances of 
unauthorized usage.138 Some KSAs even encourage consumers to ex-
amine food ingredients and report suspicious labeling to assist them 
in their monitoring endeavors.139 
 Some organizations then attempt to notify consumers of unau-
thorized trademark usages or products that are about to become de-
certified. The Big Four (and some others) provide these warnings in 
mailings and via their websites. Interested consumers can subscribe 
to receive email updates of “kosher advisories and alerts.”140 In addi-
tion, the KSAs may request that a company undertake an advertis-
ing campaign or engage in one themselves to notify customers about 
an unauthorized label, when they deem it to be necessary.141 
 Jewish religious law itself imposes several requirements on su-
pervisors and certifiers. As noted above, a certifier is prohibited from 
having a financial stake in the business he is certifying. This is 
meant to ensure that the certifier has less of an incentive to cut cor-
ners or engage in fraudulent behavior. In addition, KSAs, as com-
petitors in the market for certification, may not engage in predatory 
tactics aimed at destroying a competing certifier; prohibited behavior 
is defined differently (and perhaps more broadly) than it would be 
under the United States antitrust laws.142  
                                                                                                                      
 137. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id.  
 140. For example, to receive the OU’s Kosher Alerts go to http://www.ou.org/kosher/ 
alerts/default.htm and submit your e-mail address (last visited Oct. 12, 2003). Other forms 
of notification include the Eruv hotline, which is used to notify the local Orthodox commu-
nity. Rona S. Hirsch, Kosher Cooperation: A Local Kosher Certification Group Promises to 
Notify Non-Orthodox Leaders When Kosher Crises Surface, BALT. JEWISH TIMES, May 1, 
1998, at N1, available at 1998 WL 11325864. From there “local Orthodox rabbis . . . in-
formed their congregants of the kashrut mistake.” Id. Sometimes grocery stores display 
signs about a nonkosher item being sold. Id. 
 141. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 142. See LEVINE, supra note 119, at 21-32 (explaining the Jewish approach to ruinous 
competition and comparing it to economic theory); Chosen Mishpat, in SHULHAN ARUKH ch. 
156; RABBI CHAIM JACHTER, Hasagat Gevul: Economic Competition in Jewish Law, in 
GRAY MATTER 107 (2000), available at http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/hasagatgevul.html 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003). For an example of this law in practice, see Eugene L. Meyer, 
Royal Dragon Restaurant Breathing Fire; Kosher Chinese Establishment Blocks a Competi-
tor From Opening in Maryland, WASH. POST, April 25, 1991, at B03, available at 1991 WL 
2143423 (describing one kosher restaurant’s efforts to prevent a competitor from opening). 
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 There is no group certifying the certifiers,143 but several organiza-
tions that are not KSAs aim to help kosher consumers receive and 
process information about kashrus. These industry monitors work in 
conjunction with all KSAs and consumers in order to consolidate and 
distribute information about kosher certification, KSAs, alerts about 
unauthorized KSA symbol usages or impending decertification, and 
other items that might be of interest to consumers of kosher food. 
The two major revenue sources for the industry monitors are: (1) 
subscriptions by consumers (including consumer collectives like 
synagogues or religious schools) and industry players, and (2) adver-
tising by manufacturers and retailers of kosher food.144 This Section 
details some of these information monitoring and gathering organi-
zations; all operate in a similar fashion. While these are not the only 
organizations fulfilling this function, they have emerged as leaders 
among all watchdogs. 
 One such agency is the Kosher Information Bureau. The Bureau 
began in 1976 in order to serve the community of kosher consumers 
in Northern California. Though its strength is still in coverage of 
kashrus on the West Coast, the Bureau has since expanded its scope 
and offers a kosher internet database, a magazine offered to consum-
ers, and symbol cards depicting the trademarks of acceptable certifi-
ers. Among its services, the Bureau maintains a Kashrus reporting 
agency that is nonprofit and nonaffiliated.145 
 Another major industry monitor is KASHRUS MAGAZINE, a 
Brooklyn-based publication that has informed consumers of kosher 
food for over twenty years. The magazine includes consumer alerts, 
articles about understanding the laws of kashrus, and information 
about new kosher products and companies. Among its subscribers 
are individual consumers, KSA members, synagogues, and Jewish 
schools. It, too, has developed a comprehensive website to aid con-
sumers of kosher food.146 In order to increase its monitoring efforts, 
KASHRUS MAGAZINE pays a finder’s fee of $10 to anyone who 
brings to its attention an unknown KSA symbol or consumer alert.147 
This creates an incentive for consumer-monitoring efforts and pro-
                                                                                                                      
 143. This could be continued ad infinitum. 
 144. Interview with a consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 145. KosherQuest, Home Page, at http://www.kosherquest.com (last modified Sept. 22, 
2003). 
 146. KASHRUS MAGAZINE Online, Home Page, at http://www.kashrusmagazine.com 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003). 
 147. Be a Kashrus Watcher, KASHRUS MAG., Nov. 1993, at 6, 6. 
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duces dozens of responses every year.148 As a result, the magazine 
annually reports over two hundred mislabeled products.149  
 In addition to these organizations, several other websites attempt 
to gather information contained in various places on the internet. 
Scharf Associates operates www.kashrut.com, which touts itself as 
“The Premier Kosher Information Source on the Internet.”150 This 
site, much like the other two, compiles lists of consumer alerts and 
product updates, and prints articles about other information of inter-
est to the kosher consumer.   
 Last, Integrated Marketing Communications (IMC) is a market-
ing firm that specializes in community and ethnic programs.151 For 
fourteen years, IMC has sponsored Kosherfest, the International Ko-
sher Food and Foodservice Trade Show.152 In addition, IMC publishes 
Kosher Today, a monthly trade newspaper for the kosher food indus-
try,153 and Kosher Today Newsletter, a weekly newsletter.154 IMC’s 
main audience is not consumers; consumers comprise only 375 sub-
scribers, representing fewer than one percent of those subscribing to 
IMC’s publications.155 
C.   The Kosher Consumers 
 The laws of kashrus are laid out in Jewish biblical and rabbinical 
sources. The organizations and individuals who supervise and certify 
kosher food are all Jewish.156 In fact, Jews run all the independent 
agencies that monitor the certifiers and disseminate information.157 
                                                                                                                      
 148. E-mail from Rabbi Yosef Wikler, KASHRUS MAGAZINE editor, to the author 
(Feb. 18, 2003) (on file with author).  
 149. Id.  
 150. Kashrut.com, Home Page, at http://www.kashrut.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).  
 151. Menachem Lubinsky, IMC Marketing & Communications: Events & Exhibitions, 
at http://www.imcimpact.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). For information about IMC, see 
About Our Company, at http://www.imcimpact.com/history.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).  
On June 5, 2003, IMC entered into a strategic alliance with Diversified Business Commu-
nications, which involves Kosherfest and Kosher Today. See Press Release, Diversified 
Business Communications, Diversified Business Communications and IMC Strategic Alli-
ances Promises Growth for Kosherfest and Kosher Today (June 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.divbusiness.com/press_detail.asp?PRID=398 (last visited Oct. 23, 2003).   
 152. See Kosherfest 2003, at http://www.kosherfest.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
IMC marketed the first Kosher Food and Jewish Life Show in 1987. About Our Company, 
at http://www.imcimipact.com/history.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). The fifteenth edition 
of Kosherfest was scheduled for October 28-29, 2003. See Kosherfest 2003, supra.  
 153. See Kosher Today, Home Page, at http://www.koshertoday.com/ (last visited Nov. 
2, 2003).  
 154. Kosher Today Newsletter, at http://www.koshertodaymagazine.com/newsletter/ 
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).  
 155. Kosher Today, Magazine, at http://www.koshertodaymagazine.com/pdfs/Kosher 
_Today_mediakit.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
 156. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 157. Id.  
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So, who are the people who consume kosher food? If you answered 
Jewish people, then you would be only partially correct.158 In fact, the 
vast majority of kosher food is bought with no regard, and often no 
awareness, of the fact that it is kosher.159 In 2000, retail sales of all 
kosher certified products was approximately $150 billion.160 Consum-
ers intending to buy kosher products consisted of only $4.8 billion of 
that total amount (roughly three percent).  By 2001, this amount rose 
to $5.75 billion and by 2002 it was up to $6.65 billion.161 
 Modifying the question to who are the people that intentionally eat 
food that is kosher? does not change the answer. While most, if not 
all, of the people who purchase and eat kosher food exclusively are 
Jewish, Jews comprise a minority of people who choose to consume 
kosher food. The majority of the kosher food consumers can be bro-
ken down into several different categories: (1) those who observe die-
tary restrictions imposed by another religion, (2) those who suffer 
from food allergies, aversions, or intolerances, and (3) those who wish 
to keep vegetarian, vegan, other morally-based or health-
conscientious diets, or who believe that kosher food is a higher qual-
ity product.162 
 In some ways, the community of kosher consumers is dynamic. 
When the first kosher fraud statute was enacted in 1915,163 observant 
Jews accounted for nearly all consumers of kosher food.164 Over time, 
however, the consumer group grew more diverse due to changes in 
immigration patterns in the United States, growing consumer inter-
est in ethnic or specialized foods, and the general proliferation and 
success of the kosher supervision and certification process.165 
                                                                                                                      
 158. See Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1372 (N.J. 1992) 
(Stein, J., dissenting) (“[F]ewer than one-third of the consumers of kosher products are 
Jewish . . . .”); Kathy Stephenson, Keeping Kosher, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 19, 2002, at C1 
(reporting that twenty percent of consumers who buy kosher are Jewish); Elliot Zwiebach, 
Focusing on the Future, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Oct. 14, 2002, at 16 (noting in a profile of Al-
bertson’s Company that thirty percent of consumers who buy kosher are Jewish).  
 159. But see Steve Levin, New Products Abound at Kosherfest, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1997, at G5 (“Studies and scanner surveys have shown that when shop-
pers are faced with a choice between kosher and nonkosher products, they’ll choose kosher, 
whether it’s a subconscious or conscious choice.”). 
 160. Kosher Today, The Kosher Food Market in the U.S.A.: U.S. Sales of Food That Are 
Certified Kosher, at http://www.koshertoday.com/resourcecenter/charts/ retailsales.htm 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 161. The Kosher Food Market in the U.S.A.: Dollars Spent by Consumers Who Look for 
Kosher Food Products [hereinafter Dollars Spent], at http://www.koshertoday.com/resourcecenter/ 
charts/dollarsspentconsumr.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
 162. See Ran-Dav’s, 608 A.2d at 1356; Stephenson, supra note 158, at C1. 
 163. The Kosher Food Distributors Organization, The History of Kosher Food in the 
U.S.A., at http://www.koshertoday.com/history.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 164. Berman, supra note 11, at 15, 45. 
 165. See Fishkoff, supra note 89, at O7 (“In 1991, both Food and Wine and Rolling 
Stone magazines declared kosher the hottest new food trend of the decade.”).  
538  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:509 
 
 Market estimates report that Jews account for some thirty per-
cent of kosher food consumers. At the same time, some Jewish con-
sumers, who are a minority among all kosher consumers, almost ex-
clusively buy kosher and are particularly dependent on the kosher 
food industry.166 The other groups comprising the remaining seventy 
percent of kosher consumers do not exclusively purchase kosher food. 
Thus, they are not as readily identifiable, and the groups are some-
what transient. More importantly, they represent less market par-
ticipation than their numbers suggest. In 2002, of the $6.65 billion 
spent by kosher product consumers, Jewish consumers spent $3 bil-
lion, or forty-five percent.167 That is, while Jews represent fewer con-
sumers (since many of them only buy kosher food), they are buying 
disproportionately more kosher food than their numbers suggest.
 The reason consumers buy kosher food matters. It affects the cus-
tomer’s level of sophistication and knowledge about kashrus, the risk 
the consumer is willing to take with regard to mistake or fraud, the 
harm to the individual if nonkosher food is consumed, and the extent 
to which the consumer must depend on the kosher food industry as a 
whole. It also affects the likelihood that the individual will learn, ei-
ther before or after the fact, that nonkosher food can be mistakenly 
or fraudulently sold under the guise that it is kosher. This Section 
discusses the differences between the various individuals that form 
the pool of kosher consumers. 
1.   Observant Jews 
 As noted above, nearly one-third of the people who intentionally 
buy kosher food are Jewish. A fraction of these people work within 
the kosher food industry, as retailers, members of KSAs, or monitor-
ing agencies. 
 There is a great deal of variance within the Jewish population 
with regard to knowledge of the laws of kashrus. Even those who ac-
tively keep a kosher kitchen at home may not be experts on kashrus. 
The bulk of consumers who exclusively purchase and eat kosher food 
are the most sophisticated consumers within the entire industry.168 
While many might not understand the intricacies of kashrus, these 
kosher consumers know more of the basic rules, recognize more of 
the KSA symbols, and are more actively involved in seeking out in-
                                                                                                                      
 166. Interview with consumers and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for interview 
clarification see supra note 5).  
 167. Dollars Spent, supra note 161; Kosher Today, The Kosher Food Market in the 
U.S.A.: Scope and Size of 2002 Market Who Are Looking for Kosher Products, at http:// 
www.koshertoday.com/resourcecenter/charts/scopeandsize.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003) 
[hereinafter Scope and Size].  
 168. Interviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer watch-
dogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
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dustry information than any other group.169 They comprise the major-
ity of subscribers to those publications monitoring and gathering in-
formation and are the intended audience for the typical “kosher advi-
sories and alert.”170  
 Not all Jewish consumers of kosher food are Orthodox, but most 
are. Not only do intra-Orthodox debates exist, there also are differ-
ences between the standards of kashrus required by Orthodox and 
Conservative Judaism. Some may consider these differences negligi-
ble; yet these nuances are very important to the observant individ-
ual. And it is these types of differences that led to the current consti-
tutional assault on kosher fraud statutes. 
 Kashrus standards vary by individual, as well as the amount of 
risk a consumer is willing to assume. Even with the supervising and 
certifying industry, no one can be one hundred percent certain that 
food is kosher, but this does not seem to deter most consumers. 
Though they would not identify it as such, most Jewish consumers 
appear to have adopted a negligence standard of observance: it is for-
bidden to eat food that one knows to be or should know to be not ko-
sher.171 
 Though the laws of kashrus do not explicitly require this level of 
observance, they do provide an analogous rule concerning mistake 
and nullification. As noted above, one may not mix meat and dairy 
products. However, if some milk is mistakenly added to a pot cooking 
meat, then that amount is nullified if it is less than one-sixtieth of 
the overall contents.172 This exception applies in cases of genuine 
mistake, rather than intentional, reckless or negligent conduct.173 
The laws of kashrus allow for certain other leniencies in the after-
math of an honest mistake that is not the result of negligence, reck-
lessness, or intentional behavior.174 
                                                                                                                      
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 106. The principle behind this nullification 
is to prevent large quantities of food from being wasted by virtue of an accident. Interview 
with KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
 173. SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 24, at ch. 106. If the mixing is intentional, no 
amount can nullify the impermissible combination. Interview with KSA representative 
(Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
 174. For example, imagine that three consumers each buy and eat one hot dog, hon-
estly believing that the food is kosher. If it is later discovered that one of the three hot dogs 
was in fact not kosher, but no one can identify which hot dog it was, each consumer is per-
mitted to assume that she was in the majority and purchased one of the two kosher hot 
dogs, even though it is a forgone conclusion that this assumption will be wrong as applied 
to one of the three. However, if a consumer learns that there is a one in three chance that 
the food he or she purchased or will purchase is not kosher, he or she may not simply as-
sume to be in the kosher majority. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 
2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
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 It is difficult to quantify the amount of harm done to the relig-
iously motivated consumer who buys nonkosher food either by mis-
take or through fraud. In some cases, the consumer may have paid a 
premium for the food to be kosher, so at a minimum, the damage 
would be the extra amount paid for a good not received.175  
 Beyond this, if a consumer brings nonkosher food into her home, it 
can set off a chain of transference and absorption problems that lit-
erally can contaminate an entire kitchen.176 For the lucky consumer, 
it is merely time consuming to restore the affected pots, pans, appli-
ances, and utensils to their kosher status.177 The less fortunate may 
find that these items need to be replaced entirely.178 
 Given the chain reaction that discovery triggers, it may appear 
that the kosher consumer is better off not knowing that she has pur-
chased nonkosher food. After all, provided she has not been negli-
gent, how could she possibly be held responsible for the fact that she 
has consumed, and continues to consume, nonkosher food? Nonethe-
less, many observant Jews believe there is a spiritual harm that oc-
curs when they eat nonkosher food, even if it was by accident and 
undiscoverable.179 An unknowing violation that affects an entire 
kitchen perpetuates this non-quantifiable harm indefinitely. 
2.   Other Religious Minorities 
 Judaism is not the only religion that imposes dietary restrictions 
upon its adherents. Observant Muslims, Seventh-Day Adventist 
(SDA) church members, and Hindus, to name only a few religious 
groups, are required to adhere to dietary limitations as well.  
 SDA members abstain from “soul-defiling habits,” which are in-
terpreted to include some of the Old Testament dietary laws as well 
as other principles of healthful eating.180  
                                                                                                                      
 175. Cf. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(c) (2002) (prohibiting 
sale of adulterated or misbranded products).  
 176. See supra Section II.A.2.(b). 
 177. Actually, the luckiest consumer is the one permitted to rely on a leniency, such as 
the one described supra note 174.  
 178. This depends on the way the consumer used the food and the component material 
of the utensils. Interviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer 
watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). There are some after-
the-fact leniencies permitted within kashrus. Id. Thus, any party who encounters fraud or 
mistake should not rely on any kashrus primer (which presents rules that must be fol-
lowed as a primary matter), but rather should consult with a trusted rabbi to see what cor-
rective action must be taken. Id. 
 179. See LIPSCHUTZ, supra note 18, at 10 (“The Sages (Yoma 39b) teach that the eating 
of nonkosher food has a harmful effect on the Jewish soul, even if it was done unintention-
ally.”).  
 180. See Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Fundamental Beliefs: Christian Behavior, 
(“[W]e are to adopt the most healthful diet possible and abstain from the unclean foods 
identified in the Scriptures. Since alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and the irresponsible use of 
2004]                          KOSHER WITHOUT LAW 541 
 
 Islam requires that food be halal or permissible.181 There is some 
overlap between halal and kosher food.182 Similarly, Muslims may 
not eat pork or pork products, carnivorous animals, blood, insects, 
reptiles, and animal-based gelatin, fats, or rennet.183 Also, animals 
must be ritually slaughtered (zabiha) for meat to be halal; some Mus-
lims accept kosher slaughter while others do not.184  
 While kosher is a useful proxy, the realm of kosher food is both 
under and over inclusive for Muslims who wish to eat halal.185 For 
example, halal food may not contain alcohol;186 kosher food may. On 
the other hand, a meal is still halal where milk and meat are mixed 
together,187 whereas kashrus forbids this combination.  
                                                                                                                      
drugs and narcotics are harmful to our bodies, we are to abstain from them as well . . . . 
Eph. 5:1-21; Phil. 4:8; 2 Cor. 10:5; 6:14-7:1 . . . 1 Cor. 6:19, 20; 10:31; Lev. 11:1-47 . . . .”), at 
http://www.adventist.org/beliefs/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).  
 181. The Qur’an states: 
He hath only forbidden you dead meat, and blood, and the flesh of swine, and 
that on which any other name hath been invoked besides that of Allah. But if 
one is forced by necessity, without willful disobedience, nor transgressing due 
limits-then is he guiltless. For Allah is Oft-forgiving Most Merciful. 
THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN 2:173 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 10th ed. 1999).  
 182. For a discussion of the use of kosher proxy, see generally Stanley Sacharow, Is-
lamic Marketing Opportunities Opening Up for Converters, 69 PAPER, FILM & FOIL 
CONVERTER 58 (1995). 
 183. Muslims believe in the original version of the Old Testament. “Moslems seem to 
go straight for the Kosher section with the peace of mind that they will not consume pork 
products.” Supermarkets Stock Kosher Meats—Independent Butchers Cry Foul, KOSHER 
TODAY, Jan. 1998, available at http://www.koshertoday.com/kosher%20today%20archives/ 
1998/0198/Supermarkets%20Stock%20Kosher%20Meats-Independent%20Butchers%20 
Cry%20Foul.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2000).  
 184. For meat to be considered correctly zabiha or zibya, and therefore halal, the ani-
mal’s blood must be drained wholly and a prayer recitation at the time of slaughtering 
must be performed: “Bismillah, Allah Akbar,” which translates to “In the name of Allah, 
Allah is the Greatest.” “So eat of (meats) on which Allah’s name hath been pronounced, if 
ye have faith in His signs.” THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 181, at 6:118. 
Kosher slaughter requires a blessing, but not before each act. Some Muslims will rely on 
kosher slaughter; others won’t. Save pork, Muslims are allowed to eat the food of the “peo-
ple of the book” (Jews and Christians). Id. at 5:5. Furthermore, it is tradition for a Muslim 
guest not to ask his Muslim host if the meat that is being presented is zibya. If the meat is 
not, the “sin” is shifted to the Muslim serving the food, according to Muslim tradition (say-
ing of one of the companions of the prophet).  
 185. Kosher proxy usage is most common among Muslims in regions where the devel-
opment of kosher supervision and certification far exceeds available halal certification. In-
terviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer watchdogs (Fall 
2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). For example, some of Israel’s Muslim 
population relies on kosher certification. Id.  
 186. See THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 181, at 2:219 (“They ask thee 
[Muhammed] concerning wine and gambling. Say: ‘In them is great sin, and some, profit, 
for men; but the sin is greater than the profit.’”); id. at 4:43 (admonishing against praying 
while drunk). But see id. at 16:67 (“From the fruits of date-palms and grapes there derives 
a strong drink . . . a goodly provision.”). Alcohol can be used by Muslims for medical pur-
poses.  
 187. Cf. id. at 16:66 (describing how milk comes from a cow).  
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 There is halal certification of food, and it operates similarly to ko-
sher certification. The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America 
(IFANCA) is one such halal certifying agency (HCA) that operates in 
the United States, and its system of investigation and supervision 
parallels that of the OU and other KSAs.188 While halal certification 
is fairly established in many international markets, it lags far behind 
kosher supervision and certification within the United States. 
 The progress that Muslims seemed to have made towards estab-
lishing their own supervision and certification system in lieu of reli-
ance on the kosher proxy may have been slowed in the aftermath of 
September 11th. To create a system of supervision and certification, 
potential certifiers must be able to convince potential clients in the 
food industry that it would be profitable to have certification. Given 
the political climate within the United States, manufacturers and re-
tailers may fear this initiative because: (1) by obtaining halal certifi-
cation of their products, they may lose sales from other consumers 
who would view the certification as a signal that the producer har-
bors unwarranted sympathy toward Muslims, or (2) Muslims cannot 
be trusted to keep trade secrets learned through the supervision 
process confidential. It is not clear how likely it is that these con-
cerns exist and affect behavior. As long as hostility toward religious 
Muslims continues within the United States, the kosher proxy re-
mains a viable, if partial, option.189  
 The risk and harm stemming from consuming haram (and its 
proxy nonkosher) is similar to the harm within Judaism. Muslims 
must avoid questionable, or mashbooh (MAHS-booh), foods, which 
serves as a negligence standard of observance.190 The spiritual and 
contamination harms are analogous, though not identical. 
 Likewise, Hindus are not supposed to eat certain animal prod-
ucts—primarily, beef and beef-derivatives.191 A Hindu clearly could 
                                                                                                                      
 188. See Joe M. Regenstein & Carrie E. Regenstein, Looking In, KASHRUS MAG., 
Sept. 1990, at 46, 46 (reporting that IFANCA is considering a “circle M” and or a “crescent 
M”). 
 189. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure 
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 794 (1998) 
(“The day may come when a legislature’s failure to protect followers of Islam in adhering to 
their dietary restrictions amounts to unacceptable discrimination.”). 
 190. See SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, COMMENTARY ON HOLY QUR’AN 2:172, at 39 (“Both legal 
and illegal things are evident but in between them there are doubtful (unclear) things, and 
most of the people have no knowledge of them. So whoever saves himself from these un-
clear things, he saves his region and his honor.”). See generally Javid Aziz Awan, Islamic 
Food Laws-I: Philosophy of the Prohibition of Unlawful Foods, in 3 SCIENCE & TECHNOL-
OGY IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 151-65 (1998); Saud Twaigery & Diana Spillman, An Introduc-
tion to Moslem Dietary Laws, FOOD TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 1989, at 88-90.  
 191. The Hindu document Caraka-Samhita identifies beef as unwholesome, and there-
fore to be avoided by the majority of people. Louis E. Grivetti, Taboo-Hindu Dietary Codes, 
at http://teaching.ucdavis.edu/nut20/0050.htm (Feb. 23, 2002) (on file with author).  
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not eat kosher meat, but could rely on the kosher-pareve label to in-
dicate food that is free from all animal-sourced material. Recently, 
McDonald’s settled several class-action lawsuits that had been initi-
ated by a Hindu plaintiff contesting McDonald’s use of beef extract to 
flavor its french fries after publicizing that the fries were cooked in 
one hundred percent vegetable oil.192 The settlement demonstrated 
the overlap between kosher and other proxy users, like Hindus and 
vegetarians, as McDonald’s agreed to pay $10 million, the majority of 
which is to be distributed amongst Hindu, vegetarian, and kosher or-
ganizations.193 
3.   People with Food Allergies, Sensitivities and Intolerances 
 The number of people who suffer from food allergies, sensitivities, 
or intolerances is at an all-time high.  Clinically proven food allergies 
occur in up to eight percent of children under three years of age and 
one to two percent of adults.194 Common food sources for severe com-
plications include dairy, eggs, nuts, and shellfish.195 At least one in 
ten Americans has a lactase deficiency, which renders him or her lac-
tose intolerant.196 Current federal guidelines do not regulate use of 
the term dairy-free, and while the FDA does define the term non-
dairy, the definition permits foods with the nondairy label to contain 
milk proteins, such as casein.197 Individuals who react severely to 
milk products can suffer anaphylactic shock from even traces of dairy 
by-products, milk proteins, and derivatives (such as caseinate or 
whey), or the use of equipment that has been “contaminated” with 
other dairy products.198 One type of product notorious for presenting 
this problem is nondairy creamers.199 
 Kosher certification can help these consumers observe diets that 
respect their allergies, sensitivities, and intolerances. The pareve, 
dairy, and dairy equipment labels inform some of these consumers 
                                                                                                                      
 192. Richard Gibson, McDonald’s to Donate $10M in Hindu French Fry Case, DOW 
JONES NEWS SERV., June 4, 2002. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Hugh A. Sampson, Food Allergy. Part 1: Immunopathogenesis and Clinical Disor-
ders, 103 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 717, 717 (1999). 
 195. Id. at 720. 
 196. See NAT’L DIGESTIVE DISEASES INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, 
LACTOSE INTOLERANCE (NIH Publication No. 03-2751) (Mar. 2003) (stating that “[b]etween 
30 and 50 million Americans are lactose intolerant”), at http://digestive.niddk.nih.gov/ 
ddiseases/pubs/lactoseintolerance/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2004). 
 197. Steve L. Taylor & Martin J. Hahn, Dairy-Free and Non-Dairy: What Do These 
Terms Mean for Milk-Allergic Consumers?, The Food Allergy Resource and Research Pro-
gram, General Allergen Information Library, at http://www.farrp.org/articles/dairyfree.htm 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2003). 
 198. See James E. Gern et al., Brief Report, Allergic Reactions to Milk-Contaminated 
“Nondairy” Products, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 976, 976, 978 (1991). 
 199. EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 150. 
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what they need to know about a given product. At the same time, the 
kosher-pareve proxy is imperfect. There has been a handful of re-
ported cases of milk-allergic children reacting to food labeled as ko-
sher-pareve.200 As a result, the Food Allergy & Anaphylaxis Network 
does not recommend that individuals with milk allergies rely on ko-
sher-pareve labeling.201 
 KSAs also are growing increasingly aware that these consumers 
are relying on their information. Recently, some manufacturers and 
their KSAs have used labels to notify consumers of particular prod-
ucts that are otherwise pareve, but might be affected by the presence 
of airborne dairy dust particles that are too insignificant to render 
the product dairy under the laws of kashrus.202  
 While the degree of harm and risk taken by consumers varies 
with the severity of their food allergy (consumers’ sensitivity and in-
tolerance), members of this group may suffer the greatest physical 
damages if they consume food touted to be kosher-pareve that, in 
fact, is not.203  
4. People with Vegetarian, Vegan, Other Morally-Based, or 
Health-Conscientious Related Diets 
 Some kosher consumers wish to observe dietary restrictions that 
in some ways overlap with kashrus. The dairy, meat, and pareve la-
bels help diligent vegetarians and vegans avoid the difficult task of 
inspecting ingredients and accidentally consuming animal-sourced 
                                                                                                                      
 200. See S.O. Forman et al., Abstract, Cow’s Milk Related Anaphylaxis in a Known 
Milk Allergic Patient, 95 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 331, No. 763 (1995) (dis-
cussing the case of a four-year-old child who had an allergic episode from eating a pareve 
cookie from a local kosher bakery because the cookie improperly contained whey protein 
instead of soy protein); Gern et al., supra note 198, at 978 (describing three cases of milk-
allergic patients who had adverse reactions to pareve frozen dessert products); S.L. Hefle 
et al., Abstract, Anaphylactic Reactions to “Pareve”-Labeled Dark Chocolate in Milk-
Allergic Children, 103 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY S237, No. 911 (1999) (describ-
ing three cases of pareve dark-chocolate that contained milk residue); Richard T. Jones et 
al., Anaphylaxis in a Milk-Allergic Child After Ingestion of Milk-Contaminated Kosher-
Pareve-Labeled “Dairy-Free” Dessert, 68 ANNALS ALLERGY 223, 223-27 (1992) (describing 
the reaction of a two-year-old to pareve sorbet which contained milk residue); S. Mofidi et 
al., Abstract, Reactions to Food Products Labeled Dairy-Free: Quantity of Milk Contami-
nant, 105 J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY S138, No. 417 (2000). 
 201. Food Allergy & Anaphylaxis Network, Common Food Allergens, at 
http://www.foodallergy.org/allergens.html (last modified Sept. 21, 2003). 
 202. Interviews with KSA representatives and food scientists (Fall 2002) (for interview 
clarification see supra note 5). Some companies, including Barton’s chocolate (some of the 
products are certified OU pareve) and Ferrara Pan candy (some of which are certified ko-
sher-pareve by the St. Paul-based United Mehadrin Kosher), include warnings on their la-
bels that pareve food may contain traces of milk that would affect allergic individuals but 
are insignificant as a matter of Jewish law. Interviews with various KSA representatives 
(Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
 203. See Antony Ham Pong, Milk Allergy, at http://www.calgaryallergy.ca/Articles/ 
milkallergyhp.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003). 
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food. A vegetarian activist who relied on the kosher pareve label to 
avoid animal products was one of the intervenors in the constitu-
tional challenge to the New York kosher fraud statute.204 
 The consumers in this group vary greatly in their level of knowl-
edge, diligence, and devotion to the restrictive diet. Some of those 
who base their diets on moral principles may view consuming prohib-
ited foods as spiritually harmful, much like those who are motivated 
by the dictates of a particular religion.  
 Assuming spiritual reasons are not prevalent, those who follow 
dietary guidelines or consume higher quality foods in order to be 
more healthy and face a one-time instance of mistake or fraud suffer 
little beyond any premium paid for the desired food product. One 
consumer claimed to have kept kosher for over twenty years because, 
“[i]t’s fresh, it tastes good and hits the spot.”205 
 One big difference between this group and the group of relig-
iously-motivated consumers is that they do not seem to have adopted 
analogous rules of utensil transference and absorption. Mislabeled or 
fraudulently sold food will not contaminate others; a vegetarian who 
is sold a kosher veggie burger that includes traces of nonkosher meat 
suffers a one-time harm, not an ongoing one. 
III.   EXISTING SANCTIONS & ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES 
 Consumers face the threat that nonkosher or otherwise incor-
rectly identified kosher food will be sold under the guise that it is 
certified. Part of this threat comes from the possibility that products 
have been mislabeled or misidentified by accident or inadvertence. 
Manufacturers, retailers, certifiers, and independents may attempt 
to distribute recalls and notice when this occurs.206 
 One threat to consumers, though, has more nefarious roots. 
Manufacturers and retailers have a financial incentive to commit 
kosher fraud, or in other words, to sell food that they claim to be 
kosher, even though they either know or should know that it is not. 
Obtaining kosher certification bears costs. Though this cost is 
normally offset by the increased demand, a fraudulent party who 
                                                                                                                      
 204. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene as Defendants, Commack 
Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 96-0179) 
(proposed intervenor is “a vegetarian activist who relies on kosher labelling [sic] to indicate 
that food contains no animal products”), available at http://www.jlaw.com/Briefs 
/motion.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).  
 205. Laski, supra note 19 (quoting Art Moreno, a North Hollywood landscaper who is 
not Jewish). 
 206. See, e.g., Andrew Herrmann, Jews in ‘Panic’ over Counterfeit Kosher, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1987, at 3 (noting the recall of about 350,000 pounds of meat); The Illegal 
, at http://www.ou.org/publications/ja/5763/5763winter/kosherko.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 
2003). 
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proclaims to be selling kosher food can reap the rewards of this extra 
demand, without incurring the certification costs. Even if the market 
is competitive, the fraudulent actor has lowered his costs and can 
undercut market price. 
 The kosher meat market is particularly attractive for fraud. While 
the cost and price of most kosher food products are not significantly 
different than that of their nonkosher counter-parts, the cost and 
price of kosher meat and poultry is significantly higher on average.207 
The processes of draining the blood, soaking and salting the meat, 
and the inability to detect animals with internal blemishes (which 
renders them nonkosher) in advance of slaughtering, all add to the 
cost of the product.208 These costs are passed along to the kosher con-
sumers, who willingly pay a premium for the benefit of purchasing 
kosher meat. A fraudulent meat processor or butcher can pocket this 
kosher premium without incurring the costs that kashrus necessarily 
imposes.  
 For many years, kosher consumers have been concerned about 
fraud within the kosher food industry. Kosher fraud in America is 
nearly as old as the nation itself. During the 18th century, the 
Shearith Israel Congregation employed the only slaughterer of ko-
sher meat in New York.209 The Congregation profited from shipping 
its kosher meat, accompanied by certificates and labeled with the 
Congregation’s seal, throughout the Americas.210 In 1796 and 1805, 
two unscrupulous meat vendors were found to have affixed the Con-
gregation’s seal on meat that was not kosher.211  
 For the past eighty years, consumers have been protected by a 
multitiered enforcement scheme that aims to deter fraud. The three 
tiers in this system are nonlegal activity (private ordering), private 
law (for example, consumers may pursue common law remedies in 
contract or tort, KSAs bring suits in trademark infringement), and 
public law (for example, civil and criminal statutes authorize state 
and local officials to actively investigate or prosecute fraudulent ac-
                                                                                                                      
 207. In the Shelat example, discussed infra Section IV.B.1.(c)i., the Illinois attorney 
general’s office followed up a claim of nonritually slaughtered chicken being sold as kosher. 
Herrmann, supra note 206, at 3. The company allegedly “[bought] the processed fowl for 
about 40 cents a pound . . . then sold it as kosher for about $2.25 a pound.” Id.; see also 
Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 954 (stating that “[m]erchants can sell kosher products for up 
to three times the price of a similar nonkosher one.”).  
 208. Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 954 (noting that kosher fraud has historically been a 
problem in the United States).  
 209. JEREMIAH J. BERMAN, SHEHITAH: A STUDY IN THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LIFE OF 
THE JEWISH PEOPLE 275 (1941). The estimated Jewish population was 1000-3000 during 
the Revolutionary Era. AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y, AMERICAN JEWISH DESK REFERENCE 35 
(1999) [hereinafter AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y]. 
 210. BERMAN, supra note 209, at 280. 
 211. Id. at 284-85. 
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tors). This Section lays out the three tiers of enforcement that oper-
ate to deter fraud in the kosher food industry.  
A.   Tier One Enforcement: Reputation-Based Nonlegal Sanctions 
 The power of reputation mechanisms has been documented both 
within the Orthodox Jewish community212 as well as in other con-
texts.213 Within the kosher food industry, it is imperative that a food 
manufacturer or retailer maintains a reputation as someone who sells 
food that is unquestionably kosher. The same characteristics that cre-
ate the demand for the certification industry—the lack of access to the 
process, the difficulty in understanding the laws of kashrus, etc.—
create a market that is essentially dependent on the good name or 
reputation of the manufacturer, vendor, and certifier. 
 As more than one industry monitor and participant have explained, 
perpetrators of fraud (as opposed to mistake) do not get a second 
chance.214 Once they are caught, they will lose their business as a 
manufacturer or retailer of kosher food permanently.215 To give an ex-
ample, restaurant XYZ was certified by one of the Big Four.216 The 
owners of XYZ tried to hide the fact that it was intentionally buying 
nonkosher food in order to prepare it and serve it to consumers.217 The 
KSA inspector discovered the fraud, and the KSA immediately de-
certified the restaurant.218 Since the restaurant’s reputation was de-
stroyed, no KSA wanted to risk its own reputation by agreeing to cer-
tify the known fraud perpetrator.219 Information about the fraud spread 
                                                                                                                      
 212. See Bernstein, supra note 3; Richman, supra note 3. 
 213. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
841, 874-84 (1999) (discussing reputation of lenders within immigrant communities); Jason 
Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence from Fed-
eral Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 59-60 (2002) (comparing effects of repeat-play 
attorneys, who have strong reputation-based incentives for cooperation, with desires of 
one-shot clients); Toshihiro Matsumura & Marc Ryser, Revelation of Private Information 
About Unpaid Notes in the Trade Credit Bill System in Japan, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 166-
68 (1995) (describing other studies demonstrating reputation mechanisms and focusing on 
the information collection mechanisms used by creditors in Japan to harm the reputation 
of parties who default); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dys-
functional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2451 (2000) (exploring commercial trans-
actions in Eastern Europe and Vietnam and concluding that courts and reputation do sub-
stitute one for the other). 
 214. While this is only one story, there are others like it, where once the fraud is dis-
covered, usually by the supervising KSA, the effects on reputation destroy the business. In-
terviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for inter-
view clarification see supra note 5).  
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
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rapidly among kosher consumers.220 Thereafter, the business immedi-
ately failed. 221 
B.   Tier Two Enforcement: Private Law Remedies 
1.   Consumer Remedies 
 Consumers who discover that they are victims of kosher fraud can 
sue the violating party under theories of contract or tort. For example, 
a consumer can sue the perpetrator for breach of contract for kosher 
food on the grounds that the kosher nature of the food was a material 
component of the deal.222 A consumer could also sue in tort for misrep-
resentation of a material fact.223 The consumer could seek a damage 
award that would cover the amount of harm she suffered.224  
 Traditional damages may serve some kosher consumers better than 
others. Those consumers who suffer from food allergies, insensitivities, 
and intolerances are likely to fair the best if they can bring a successful 
claim for breach of contract, breach of duty, or misrepresentation.225 
                                                                                                                      
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.   
 222. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159-173 (1979) (on misrepresenta-
tion generally). Section 162 reads: 
(1) A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his assertion to in-
duce a party to manifest his assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that 
the assertion is not in accord with the facts, or (b) does not have the confidence 
that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion, or (c) knows that he does 
not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion. (2) A misrepre-
sentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to 
manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the 
recipient to do so. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: WHEN A MISREPRESENTATION IS FRAUDULENT OR 
MATERIAL § 162 (1979). 
 223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 (1997) (“One en-
gaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who, in connection with 
the sale of a product, makes a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of ma-
terial fact concerning the product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the misrepresentation.”).  
 224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN GENERAL § 
347 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 549, 552B, 552C cmt. f (1977). The dam-
ages for fraudulent, negligent, or even mistaken misrepresentation within the context of a 
sale include restitution damages, “the difference between the value of what [the plaintiff] 
parted with and the value of what he has received and still retains[,]” for reliance on mis-
representation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: MISREPRESENTATION IN SALE, RENTAL 
OR EXCHANGE TRANSACTION § 552C cmt. f (1977). 
 225. Cf. Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp. 235 F.2d 893, 899-900 (10th Cir. 1956) (Murrah, 
J., concurring) (discussing competing theories on whether proof that a small segment of the 
population may be allergic to a product imposes duty to warn); Kennedy v. Baxter Health-
care Corp., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 745 (Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to certify class of latex-
allergic plaintiffs given individual differences among proposed members); Briggs v. Nat’l 
Indus., 207 P.2d 110, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (holding injuries from allergic reactions to 
ordinary products not compensable); Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 235 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 
1951) (holding injuries from allergic reactions to ordinary products not compensable as a 
matter of law). 
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Damage awards can reimburse medical costs and compensate for pain 
and suffering as well as emotional distress that accompanies the obvi-
ous physical harm.226 
 There is little guidance of what award would be appropriate for 
other types of kosher consumers.227 Courts typically do not compensate 
adequately, or sometimes at all, for emotional distress or spiritual 
harms that occur independent of physical damage.228 In addition, it is 
unclear if consumers can be compensated for the costs associated with 
fixing or replacing utensils that have been contaminated by transfer-
ence or absorption. Although these costs can be seen as foreseeable 
consequential damages caused by the sale of nonkosher food to kosher 
consumers, they are not damages that courts regularly award.229 Some 
judges would simply order that the customer is entitled to get her 
money back to be made whole again.230 Even if courts properly compen-
sated the individual consumer, the cost of the suit itself could often 
outweigh any damages available. However, kosher consumers could re-
quest punitive damages in the case of a repeat or particularly devious 
                                                                                                                      
 226. See Cooper v. Borden, Inc., 709 So. 2d 878, 883 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding 
trial court award of $1500 to penicillin-allergic plaintiff who purchased milk that improp-
erly contained penicillin).  
 227. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 683 
n.74 (1985) (suggesting that the correct damage measure for resulting consumer injuries is 
the amount the consumer would have been willing to pay ahead of time knowing that non-
kosher food might be substituted and further suggesting that the answer often is that no 
amount would be enough). 
 228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: LOSS DUE TO EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE § 
353 (1979) (“Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also 
caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional 
disturbance was a particularly likely result.”). For a discussion suggesting that serious in-
jury is likely to occur, see Jan Crawford, 2 Firms Fined $250,000 for False Kosher Labels, 
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 1987, at 2 (quoting an attorney for the OU who noted that kosher fraud 
“tamper[s] not only with the religions, but the emotional and moral convictions of a segment of 
the population”). 
 229. For example, most of the cases that involve the awarding of damages for religious 
or spiritual harms occur in the context of the government violating some free exercise 
right. See Abdul Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1999) (de-
claring that Muslim prisoner who was unable to exercise his religion during Ramadan can 
collect more than nominal damages, but vacating the award of $9,000 as too abstract); Nol-
ley v. County of Erie, 802 F. Supp. 898, 905 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (awarding $10 in presumed 
damages per session to an inmate who was improperly confined in segregation and denied 
access to religious services for thirty-five weeks). Compare one remarkable case where sev-
eral plaintiffs sued a televangelist and his church alleging fraud, conspiracy, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. In Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. 
1996), despite recognizing the validity of the plaintiffs’ claim, the Texas Supreme Court re-
fused to award damages for allegedly unanswered prayers. The court noted that “[b]ecause 
it is beyond judicial inquiry whether plaintiffs’ prayers would have been answered had 
Tilton fulfilled his promises to read, touch, and pray over their tithes and prayer requests, 
plaintiffs’ damages, if any, may not include compensation for their allegedly unanswered 
prayers.” Id. at 675. 
 230. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 680 (noting that in a fraud case, the usual measure of 
damages is the actual amount of plaintiff’s loss). 
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offender. There is also the possibility of kosher consumers joining forces 
to bring a class action against a party who has defrauded many.  
2.   KSA Remedies 
 A KSA who finds that a fraud perpetrator is engaging in an unau-
thorized usage of its symbol can bring a cause of action against that 
party under trademark law.231 Treble damages and attorneys’ fees are 
available for willful infringement or the counterfeit of marks.232 The or-
ganization would be able to obtain an injunction to prevent future un-
authorized usages as well as damages to compensate for any harm 
from the infringement.233 Some courts would allow the KSA to employ 
theories of restitution that would enable it to collect an amount based 
upon the profits of the infringing party.234 
C.   Tier Three Enforcement: Consumer Protection Laws 
1.   Laws of General Application 
 Most states have consumer protection statutes that are broad 
enough to cover many instances of the fraudulent sale of nonkosher 
food, even though they do not identify kosher fraud specifically.235 For 
example, most states have deceptive business trade acts that prohibit 
false advertising and misrepresentation.236 This includes the behavior 
of parties who recklessly or willfully offer food for sale as kosher when 
it is not. Prosecution occurs on the state level, and the power is vested 
in the attorney general’s office. Despite the existence of consumer pro-
                                                                                                                      
 231. Certification marks are protected under 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002). 
 232. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)-(b) (2002). If the damages are either inadequate or excessive, 
the court may affix “such sum as the court shall find to be just.” Id. at § 1117(a). This stat-
ute provides statutory damages for counterfeit marks as well. Id. at § 1117(d). 
 233. See generally Donel Corp. v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 
8377, 2001 WL 228364 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 2001) (permanently enjoining the KOA from using 
the letter K inside of a circle). 
 234. See Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 
749, 752 (2d Cir. 1996); Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 
1994); X-It Prods., LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 494, 528 
(E.D. Va. 2002). 
 235. For a list of federal statutes relating to the consumer protection mission, visit the 
Federal Trade Commission home page, at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.htm (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2003). For a collection of state consumer protection laws, see Michelle L. Evans, 
Annotation, Who Is a “Consumer” Entitled to Protection of State Deceptive Trade Practice 
and Consumer Protection Acts, 63 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1998).  
 236. Deceptive business practices include the sale of mislabeled commodities. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 13A-9-41 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.710 (Michie 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 906 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-50 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-870 (Michie 
2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517.020 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 901 (West 2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 570.140 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-318 
(2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:6 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-7 (West 2003); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §39-14-127 (2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §32.42 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-507 (2003). 
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tection statutes of general application, there are detailed federal and 
state consumer protection statutes regulating various industries, in-
cluding food, cars, drugs, toys, and the like. 
2.   The Kosher Fraud Statutes 
 Kosher fraud statutes represent a specialized form of consumer pro-
tection law aimed at protecting consumers in the kosher food industry. 
Twenty-two states have enacted kosher fraud laws.237 This Section 
briefly details where these laws came from, how they operate, and why 
they are under judicial attack. 
(a)   The History 
 The kosher fraud statute developed in New York.238 The first legisla-
tive enactment directed at the kosher food industry occurred in the 
early 19th century, when Congregation Shearith Israel replaced its 
shochet.239 The old shochet continued to sell kosher meat without the 
Congregation’s authorization, and the Congregation was able to con-
vince the city council to pass a resolution limiting the right to sell ko-
sher meat to the trustees of the Congregation.240 It appears that this 
                                                                                                                      
 237. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-941 to –942 (2003) (“Kosher Foods”); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 20-57-401 (Michie 2003) (“Kosher Foods”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 383b-c (Deering 
2003) (listing kosher meats and meat preparations, sale and labeling regulations, false re-
presentations, punishment, defining kosher); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-317 (West 2003) 
(“Fraudulent sale of kosher meat, meat products, and other food”); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-
330 (2002) (“Kosher Foods”); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 645/1-2 (West 2003) (“Kosher Food 
Act”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.850 (Banks-Baldwin 2002) (“Kosher Meats or Meat Pre-
parations”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:608.2 (West 2003) (“Unlawful practices in sale of 
kosher food; penalty”); MD. CODE ANN. COMM. LAW § 14-901 to -907 (“Kosher Products”) 
(disclosure statute); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, § 156 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (listing kosher food, 
labeling, sale and display, and civil penalties); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.297e (2003) (“Kos-
her food products; definition [of kosher]”; fraudulent sale and marking of foods; investiga-
tion; penalty); MINN. STAT. §§ 31.651–661 (2002) (“Kosher Foods”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
196.165 (West 2003) (“Falsely representing food to be kosher prohibited, penalty—kosher 
defined”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-7.3 to -7.4 (West 2003) (False representation by oral or 
written statement to make person believe nonkosher food or food product is kosher; pre-
sumptive evidence; defense); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-a to -i (Gould 2003) (“Sale of 
kosher meat and meat preparations, kosher articles of food and food products”); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1329.29 (Anderson 2003) (“Misrepresentation in sale of kosher foods”; war-
ning before prosecution); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107.1 (West 2003) (“Deception rela-
ting to kosher food products”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-16-1 (2002) (“Violations or deception as 
to religious dietary laws by dealers in meats”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.821 to 
.826 (Vernon 2003) (“Labeling, Advertising, and Sale of Kosher Foods”); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-236 (Michie 2003) (“Regulating sale of kosher meat and meat preparations”); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.90.010 to .90.900 (West 2003) (“Kosher Food Products”); WIS. STAT. 
§ 97.56 (2002) (“Kosher meat”). However, Tennessee and the District of Columbia have re-
pealed such kosher fraud statutes. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-5204 to –5206 (2003) (repealed 
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-6-101 to –6-102 (2003) (repealed 1983). 
 238. BERMAN, supra note 209, at 286. 
 239. Id. at 285-86. 
 240. Id. at 286. 
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resolution was not aimed at protecting kosher consumers but rather 
kosher monopolists who did not want to face the competition of another 
kosher meat source.241 
 It was not until one hundred years later, though, that the modern 
kosher fraud statute came to be. During the early 20th century, as 
technological advances began to exert influence on the food industry, 
Jewish immigration exploded and kosher fraud became an increasing 
problem.242 Immigrants, unfamiliar with the language and accustomed 
to insular Eastern-European communities, trusted that food advertised 
as kosher met the standards of kashrus.243 In the wake of this climate, 
kosher laws were written into the civil or criminal codes of many 
states.244 One main force behind the campaign to enact the kosher 
fraud statutes was the Union of the Orthodox Jewish Congregations of 
America, the OU, before it entered the supervision and certification 
business.245 
(b)   The Legal Content 
 Due to their common origin, the New York kosher fraud law,246 most 
kosher fraud statutes operate in a similar fashion and have identical or 
similar provisions. The statutes define what they mean by kosher, in-
clude steps that must be taken to ensure that consumers are not mis-
led, identify the intent required for a violation, and proscribe an en-
forcement mechanism.247 As an organizational matter, some of these 
statutes appear in state criminal codes, while others are part of the 
                                                                                                                      
 241. See id. 
 242. 1900-1920 represents the largest wave of Jewish immigration to the United 
States. AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y, supra note 209, at 35. In 1890, the Jewish population in 
the United States was slightly less than one half of a million people. Id. By 1900, this 
amount doubled to approximately 1 million, and by the 1920s, when the problem of kosher 
fraud reared its ugly head, the Jewish population had more than tripled to an estimate of 
3.5 million people. Id. For a thorough discussion of the history of the New York kosher 
fraud statute, see HAROLD P. GASTWIRT, FRAUD, CORRUPTION, AND HOLINESS: THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER THE SUPERVISION OF JEWISH DIETARY PRACTICE IN NEW YORK CITY 
1881-1940, at 124-46 (1974). 
 243. GASTWIRT, supra note 242, at 22.  
 244. Before 1950, statutes were enacted in states such as: New York (1915), Massachu-
setts (1929), Pennsylvania (1929), Wisconsin (1935), Rhode Island (1937), and Michigan 
(1939). See FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at 65. While the list of states with kosher fraud laws 
includes the states with some of the largest Jewish populations, such as New York and 
California, a few of the states with these laws have incredibly small Jewish populations. 
See Jim Schwartz & Jeffrey Scheckner, Jewish Population in the United States, 2001, in 
102 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK 247, app. tbl. 1 at 254-55 (David Singer & Lawrence 
Grossman eds., 2002), available at American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, Jewish Vir-
tual Library, Jewish Population of the United States by State, http://www.us-israel.org/ 
jsource/US-Israel/usjewpop.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). For example, the 1700 Jews in 
Arkansas represent a mere 0.1 % of Arkansas’s population. Id. 
 245. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 185. 
 246. See supra Section III.C.2.(a). 
 247. See statutes cited supra note 237. 
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state codes on public health and welfare, food regulation, or commerce 
and trade.248 
 The kosher fraud statutes define kosher by referring to the stan-
dards of kashrus in some way. The Illinois Kosher Food Act, for exam-
ple, defines kosher as food that is “sanctioned by the Code of Jewish 
Laws.”249 In this regard, Illinois is an outlier. The New York kosher 
fraud law defines kosher by referencing “the orthodox Hebrew religious 
requirements”250 and nearly all the other states with such laws use the 
same or similar phrasing.251  
 Many of the statutes not only prohibit nonkosher food falsely repre-
sented to be kosher but also impose affirmative duties on vendors who 
sell kosher food.252 These tasks include registering the name and ad-
dress of the KSA and posting signs differentiating between kosher and 
nonkosher meat, when both products are sold.253 
 Most kosher fraud statutes require specific intent to defraud, or 
knowledge.254 Yet, the New York statute also states that, “[p]ossession 
of non-kosher meat and food, in any place of business advertising the 
sale of kosher meat and food only, is presumptive evidence” that the 
vendor sells nonkosher food with intent to defraud.255 An old New Jer-
sey law contained a similar provision.256 The penalty for violating the 
                                                                                                                      
 248. The California, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia 
kosher fraud statutes appear in criminal codes; the Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, and Texas 
statutes are organized with other laws of commerce and trade; Minnesota and New York 
feature statutes that fall under the department of agriculture; and the remaining statutes 
(Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Washington) 
are grouped with public health laws. See id. 
 249. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 645/1 (West 2003). 
 250. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-a (Gould 2003). 
 251. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-57-401(1) (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 383b 
(Deering 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-317(a) (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-
330(2) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.850(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:608.2(1) (West 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94 § 156(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2003); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.297e(1) (2003); MINN. STAT. § 31.651(1) (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
196.165 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.29(A)(1) (Anderson 2003) (“Orthodox 
Hebrew religious requirements”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-236 (Michie 2003). For variations, 
see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107.1(b) (West 2003) (“the requisites of traditional Jewish 
law”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-16-1(1) (2002) (“the traditional or orthodox Hebrew religious re-
quirements and dietary laws”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.821(1) (Vernon 2003) 
(“orthodox Jewish religious requirements”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.90.010(2) (West 
2003) (“requisites of traditional Jewish dietary law”); WIS. STAT. § 97.56(2)(a) (2002) (“or-
thodox Hebrew religious requirements”). 
 252. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 97.56(2)(c) (West 2002) (prohibiting the sale of both 
kosher and nonkosher food unless there are signs stating, “in block letters at least 4 inches 
in height, ‘Kosher and Nonkosher Meat Sold Here’”). This requirement is copied directly 
from the New York kosher fraud statute. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-a(1) (Gould 
2003). 
 253. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-a(1)-g (Gould 2003). 
 254. See statutes cited supra note 237. See generally Masoudi, supra note 11, at 672-73. 
 255. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-a(1) (Gould 2003). 
 256. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 45A-21.6 (2003) (same title and section as current ver-
sion). 
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statutes can be fines or even imprisonment.257 Some statutory schemes 
vest the power to inspect whether food retailers are complying with the 
law in the attorney general, a commission, or a special agency.258 In the 
few places such a commission exists, local rabbis often serve as offi-
cials.259  
(c)   The Constitutional Question 
 The first constitutional challenge to a kosher fraud statute was not 
brought on First Amendment grounds, but rather on the grounds that 
the term kosher was impermissibly vague.260 In Hygrade, the Supreme 
Court upheld the New York kosher fraud statute, finding that kosher 
was not so indeterminate as to present a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.261 Hygrade did not deal with the Establishment Clause, since it 
predated the application of the First Amendment to states. 
 Over the last ten years, three courts—the Second Circuit,262 Fourth 
Circuit,263 and New Jersey Supreme Court264—have invalidated kosher 
fraud statutes on Establishment Clause grounds. Most notably, 
though, was the Second Circuit’s decision, in May 2002, to strike down 
the New York state kosher fraud law, the law that served as the model 
for the rest of the states.265 Just as the New Jersey Supreme Court and 
Fourth Circuit had previously held, the Second Circuit in Commack in-
validated New York’s kosher fraud statute because it had the primary 
effect of advancing religion and creating excessive government in-
                                                                                                                      
 257. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 645/2 (West 2003) (violation of the act consti-
tutes either a Class C or a Class A misdemeanor). The penalties vary from state to state. 
Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-57-401(3) (Michie 2003) (violator “is guilty of a misde-
meanor and punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by im-
prisonment of not less than thirty (30) days or not more than six (6) months”) with MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 156(3)(h) (West 2003) (“civil penalty or fine of not less than five 
hundred dollars and not more than two thousand dollars”). The New Jersey statute that 
was invalidated set a maximum fine of $2000 for a first offense and up to $5000 for subse-
quent offenses. Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.J. 1992). It 
also permitted injunctions against offenders. See id. Not every statute specifically desig-
nates the penalty for a violation. See Greenawalt, supra note 189, at 787-88 (noting that 
“[m]uch enforcement of kosher requirements is private”); Lindsay, supra note 11, at 346.  
 258. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 156(3)(g) (West 2003) (granting the at-
torney general the power to investigate during business hours); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
750.297(e)(5) (2003) (granting the department of agriculture the power to “investigate, in-
spect and supervise”); Greenawalt, supra note 189, at 788 (noting that a “state could un-
dertake direct enforcement with inspections”). 
 259. See infra note 273. See generally Lindsay, supra note 11, at 343. 
 260. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 501 (1925).  
 261. Id. at 501-02; see also Erlich v. Mun. Court, 360 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1961) (upholding 
the California kosher fraud statute against a void for vagueness challenge). 
 262. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1250 (2003).  
 263. Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 264. Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992). 
 265. See Commack, 294 F.3d at 432. 
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volvement in religious matters,266 thus violating the second and third 
prongs of the Lemon test.267 
 The facts of all three cases demonstrate the wide array of behavior 
captured by the kosher fraud laws and shed light on the reason the 
laws were invalidated. In Barghout, the vendor, who did not obtain any 
private KSA certification, cooked kosher hot dogs alongside nonkosher 
hot dogs on the same grill.268 This practice would strike any sophisti-
cated kosher consumer as problematic due to the rules of transference 
and absorption, while it might not disturb some proxy-using kosher 
consumers at all.269 The Commack plaintiffs obtained private supervi-
sion and certification from a Conservative rabbi (Rabbi Berman), who 
asserted that the procedures the state alleged to be violations of the 
law (some technical rules of soaking/salting meat) were permissible 
under Jewish law.270 And in Ran-Dav’s, the plaintiff was supervised 
and certified by a private KSA (“Orthodox Kashruth Supervision Ser-
vices”271), and Rabbi Harry Cohen, the KSA administrator who regu-
larly inspected the business at least twice a week unannounced, main-
tained that the business establishment was kosher despite the alleged 
violations.272  
 The contentious parts of the statutes in all three cases were that the 
states or local governments specifically employed rabbis as state-
appointed officials,273 and that the kosher fraud law expressly defined 
kosher to mean “Orthodox.”274 
                                                                                                                      
 266. Id. at 425 (merging the analysis of excessive entanglement into the effects inquiry 
as per Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997)); see Ran-Dav’s, 608 A.2d at 1365; see 
also Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1344-46. 
 267. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 268. 66 F.3d at 1339. 
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 52-61 and 176-78. 
 270. 294 F.3d at 420. 
 271. Note the similarity of the name to the OK (“Organized Kosher Laboratories”). See 
supra text accompanying note 90. 
 272. Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 579 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1990), rev’d, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992). Part of the conflict in Ran-Dav’s was the presump-
tive effect of possession of impermissible foods. Id. at 321. On appeal from the trial court, 
the plaintiffs were not arguing that they followed alternative accepted practices of kash-
rus. Id. 
 273. The current Chief of the Bureau of Kosher Enforcement (Division of Consumer Af-
fairs) in New Jersey is a rabbi, but his predecessor was not, and he employs inspectors who 
are not rabbis and in some cases are not Jewish. Id. at 320. In addition, the Attorney Gen-
eral created a kosher advisory committee comprised of all Orthodox rabbis, save one mem-
ber who is a Conservative rabbi. Id. The Baltimore ordinance created the “Bureau of Ko-
sher Meat and Food Control,” which was required to include “three duly ordained Orthodox 
Rabbis and three laymen selected from a list submitted by ‘The Council of Orthodox Rabbis 
of Baltimore’ and ‘The Orthodox Jewish Council of Baltimore.’” Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1339. 
And last, the director of the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the New York State De-
partment of Agriculture and Markets is a rabbi. Commack, 294 F.3d at 418.  
 274. See Ran Dav’s, 579 A.2d at 319. 
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 While New Jersey replaced its invalidated kosher fraud statute 
with a new form of law, the kosher disclosure statute,275 the Com-
mack decision has created an uproar in New York.276 Within one 
week after the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari,277 
the Governor had already proposed legislation (the “Emergency Ko-
sher Law Protection Act of 2003”) to replace the old kosher fraud 
statute.278 This proposal combines the disclosure model with a re-
quirement that kosher be defined by “the reasonable expectations” of 
consumers of kosher products and generally accepted standards in 
the trade.279 To aid in this task, the proposed law would create an ad-
visory board of kosher consumers, producers, distributors, and other 
persons interested in maintaining the integrity of kosher trade stan-
dards.280 Though not all parties involved support the Pataki proposal, 
there is a widespread belief within the kashrus world that some re-
enactment of the kosher fraud law is necessary to protect consum-
ers.281  
                                                                                                                      
 275. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-63 (West 2003). The “Regulations Governing the Sale of 
Food Represented as Kosher” can be found at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 45A-21.1 to –21.8 
(2003). The idea of a disclosure statute was proposed by the court in Ran-Dav’s, 608 A.2d 
at 1366-67. 
 276. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Gov. George E. Pataki (Feb. 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/year03/feb24_03.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). 
Pataki stated: 
 I am deeply disappointed that the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to review 
the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declaring cer-
tain provisions of New York’s kosher laws unconstitutional. Our State’s kosher 
laws are vitally important to tens of thousands of New Yorkers of all faiths and 
have protected generations of consumers from fraudulently packaged and mis-
branded products.  
 I remain strongly committed to protecting New Yorkers who consume kosher 
products, and will promptly seek remedial legislation to ensure that those who 
purchase products labeled as kosher receive the full protection of our laws. 
Id.; Jewish Law, Recent Developments, Agudath Israel Reacts to Kosher Laws Ruling, at 
http://www.jlaw.com/Recent/kosherlawsruling.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2003). 
 277. The application of current Establishment Clause doctrine to the kosher fraud 
statute seems to be fairly obvious and routine. Cf. Meacham, supra note 11, at 641-43 (ar-
guing that protecting consumers from fraud is a secular purpose and fits within the princi-
ples of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)); Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 952, 1003 
(arguing non-endorsement); Sullivan, supra note 11, at 207-08 (arguing that kosher fraud 
laws further a state interest). 
 278. Press Release, N.Y. Gov. George E. Pataki, Governor Pataki Proposes New Kosher 
Foods Legislation (Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/ 
year03/feb26_2_03.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003); Andrew Metz, Pataki Proposes New Ko-
sher Law, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 2003, at A14 (declaring that the new law is not expected to 
be dramatically different from the old one). 
 279. Metz, supra note 278. 
 280. See id. This Article declines to comment whether the Pataki plan would clear the 
constitutional bar. 
 281. See, e.g., Tzivia Emmer, High Court Says No to State Kosher Laws, Silver An-
nounces Conference to Plan New Legislation, JEWISH PRESS, Feb. 26, 2003 (explaining that 
the New York State Assembly Speaker is planning a conference in mid-March to discuss 
new legislation), available at http://www.thejewishpress.com/news_article.asp?article=2131. 
But see Metz, supra note 278 (quoting the president of the New York Board of Rabbis as 
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IV.   HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THE VARIOUS SANCTIONS: THEORY VS. 
PRACTICE 
 Multiple layers of enforcement aim to protect consumers of kosher 
food. On the surface, it would not necessarily be clear which protections 
best combat the problem of fraud in the kosher food industry. In light of 
this complicated situation, it is particularly troublesome that those ad-
vocating the reenactment of kosher fraud laws have not analyzed the 
effects of these statutes in protecting consumers of kosher food com-
pared with the effects of other available sanctions.  
 This Section first examines whether economic theory predicts that 
the kosher fraud statute would play a significant part in combating 
fraud within the kosher food industry, given the choice of available en-
forcement mechanisms. Then, it offers an evaluation of the overall 
amount of fraud, the degree of mistake within the food industry, the 
problems and challenges various industry players perceive, and the 
manner in which kosher fraud has been policed and monitored. This 
analysis suggests that the kosher fraud statute is merely another auxil-
iary, and usually unnecessary, aid to a group of kosher consumers that 
already receives a great amount of protection from instances of fraud. 
Last, this Section proposes a centralized information bank that could 
better aid kosher consumers and discusses the possible effects of the 
kosher disclosure statute, which has replaced the kosher fraud statute 
in New Jersey. 
A.   Predictions About the Market 
1.   The Profit Motive & the Detection Problem 
 The market for kosher food has a built-in incentive rewarding 
fraudulent behavior. Consumers are willing to pay a premium for food 
that is deemed kosher. Also, given the choice between two identically 
priced food products, many will select the kosher item.282 Some busi-
nesses choose to take advantage of kosher’s premium price and reputa-
tion. Manufacturers and retailers who do not purchase kosher ingredi-
ents, who do not take the necessary precautions to ensure that food is 
kosher, or who do not actually obtain certification can collect this pre-
mium for kosher products without paying these associated costs. Fur-
thermore, the unscrupulous suppliers or vendors are then at an advan-
tage, when compared to the vendors following the rules, and can un-
dercut the prices of honest competitors.  
                                                                                                                      
stating that the main problem is “an unhealthy entanglement between state and religion . . 
. . We should be overseeing kashrut standards for our own people”).  
 282. See Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.J. 1992). 
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 This profit motive, however, describes nearly every industry. Un-
scrupulous sellers can cut costs by delivering products that do not meet 
the required standards. What makes kosher fraud any more likely than 
other forms of fraud such that it warrants special attention? The an-
swer lies in the ability to detect the fraud perpetrated. If a retailer sells 
a color television, the consumer can readily see if the television indeed 
offers a color picture. A fraudulent attempt to substitute a cheaper, 
black and white television for a color one would not last very long.  
 On the contrary, the fraudulent sale of nonkosher food under the 
guise that it is kosher, which is kosher fraud, is attractive because of 
consumers’ inability to detect the nonkosher or kosher status of food 
simply by looking at it or by chemically testing it.283 The very same dif-
ficulty that gave rise to the certification subindustry also creates the 
incentive for fraud. In addition, given that mistakes about the kosher 
status of food also occur, not only is it difficult to detect instances of 
fraud, but it is even more difficult to prove that a particular example of 
nonkosher food being substituted for kosher food was an intentional act 
and not an accident. 
 Lastly, the exit from the kosher food industry and reentry into the 
general food industry population can be smooth. For instance, a retailer 
who fraudulently vends televisions that do not perform as promised 
may have difficulty starting a new business anywhere in the electronic 
retail world; where as, it seems, someone discovered as a fraudulent 
vendor within the kosher food industry could continue to sell nonkosher 
food quite easily. The reputation mechanism does not follow the mer-
chant across industry lines. Furthermore, there is no indication that 
the kosher food subindustry is more supra-competitive than the food 
industry as a whole. So, it is not clear what the cheater gives up by los-
ing access to the kosher food market.284 As a result, it is not clear that 
the kosher food market produces as great a penalty for trying to act 
fraudulently and getting caught as other markets might.  
2.   The Expected Deterrence Effects of the Various Sanctions 
 Taken on its own, the effectiveness of each enforcement mechanism 
could be measured by the amount of fraud deterrence it creates. Over-
lapping sanctioning systems with different penalties and detection 
abilities substantially complicate this theoretical analysis. Some fraud 
                                                                                                                      
 283. A salt-content test can reveal that a meat or poultry product is not kosher. Inter-
views with KSA representative and food scientist (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5). Presence of a sufficient level of salt, on the other hand, may be indicative of 
the kashering procedure, but it does not prove that the item is kosher. Id.  
 284. There is a theory that even in a perfectly competitive market, firms compete over 
volume. Since the manufacturers of kosher food are often competing for sales to both ko-
sher consumers and all other consumers, a cheating manufacturer or retailer might forfeit 
volume by losing the kosher sales.  
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will be caught and punished by any number of the sanction choices. If 
one sanction were removed, another sanction might step in against the 
perpetrator.  
 To illustrate, imagine there are two sanctions available: Sanction 
System 1 (SS1) and Sanction System 2 (SS2). SS1 discovers and penal-
izes seventy-five percent of the total discovered fraud perpetrators and 
SS2 discovers and penalizes the remaining twenty-five percent of 
known fraud perpetrators. One might be tempted to say that SS1 is 
more effective than SS2 at discovering and penalizing fraud. However, 
one could not make this claim without more information about the level 
of penalty involved or the comparative costs of operating each system 
(including the investigative element that uncovers the fraud). Even 
worse, what if SS2 is duplicative of SS1 and would have uncovered the 
same amount of fraud in the absence of SS1? 
 Any analysis of the kosher food industry setup must take into ac-
count these three problems—the comparative cost of operation, the 
relative penalty extended, and the ability to avoid duplication—in or-
der to accurately measure the expected deterrence effects of the rele-
vant legal and nonlegal sanctioning mechanisms. This Section com-
pares the relative merits of the four enforcement choices available 
(nonlegal monitoring and reputation sanctions, private law remedies, 
general consumer protection laws, and kosher fraud statutes) as best as 
possible, given the constraints listed above. 
(a)   Comparative Cost of Operation 
  Nonlegal sanctions require no financial commitment from the 
state, but that does not mean they are costless. KSAs include the cost 
of supervision and investigation as part of their fees.285 Private moni-
toring agencies harness the power of consumer investigators, and the 
cost of publishing their results is borne by the consumers and kosher 
food manufacturers who choose to advertise.286 Reputation harm 
sanctions are distributed internally within a subset of the community 
of kosher consumers with only the transaction costs of information 
sharing. 
 Private law remedies are a bit more costly to the state and espe-
cially to the individuals or organizations pursuing their interests. 
The availability of the judicial system as an avenue of adjudication 
imposes some cost. Far greater are the attorney fees and court-
related costs that the parties wishing to litigate a case in contract, 
tort, or trademark infringement would incur. The opportunity to set-
                                                                                                                      
 285. Interview with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification 
see supra note 5); see EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 8-9, 12-15. 
 286. Interview with consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see su-
pra note 5).  
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tle or seek arbitration (particularly through the rabbinical courts) 
acts to lower these costs. 
  Consumer protection laws require an even greater commitment of 
state resources, since not only does the judiciary avail itself of dispute 
resolution, but the state or local government must prosecute the action 
as well. To the extent that kosher fraud statutes set up investigation 
agencies and boards, protecting the kosher consumer costs even more. 
 To compare the cost of operation, though, one must ask who incurs 
the cost? Do private costs count the same as expending state resources? 
When kosher consumers, certifiers, and watchdog groups expend re-
sources trying to monitor, investigate, and distribute information, the 
costs are borne by the parties being protected. Any form of state en-
forcement directly targeting the kosher food industry is a subsidy for 
these parties, and the burden is shared by all taxpayers.  
 There are two lenses through which this subsidy can be viewed. In 
one framework, based on a theory of criminal law, the kosher food in-
dustry warrants extra protection because it is an area in which prob-
lems of fraud were, or are, replete.287 General theories of criminal and 
civil enforcement suggest that it is the province of the state to police 
wrongdoers when: (1) any one individual has an incentive to free ride 
off the monitoring and sanctioning efforts of others, (2) discovering the 
wrong and stopping the harm would be likely to escalate to physical 
violence, or (3) there is a communal need to express disapproval for bad 
behavior.288 
 The alternate model is to view the kosher fraud law purely through 
the public choice lens that presents it as a state subsidy obtained by 
key kosher food industry players as successful participants within the 
political process.289 Under this view, the allocation of state resources to 
aid consumers of kosher food is essentially a given. Kosher fraud laws 
are merely the form of subsidy requested and obtained. 
 Thus, forming an opinion about the appropriate legal response in 
the face of the kosher private ordering may depend on through which 
lens such regulation is viewed. Yet through either lens, any statute 
that does not achieve its purported goals is suspect. 
(b)   The Nature of the Penalty 
 Much like the cost, the severity of the sanctions also varies from one 
level of enforcement to the next. Even within each sanctioning scheme, 
the penalty can range from a business death penalty to practically 
                                                                                                                      
 287. See Berman, supra note 11, at 14. 
 288. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419-35 
(1999) (describing different theories for criminal punishment).  
 289. Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1439-41 (2003).  
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nothing.290 As a result, the litany of sanctions available is meaningless 
without an actual idea of what penalties are actually imposed.  
 Nonlegal sanctions may be just as severe as legal ones, depending 
on the importance of reputation and the access to information within 
the industry. In some cases, nonlegal sanctions are the most important 
check on bad behavior.291 Thus, they can do nothing at all or destroy an 
entire business on the basis of one errant incident.  
 Private law remedies may force wrongdoers to pay anywhere from 
the kosher premium extracted to the entirety of the profits received 
from a wrongful act and perhaps punitive damages as well.292 Con-
sumer protection laws can be used to impose fines, jail time, or a per-
manent injunction against a business.293 Kosher fraud statutes also of-
fer fines and jail time for offenders.294 
(c)   Duplication Among Sanctioning Systems 
 In some regard, all three tiers of enforcement aim to capture the 
problem of fraud within the kosher food industry. Duplicative efforts 
are fairly likely, but there are significant differences too. For example, 
the nonlegal sanctions do not create a remedy for the consumer victims 
of a past wrongdoing. The kosher fraud statute and some consumer 
protection laws do not create such a remedy either, only private law 
remedies would. 
 The trumping characteristic, though, is that the kosher fraud stat-
ute in many ways applies to a subset of cases already covered by gen-
eral consumer protection laws. As a result, its sanctioning mechanism 
(as opposed to its monitoring tools) is duplicative of other sanctioning 
systems. And to the extent the kosher fraud statute seeks to discover 
and punish behavior that the other sanctioning systems leave un-
touched, it is not clear that the laws are capturing willful fraud in the 
kosher food industry.295  
                                                                                                                      
 290. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 291. See sources cited supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra Section III.B.1. 
 293. See id. 
 294. See statutes cited supra note 237. 
 295. Note that the plaintiffs in Ran-Dav’s and Commack had obtained supervision and 
certification from KSAs that insisted on the kashrus of the food (even though these KSAs 
were not acceptable by the Orthodox mainstream). Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 
608 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.J. 1992); Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. 
Supp. 2d 445, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. 
Ct. 1250 (2003). 
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B.   Evaluating the Market296 
1.   Observations About Enforcement 
(a)   Tier One: The Nonlegal Sanctions 
 Private or nonlegal enforcement (Tier One) is robust. KSAs and vigi-
lant consumers working in conjunction with the KSAs, other industry 
monitors, or simply by themselves, monitor packaged food products and 
food establishments to examine whether items in question have appro-
priate kosher certification. Throughout this Article, the entire kosher 
food industry has been treated as one entity. To better understand how 
the private monitoring and sanctioning efforts work, though, it is im-
portant to bifurcate the market into two segments—packaged versus 
prepared food. Packaged, or manufactured, food is what we find on the 
shelves of supermarkets and grocery stores. The bulk of kosher prod-
ucts fit into this category. Prepared food, on the other hand, is sold in-
dependent of any packaging. This can include the food from restau-
rants, bakeries, caterers, or butcher shops.  
i.   KSA Activity 
 Much of the monitoring of kashrus in both the packaged and pre-
pared kosher food subindustries comes from the KSAs themselves. 
First and foremost, the KSA is responsible for monitoring and sanction-
ing its own clients, and thus, can find problematic behavior through 
surprise visits.297 
 KSAs who catch instances of mistake or fraud (whether accidental, 
negligent, reckless, or willful) from their own clients require that the 
client take corrective action.298 Companies that repeatedly err, ignore 
the KSA’s instructions, or engage in fraudulent behavior are 
dropped.299 One KSA administrator explained that it is important to 
search the garbage at the beginning and end of the visit, because it al-
lows the KSA to see what the company normally disposes (wrappers, 
scraps, receipts, etc.) as well as what the company did not want the 
KSA to see.300 The requirements of notification through trade publica-
tions, other sources commonly read by kosher consumers, and product 
recall in the face of a mistake, are sometimes delineated via the initial 
                                                                                                                      
 296. Much of the information in Section IV.B was obtained via the interviews referred 
to in note 5.  
 297. See EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 13. 
 298. See id. at 14. 
 299. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 300. Interview with KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see su-
pra note 5). 
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contract between the KSA and client.301 In other circumstances, the 
KSA may demand corrective action as a condition of future dealing.302 
 KSAs can be forgiving of their clients’ mistakes if steps are taken to 
rectify the situation and the problems are not indicative of gross disre-
gard for the kashrus of the product.303 Willful fraud, on the other hand, 
is unforgivable. For example, when an OU supervisor caught one set of 
clients, the owners of two New York City restaurants, hiding nonko-
sher chicken in the kitchen, the OU dropped its certification and super-
vision of the restaurants.304 In the face of such blatant fraud, no other 
KSA would agree to pick up the clients.305 
 Another interesting case occurred in 1990, when the supervisor for 
the Rabbinical Council of Greater Washington (which serves as a KSA 
among other functions) found allegedly nonkosher ducks and receipts 
from a nonkosher supplier at Moshe Dragon, a Chinese restaurant the 
KSA supervised.306 The Rabbinical Council eventually cleared the res-
taurant owner of any wrongdoing and fired its own supervisor, contrary 
to the findings of a private investigator working on the case.307 None-
theless, word of the dispute spread through the “Washington Jewish 
Week” and another local business publication even undertook to ana-
lyze some of the food, searching for (impermissible) traces of whey.308 
The restaurant owner claimed that he lost over $30,000 as a result of 
the rumors and decided to sell the business.309 
 Often, though, it is difficult to ascertain if an error is the result of 
fraud or mistake. Given the liability potential and ambiguity of the 
term kosher within any legal context, a KSA dropping a client usually 
will not declare a product, line of products, or food establishment to be 
not kosher. Instead, a KSA will announce that it no longer certifies 
Product A or Restaurant B.310 The KSA declares that due to the fact 
that it will not be supervising the manufacturer or retailer, it can no 
longer certify that the food is kosher. KSAs save retroactive decertifica-
tion for instances in which particularly egregious conduct leaves the 
                                                                                                                      
 301. See EIDLITZ, supra note 14, at 12-15.  
 302. Interview with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 303. Id.  
 304. Id.  
 305. Id.  
 306. Ruth Sinai, Is Everything Kosher with Moshe Dragon’s Duck?, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
July 4, 1990, available at 1990 WL 6012694. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id.; see also Eugene L. Meyer, Dispute Blamed in Sale of Restaurant; Chinese Ko-
sher Eatery’s Business Fell After Inspector’s Allegation, WASH. POST, June 22, 1990, at D06, 
available at 1990 WL 2124618 (stating that owner wants to stay in business but cannot af-
ford to). 
 310. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
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KSA with little to no doubt that a product cannot be deemed kosher 
even during the time in which the KSA was contracted to supervise 
and certify the food.311 Retroactive decertification is mostly limited to 
the packaged food industry, due to the difference in shelf life of the 
products.312 In both instances, prospective and retroactive decertifica-
tion, the KSA neither expressly confirms nor denies whether the food 
actually is kosher.  
 Prospective and retroactive decertification create different reputa-
tion effects. Retroactive decertification severely harms the reputation of 
the food manufacturer. No KSA likes to be in the position of having to 
declare a product not kosher after the fact, because it undermines con-
sumer confidence in the kashrus of all of the food that the KSA super-
vises and certifies. Thus, KSAs rarely employ this sanction, and once 
they do, other KSAs are quite unwilling to agree to contract with that 
manufacturer for future certification.313 
 Prospective decertification has less effect on product or establish-
ment reputation, particularly because it is fifty percent of the steps 
needed to switch to a different KSA. Independent food monitors report-
ing these decertifications attempt to give full opportunity for the com-
pany or a new KSA to declare if a new certifier has been hired.314 This 
way, ideally, the kosher alert section does not state, “KSA X no longer 
certifies Product 1,” but would be paired with the relevant information 
on Product 1; for example, “KSA Y will now certify Product 1.”315 Occa-
sionally, since newly certified products are self-reported to the watch-
dog groups, there can be a gap in reporting a switch in supervising 
agencies, and only a statement of decertification will be published, with 
some negative implication against the manufacturer or establish-
ment.316 
 KSAs also must pass judgment on the standards of one another to 
perform their tasks properly. Vertical product integration requires a 
KSA either to accept or reject the supervision and certification of all the 
KSAs that may happen to precede it on the food chain. As a result, one 
KSA will have to call up other KSAs to inquire about their standards 
and requirements.317 To justify its decision whether to certify, the KSA 
will necessarily have to announce to the client, at a minimum, that it 
deems the products of another KSA to be kosher. In the alternative, the 
KSA will have to announce to the client that, based on the standards 
                                                                                                                      
 311. Id.  
 312. Id.   
 313. Id.  
 314. Interview with a consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.  
 317. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
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and activities of the other KSA, it can neither confirm nor deny the 
kashrus of the food.318 
 Information about general standards and bad actors is fluid between 
KSAs. Not only do the individuals involved in the KSAs work with one 
another professionally, sponsoring joint lectures on common areas like 
food technology, but they also share information through their partici-
pation religiously and socially within the Orthodox Jewish commu-
nity.319 As a result, KSA sanctions against parties known to have per-
petuated fraud are death-penalty like. Companies caught in the act of 
deliberately switching a nonkosher food source for a kosher one or in-
tentionally ignoring known plant or store requirements and problems 
do not continue to exist within the kosher food industry. 
ii.   Consumers and Consumer Watchdogs 
 The kosher food industry features a unique group of sophisticated 
consumers, who vigilantly attempt to identify mistake and fraud within 
the food industry.320 These consumers represent a minority of all kosher 
consumers and engage in behavior off which others can free ride.321 
Since consumers are denied access to the manufacturing process, it 
might seem surprising the extent to which some consumers are able to 
spot instances of mistake or fraud simply by contacting KSAs or 
watchdog groups when they find a new or otherwise suspicious certifi-
cation on a product.322 Spotting examples of mistake or fraud is some-
what easier for consumers in the prepared food subindustry. Much of 
the kosher fraud enforcement originates with some observation, ques-
tion, or tip directly from a kosher consumer.323 This is particularly un-
usual given the minimal financial incentive for any one consumer to 
seek out wrongdoing and the free riding incentive. It seems unlikely 
that the ten dollar reward offered by KASHRUS MAGAZINE over-
comes the inherent problem of free riding.324 
 Even greater than their ability to monitor the kosher food industry 
to prevent violations, though, are the sanctions that kosher consumers 
can impose on wrongdoers. The kosher consumers who are observant 
Jews can and do effectuate boycotts of fraudulent vendors of kosher 
food, using the internal network of the Jewish community, such as an-
                                                                                                                      
 318. Id.  
 319. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 320. See Consumer Alert, KASHRUS MAG., Sept. 1990, at 7, 7-18.  
 321. See id.  
 322. See id.  
 323. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 324. See Be a Kashrus Watcher, supra note 147, at 6 (offering ten dollars for evidence of 
a mislabeled or unauthorized kosher product). 
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nouncements and postings in synagogues, to spread information about 
questionable food manufacturers and retailers.325  
 One concern with the nature of the private activity would be over-
vigilance. Accidental sales of nonkosher food as though it were kosher 
is just as harmful to nearly all kosher consumers as willful fraud.326 
Yet, while the private enforcers care to find instances of mistake, it 
does not appear that one-time perpetrators of mistakes suffer sanc-
tions.327 At the same time, the Moshe Dragon incident suggests that 
once consumers learn that a KSA has reason to believe a client acted 
improperly, they may not accept the food from that vendor as kosher, 
even in the face of KSA exoneration.328 
 This disconnect between KSA and consumers may have positive ef-
fects, such as preventing the KSAs from acting in concert with their cli-
ents to the detriment of consumers a la Enron.329 On the other hand, it 
may deter KSAs from providing information to consumers in the first 
place until the KSA can confirm its findings. In this respect, a back-
ground religious limitation on gossip or slander affects both KSA and 
consumer behavior. One who destroys the reputation of another is 
analogized to one who has spilled blood.330 While this religious principle 
excepts out cases where failure to share information would be harmful, 
including the potential for financial loss, its existence might act to chill 
some information sharing. To the extent the KSAs or consumers ad-
here to this law, it limits the amount of information available, but it 
only serves to strengthen the effects of reputation mechanisms. That is, 
once information is released, it is more likely to be accepted precisely 
because it has already cleared the hurdle of improper slander. 
(b)   Tier Two Enforcement: Private Law Remedies 
 While some consumers are actively engaged in seeking out instances 
of fraud or mistake, there were no reported cases of consumer initiated 
private law actions in tort or contract (tier two enforcement).331 Various 
                                                                                                                      
 325. Interviews with consumers and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifi-
cation see supra note 5). Not all the information shared is bad news. Contrast kosher fraud 
with the announcements in favor of new kosher establishments or products certifications, 
like M&Ms or Oreos, information that was happily received and spread by kosher consum-
ers. Id. 
 326. That is, if consumers themselves are not negligent, the vendor’s intent does not 
mitigate the harm to consumers. 
 327. Interviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer watch-
dogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 328. See Meyer, supra note 309. 
 329. One interesting question presented is whether the nonprofit status of the KSAs 
minimizes the risk of self-serving practices. 
 330. Leviticus 19:16 (“You shall not be a gossipmonger among your people . . . .”). 
 331. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).   
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members of the industry attribute this to the high cost of litigation and 
uncertainty concerning damages available.332 
 Though some KSAs (especially the Big Four) aggressively pursue 
unauthorized usages of their trademarks, actual litigation of these is-
sues is quite rare.333 In one notable exception, the OK brought suit 
seeking to enjoin the Kosher Overseers Association (KOA) from using 
an encircled half-moon K.334 Usually, though, a simple phone call is 
enough to take care of the problem.335 In the face of an unauthorized 
usage, the KSAs will notify the kashrus publications.336 In addition, 
when the result of the unauthorized usage is that a nonkosher product 
is mislabeled, the KSAs may insist that offenders publicize unauthor-
ized usages in commonly read Jewish publications and recall misla-
beled products.337 
 One explanation for the lack of private litigation is that its costs 
may outweigh any benefits, especially for smaller, local KSAs that only 
certify a handful of clients who market food nationally.338 Some KSAs 
express concern only if the kashrus standards of the KSA with the con-
fusing alternate mark are not acceptable to them.339 
 Yet another explanation for the lack of activity that applies to both 
KSAs and kosher consumers who are observant Jews is a religious law 
that prohibits Jewish parties from suing one another in secular court.340 
The Beit Din (rabbinical court) would be the appropriate forum for re-
solving these disputes.341 Yet, there is no evidence that KSAs or con-
sumers go to the Beit Din to arbitrate these types of claims either.342 
                                                                                                                      
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. This is so despite the facts that a number of KSA trademarks appear to be 
very similar. For example, there are several variations of a Square K. One might think 
that some trademark similarity is inevitable to the extent that KSAs wish to employ the 
letter K and some basic shape or religious object in an easily printed insignia. 
 334. Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting 
the OK the injunction it sought, but awarding no damages). Compare the half moon K (if 
encircled) with the OK mark: 
 
 versus . Who’s Who, Nov. 1993, supra note 77, at 30, 
33. 
 335. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 336. Id.  
 337. Id.  
 338. These KSAs would have to demonstrate that the alternate mark has created con-
fusion within the geographic scope of their own mark. See Levy, 104 F.3d at 41-42. 
 339. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 340. See Ira Yitzchak Kasdan, A Proposal for P’Sharah: A Jewish Media-
tion/Arbitration Service, JEWISH ACTION, Spring 1990, at 22, 22-26 (discussing the prohibi-
tion and presenting alternatives to the rabbinical courts), available at http://www.jlaw. 
com/Articles/psharah1.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). 
 341. Id. at 22. 
 342. See generally id. (suggesting some reasons parties might reject rabbinical courts). 
It is possible that jurisdictional limitations on rabbinical courts undercut their appeal. See 
id. at 23. 
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(c)   Tier Three Enforcement: Consumer Protection Laws 
i.   The Shelat Example 
 Over the past twenty years, the kosher food industry has not faced 
crisis upon crisis of large-scale instances of fraud or mistake. Instead, 
there have been only a handful of controversies that have caught the 
attention of industry insiders and consumers alike. The cases are few 
and far between. 
 The biggest fraud case, however, was the suit brought by the State 
of Illinois against three Chicago corporations: Shelat Kosher Foods, 
Inc., United Poultry, Inc., and Aspen Foods, Inc.343 As described above, 
the kosher food industry exploded in the 1980s. One company taking 
part in this expansion was Shelat, one of the nation’s biggest suppliers 
of kosher chicken.344 Fittingly, Shelat kosher chicken was supervised 
and certified by the OU, the biggest KSA in the world.345 
 In late 1987, a Jewish employee of United Poultry Inc., sister com-
pany of Shelat Kosher Foods Inc., came forward to the OU with the tip 
that at night, when the KSA supervisor left the plant, the company 
would package nonkosher food items to be sold as kosher.346 A surprise 
inspection by the OU verified the accuracy of the whistle-blower’s 
statement.347 The information broke at the time that the Chicago Rab-
binical Counsel (CRC), a dominant KSA in Illinois and much of the 
Midwest, was installing the new head of its Rabbinical Court.348 The 
event featured many esteemed leaders of the Jewish community, pre-
senting a cast of who’s who in kosher supervision and certification.349 
The manner and speed with which the news of the Shelat fraud spread 
provides a prime example of how much the monitoring, reporting, and 
sanctioning of kosher fraud relies upon participation in social and reli-
gious activities within the Orthodox Jewish community. 
 The Shelat scandal presented the worst instance of fraud perpetu-
ated against the kosher food industry.350 Kosher consumers in as many 
as twenty-two states were affected by the fraud.351 One Rabbi oversee-
                                                                                                                      
 343. See Mary Ann Galante, Suit Says Shelat Falsely Labeled Foods Kosher, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1987, at B4, available at 1987 WL 2252467. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. See id.; William C. Hidlay, Companies Accused in Kosher Fraud Agree to Settle-
ment, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 1988, available at 1988 WL 3770784.  
 347. Hidlay, supra note 346. 
 348. Interview with prosecuting attorney in the case (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifi-
cation see supra note 5). The CRC Rabbinical Court, or Beit Din, mediates and arbitrates 
civil disputes, issues religious divorces, and oversees religious conversions. Its KSA symbol 
is depicted supra note 95. 
 349. Interview with prosecuting attorney in the case (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifi-
cation see supra note 5).  
 350. Galante, supra note 343. 
 351. Hidlay, supra note 346. 
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ing kashrus for the OU on the West Coast explained, “[s]omething of 
this magnitude has never happened before in certification history.”352 
The fact that one company could willfully defraud the OU and, accord-
ingly, so many kosher consumers, sent waves through the kosher com-
munity. 
 Illinois Assistant Attorney General Rabbi James Gordon was an-
other individual present at the time of the installation when the Shelat 
story broke.353 The informant employee agreed to give a detailed affida-
vit to the Illinois Attorney General’s office, explaining the nature and 
extent of the fraud, and the case was referred to the Consumer Fraud 
Division.354 
 The State of Illinois enacted a kosher fraud statute entitled the “Ko-
sher Food Act.”355 The Illinois Kosher Food Act provides that anyone 
who acting “with intent to defraud . . . falsely represents any food prod-
uct” to be kosher is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.356 A Class C mis-
demeanor is punishable with a fine of $1500; Class A is the greater of 
$2500 or the amount of the offense.357 Class C is punishable with up to 
thirty days in prison; Class A is less than a year.358 
 Despite the presence of the specialized kosher fraud statute, the 
chief of the Consumer Protection Division, William Sullivan, declined 
to use it for the basis of prosecution in the Shelat case.359 Instead, on 
November 4, 1987, the case was brought under the Illinois Consumer 
Fraud and Deceptive Business Act,360 a general consumer protection 
statute, and the State sought a permanent injunction against Shelat as 
well as a large fine.361 The Attorney General’s office estimated that She-
lat made about $250,000 in profits from its fraud.362  
 Sullivan explained his selection of the Fraud and Deceptive Busi-
ness Act and rejection of the kosher fraud statute on the grounds that: 
(1) he doubted the constitutionality of the kosher fraud law, and did not 
want to lose an easy case on constitutional grounds or expend vast re-
sources litigating what kosher meant, and (2) Illinois general consumer 
protection remedies were liberal.363 
                                                                                                                      
 352. Galante, supra note 343. 
 353. Interview with an attorney present at Attorney General’s office (Fall 2002) (for in-
terview clarification see supra note 5). 
 354. Id.  
 355. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 645/1 (West 2003). 
 356. Id. 
 357. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-9-1 (West 2003). 
 358. Id. at 5/5-8-3. 
 359. Interview with an attorney present at Attorney General’s office (Fall 2002) (for in-
terview clarification see supra note 5). 
 360. Id.; 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 2003). 
 361. See Hidlay, supra note 346. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Interview with an attorney present at Attorney General’s office (Fall 2002) (for in-
terview clarification see supra note 5).  
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 This raises two salient points about the enforcement value of the ko-
sher fraud statutes. First, it suggests that even if kosher fraud statutes 
offer unique enforcement monitoring or sanctioning schemes, any effort 
to calculate the cost of implementation would have to include the un-
certain cost of future litigation concerning the statutes’ constitutional-
ity. And second, it demonstrates that not only do general consumer pro-
tection statutes punish the same behavior that kosher fraud statutes 
capture, but in many cases, they may offer clearly superior remedies for 
the violation. 
 On November 5, the Cook County Circuit Court ordered a nation-
wide recall of approximately 350,000 pounds of meat and poultry and 
issued a temporary injunction shutting down the Shelat plant that 
processed kosher poultry.364 Three weeks later, Shelat entered into a 
consent decree where it stipulated its fault and agreed not to sell ko-
sher food products in the future.365 Its officers were fined $236,000 to 
$250,000 in restitution paid to the OU and $14,000 in civil penalties.366 
Though consumers were directed to the retailers from whom they pur-
chased Shelat products, none of the court award went to consumers or 
consumer groups.367  
 The effects of the Shelat scandal on the kosher food industry are 
hard to measure. Though industry participants worried about con-
sumer confidence,368 the kosher market, in the aftermath of Shelat, suf-
fered no noticeable dip.369 The main lesson the kosher food industry 
learned from Shelat was that there were some gaps in the KSA super-
vision process that needed to be filled to prevent future fraud, but in 
the face of a willful tortfeasor, everyone was vulnerable. After Shelat, 
the KSAs tightened their internal monitoring of their clients.370 Given 
the general expansion of the kosher food industry and the dominant 
presence of the OU, it is not clear that the OU suffered any lingering 
affects from having been victimized by its own client. A smaller, less 
well-known KSA could have been harmed if it had been hired by She-
lat. Due to its good reputation through the kosher food industry, con-
sumers could easily view the OU as a co-victim of the fraud, rather 
than blaming the OU for what happened.  
                                                                                                                      
 364. Hidlay, supra note 346.  
 365. Id. 
 366. Bogus Kosher Food Firm Ordered Closed, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 25, 1987, at 18, 
available at 1987 WL 4122141 [hereinafter Bogus Kosher].  
 367. Interview with a consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5); see also Bogus Kosher, supra note 366. 
 368. Herrmann, supra note 206 (explaining that Jews who kept kosher were in “an ab-
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 369. Interviews with consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
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 370. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
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 Though the events described above occurred fifteen years ago, the 
name Shelat is still synonymous with fraud in the kosher food indus-
try. When asked about the problem of kosher fraud, some industry in-
siders and leaders in the Jewish community immediately will talk 
about Shelat as a frame of reference.371 Despite significant market 
growth since then, there still has not been another instance of fraud 
discovered like Shelat. 
ii.   Kosher Fraud Statute Enforcement 
 While many states have kosher fraud statutes, kosher fraud en-
forcement is not uniform throughout the United States. No one has 
systematically collected enforcement data from all states with kosher 
fraud statutes in thirty years. Despite the dramatic changes in the ko-
sher food industry since then, some of the findings from 1972 still hold 
true today. Most important is the fact that state enforcement is limited 
to a handful of jurisdictions that feature the largest Jewish communi-
ties, such as New York, New Jersey, and Baltimore, Maryland—
precisely the same regions that produced the cases declaring the laws 
unconstitutional.372 Thus, the majority of kosher fraud statutes are 
empty shells—legislative sentiments with no accompanying monetary 
commitment expressed in favor of a community that may or may not 
exist in 2003. Only a few loci of Jewish communal life present any evi-
dence of the effectiveness of active kosher fraud enforcement or the lack 
thereof. This Section will briefly detail the prior research findings 
about kosher fraud enforcement, and then demonstrate how much the 
landscape has changed. 
  1)   Thirty Years Ago 
 In 1972, Professor Daniel Elazar, a political scientist, and Professor 
Stephen Goldstein, a lawyer, wrote an article detailing whether Ameri-
can Jews have a distinctive legal status as a community.373 Recognizing 
that “[k]ashrut enforcement represents one of the most methodical sys-
tems of linkage between government and the Jewish community in the 
United States,”374 Elazar and Goldstein sent a questionnaire to the offi-
cials responsible for enforcing kosher fraud statutes in the eighteen 
states that had such laws soliciting information about them, including 
                                                                                                                      
 371. Interviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer watch-
dogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 372. Interview with a consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 373. Daniel J. Elazar & Stephen R. Goldstein, The Legal Status of the American Jewish 
Community, in 73 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK 1972, at 3, 3-94 (Morris Fine & Milton 
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 374. Id. at 35. 
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how often the statute was invoked and the annual expenditure on ko-
sher fraud enforcement.375  
 Using the results of the surveys combined with “documentary 
sources,”376 Elazar and Goldstein found that only New York and Cali-
fornia reported “significant numbers of prosecutions” and that most 
states reported “little or no prosecution.”377 In order to understand what 
significant numbers mean, the article identified that New York re-
ported a monthly average of six civil penalties for violations378 or, in 
other words, seventy-two prosecutions culminating in penalties each 
year.  
 In 1957 and 1958, the California legislature appropriated $20,000 
for kosher food law enforcement, representing the only case of any spe-
cific legislative appropriation for kosher fraud enforcement.379 In addi-
tion, an Orthodox Rabbi was hired to work for the California Depart-
ment of Public Health (DPH) as a kosher-food law representative from 
1957 until 1965, when the post was eliminated.380 The chief of the DPH 
Bureau of Food and Drugs explained that part of the reason for the 
move away from kosher fraud enforcement was the “divergence of opin-
ion” within the Jewish community about what kosher meant.381 
 In the face of this evidence, Elazar and Goldstein were hesitant to 
criticize the effectiveness of the kosher fraud statutes. They theorized 
that the mere existence of the statutes and threat of investigation or 
prosecution could act as a deterrent.382 In fact, though they offered no 
evidence to substantiate this theory, they asserted in their conclusion 
that “kashrut-enforcement laws protect individual consumers from 
fraud.”383 
  2)   Today 
 Over the past thirty years, the kosher food industry has exploded. 
Yet the kosher fraud statute enforcement continues to be a local phe-
nomenon specific to the large Jewish communities in the New 
York/New Jersey metro area, Baltimore, and southern Florida.384 After 
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(for interview clarification see supra note 5). There are some reports that some KSAs in loca-
tions with unenforced kosher fraud statutes inform parties of the existence of the laws hop-
ing it will deter bad behavior. See Elizabeth Lee, Ruling on Kosher Label May Affect Laws 
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courts struck down the kosher fraud statutes, those jurisdictions have 
been forced to reformulate their statutes and are copying the current 
New Jersey disclosure model.385 As a result, the only current data about 
kosher fraud statute enforcement comes from New York. 
 The following data comes from the New York State Department of 
Agriculture and Markets Annual Report:386  
Year Complaints Investigations Inspections Violations 
1998 46 392 8401 105 
1999 63 418 7277 103 
2000 61 309 7441 84 
2001 61 342 8173 97  
 As the data show, while the number of investigations rose, the 
number of inspections (or visits) declined. In fact, though the number of 
inspections started to climb after 1999, it still did not hit the level of in-
spections in 1998. The 2000 and 2001 reports attribute a decrease in 
violations to an increase in enforcement efforts;387 this explanation is 
questionable given the 1998 data. If the increased enforcement in 2000 
and 2001 deterred bad conduct, producing fewer violations, why did the 
1998 level of activity not produce a similar result? There is no evidence 
that the types of inspections and investigations were less thorough or 
skilled in 1998; if anything, the looming Commack litigation may have 
undermined the kosher enforcement bureau’s authority.388 
 Even more importantly, the raw data does not explain the nature of 
the penalties (for example, amount of fine, possibility of jail time) is-
sued for each violation. The number of violations is an imperfect proxy 
used to measure the enforcement. Because the violation at issue in 
Commack was a fourth offense, the Department of Agriculture fined 
Commack $11,100.389 But this is an unusually high fine. About eighty 
of the violations in 2001 carried fines of only $300.390 Commack in-
curred fines of $600 and $300 for its prior offenses.391 The harm from 
the Commack fine is attributed not to the amount of money, but rather 
                                                                                                                      
Commission stating that “the laws serve as leverage in persuading restaurants to stop re-
ferring to themselves as kosher when they are not”).  
 385. Interview with consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra 
note 5).  
 386. N.Y. ST. DEP’T AGRIC. & MARKETS ANN. REP. (1998-2001), available at 
http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/annualreport.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2003). 
 387. Id.  
 388. The district court issued its opinion declaring the New York kosher fraud statute 
unconstitutional in July 2000, Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. 
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appeal. 
 389. Katherine Marsh, Dispatch: Busting Chops, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 59-60. 
 390. Id. at 62. 
 391. See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 419-20 (2d 
Cir. 2002). 
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to consumer reaction to the fine being reported in KASHRUS 
MAGAZINE and the Jewish Press due to the fact that “an allegation 
that a purportedly kosher facility acted in contravention of the laws 
governing kashruth is a reflection upon the integrity and reliability of 
the proprietors of the purportedly kosher facility.”392 
 As a result, it seems that the bureau’s declaration about the effects 
of its enforcement efforts is mostly wishful thinking. From the data of-
fered, it is impossible to offer any explanation about the relationship 
between the existence of kosher fraud and the number of kosher fraud 
investigations, inspections, or violations. 
 While no one can claim to know the exact amount of kosher fraud, 
when asked about the amount of fraud overall, industry participants 
approximated that since Shelat, the total amount of fraud has in-
creased; however, in real terms, these individuals felt that fraud either 
had remained constant or actually decreased.393 That is to say, fraud 
has not been growing at the same rate that the kosher food industry 
has expanded. A comparison of the 1972 data with the 1998-2001 data, 
as incomplete as the data is, loosely substantiates this observation.394 
In 1972, the number of penalties issued in New York was roughly sev-
enty-five percent of the total number of violations issued thirty years 
later.395 At the same time, the kosher food industry has grown far be-
yond that. 
 When asked to explain this change in the rate of fraud, industry in-
siders will point to the stricter supervision from KSAs, the increasing 
level of sophistication in consumers, and the easier means of spreading 
information (internet, cell phones, and the like).396 None cite changes in 
kosher fraud laws or their enforcement. There is no other evidence 
suggesting that kosher fraud statute enforcement is responsible for this 
change. 
 According to some industry insiders, the kosher fraud enforcement 
is of limited value, because offenders simply view the penalties as “the 
cost of doing business” and repeat instances abound.397 Thus, the prob-
lem with kosher fraud prosecution might be that the fines and penal-
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ties are not sufficiently high to deter fraudulent behavior, not that they 
have no effect.398 Given the strong reputation harms, one might wonder 
how a food manufacturer or retailer even gets a chance to be a repeat 
offender. After all, would not the state action trigger an adverse reac-
tion within the networked community of kosher consumers?  
 Three factors prevent state sanctions from automatically translating 
into reputation harms. First, the specter of libel looms. KASHRUS 
MAGAZINE formerly published the state violation listings, such as in 
Commack, but encountered problems when the state would clear a 
business after the fact and the magazine had already printed the in-
formation.399 As a result, the magazine stopped reporting state viola-
tions.400 Next, many of the parties fined or penalized by the kosher en-
forcement never were considered merchants of kosher food as required 
by mainstream Orthodox standards.401 This is clearly true in the 
Barghout402 and Commack cases. Absent the usage of the term kosher, 
neither case presented an instance of a vendor misrepresenting his be-
havior or private certification status to consumers. Lastly, kosher con-
sumers and industry participants are somewhat suspicious that the 
state kosher enforcement can act more to harass business owners than 
protect consumers. This circumstance was likely present in the Com-
mack case as well.403  
 Some kosher fraud prosecution is a direct result of private efforts to 
discover fraud. It is unclear how much of the state action results in new 
reports of fraud and how much it relies on tips from private consumers 
anyway. Other weaknesses of the kosher fraud enforcement called into 
question were investigative “surprise” visits scheduled “next Tues-
day.”404  
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against Rabbi Rubin, the director of the New York Kosher Law Enforcement Division, al-
leging that Rubin “intentionally fabricat[ed] baseless charges” against Hebrew National. 
Nat’l Foods, Inc. v. Rubin, 727 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). “The Attorney General 
refused to bring an enforcement proceeding against Hebrew National,” stating that “the 
Kosher Law Enforcement Division had failed to conduct even the most rudimentary inves-
tigation.” Id. at 107 (finding that no § 1983 suit could lie against Rubin for harms to “repu-
tation alone”). 
 404. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
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 Among various issues of concern to industry participants, though, 
willful fraud is not a particularly large concern, and they often view the 
kosher fraud statute as anachronistic. One consumer watchdog ex-
pressly stated that the kosher fraud statute has “outlived its day.”405 At 
the same time, nearly all would defend the law.406 While the attach-
ment might be attributable to the belief that the law has some utility, 
the clear argument in favor of the statute is an expressive one: the ko-
sher fraud statute legitimates Jewish Orthodox standards of kashrus 
in the fight for who controls the standards of kashrus and acts to ex-
clude competing interpretations.407 In this light, one could hardly argue 
with the viewpoint that the constitutional problem with state kosher 
fraud enforcement is that it is a state choice of one definition of kosher 
over alternatives. If anything, it demonstrates the accuracy of the de-
terminations by the California Department of Health408 and various 
courts409 that the kosher fraud statute is about selecting one orthodoxy 
over another.  
 In conclusion, the kosher fraud statute enforcement does contribute 
in discovering and sanctioning willful fraud within the market for pre-
pared kosher food. However, it is not likely that the threat of investiga-
tion and penalty under these statutes significantly deters willful fraud 
more effectively than the threat of private sanction or prosecution un-
der general consumer protection laws.  
2.   Other Market Observations 
 While this Article tackles the issue of how multitiered enforcement 
efforts to combat kosher fraud interact, industry insiders place kosher 
fraud fairly low on their lists of significant concerns and issues facing 
                                                                                                                      
 405. Interview with a consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 406. Parties who sought to intervene in Commack in defense of the law included the 
following major Orthodox organizations: the OU, Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), 
Agudath Israel of America, National Council of Young Israel, Rabbinical Alliance of Amer-
ica, Agudath Harbonim of the United States and Canada, and Torah Umesorah-National 
Society of Hebrew Day Schools. Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 170 
F.R.D. 93, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). In addition, various individuals sought to intervene, in-
cluding: (1) several kosher consumers, (2) a competing kosher business in Plainview, New 
York, and (3) an Orthodox rabbi in a neighboring town. Id. at 101-02. 
 407. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 615-17 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593-601 (1996) (describing punishment as a form of expres-
sive condemnation); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943, 946-47 (1995) (government actions as prescribing orthodoxy); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923 (1996). 
 408. Elazar & Goldstein, supra note 373, at 39-40. 
 409. See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 425 (2d Cir. 
2002); Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1346 (4th Cir. 
1995). 
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the kosher food industry today.410 More important to them, for example, 
are mistakes, the rapid proliferation of KSA marks, and international 
fraud/theft of intellectual property.411 In addition, it appears that an en-
tire class of kosher consumers, namely those who are not observant 
Jews, is excluded from consideration within the existing enforcement 
regimes. Studies aimed at aiding all kosher consumers today, thus, 
would have to examine these other areas of concern, along with fraud, 
before offering a general proposal.  
(a)   Role of Mistake 
 According to the industry participants interviewed, the majority of 
food erroneously being sold as kosher is likely a result of mistakes by 
various parties (the KSA, the manufacturer, and so on) or unintended 
unauthorized usages of kosher symbols.412 A significant concern is how 
to best limit the instances of mistake and how to limit the complica-
tions that arise when attempting to correct for mistakes.413 
 There are several ways that these mistakes can happen. A high per-
centage of the mistakes reported represent instances where a KSA 
made an error in how it certified a product or product line (for instance, 
an erroneous declaration of pareve) or there was some miscommunica-
tion between the client and KSA about necessary steps to ensure the 
kashrus of a product. Mistakes are more common when kosher and 
nonkosher foods are labeled at the same plant. For example, labels for 
octopi, which are invertebrates, and thus not kosher, were switched 
with labels for tuna, which is a kosher fish.414 The error was fairly obvi-
ous to consumers who opened the wrongly labeled cans. For some other 
food products, mistakes are less visible. 
 The classic unintended, unauthorized usage occurs when an inter-
nal company product label happens to be the same as a trademarked 
KSA symbol. For example, some of the KSA symbols feature letters 
within a circle, such as an encircled U, K, or V.415 When one company 
used alphabet codes of a letter within a circle to label products for in-
ternal usage and then sold the food without having removed these la-
bels, some inevitably contained a KSA trademark.416 OK Laboratories 
relies on its trademark of a circle around a K;417 this can lead to confu-
                                                                                                                      
 410. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
 411. Id.  
 412. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 413. Id.  
 414. Id. 
 415. Who’s Who, Nov. 1993, supra note 77, at 30-31. 
 416. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 417. Who’s Who, Nov. 1993, supra note 77, at 30. 
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sion about the food sold at Circle K, a supermarket chain found in the 
South and West. 
 Mistakes are just as important to consumers as instances of actual 
fraud—the harm is nearly identical. In fact, one area worth exploring is 
whether the sale of nonkosher food as though it were kosher should be 
a strict liability offense akin to the sale of a defective or unsafe product. 
Because the harm caused by mistake is almost the same as the harm 
caused by negligent, reckless, or willful fraud, perhaps strict liability is 
appropriate. Under classic theory, strict liability is appropriate when 
preventing harm is essentially within the purview of the defendant. 
Tort law treats defective product design differently from general con-
sumer fraud because of the fear that strict liability would create a 
moral hazard. Given the vigilance of the kosher consumer and the in-
evitability of (and forgiveness issued toward) mistake, strict liability in 
the kosher fraud context might seem problematic as well.  
(b)   Too Many Marks 
 When asked to identify the biggest problem facing kosher consum-
ers today, not one industry insider offered fraud itself or the attack on 
kosher fraud laws as an answer.418 The main issue most frequently 
identified was the proliferation of certification symbols, especially non-
mainstream ones that consumers were not likely to recognize.419 In par-
ticular, there was concern regarding the degree of similarity that was 
occurring, and inevitably would, given hundreds of certification sym-
bols. Furthermore, many of the newer certifiers lacked adherence to 
Orthodox standards of kashrus, so confusion between the marks could 
lead to mistaken consumption of food that Orthodox authorities would 
not deem to be kosher.420  
 One commentator, critical of the kosher fraud statute, noted that if 
his preschool-aged niece knew how to look for the symbol of the OU to 
know if something is kosher or not, then the average adult could rely 
on KSAs without the need for state intervention.421 Yet there are hun-
dreds of KSAs certifying food as kosher. The question is not whether a 
preschooler or adult could recognize the OU mark; rather, when pre-
sented with alternative marks, like the Scroll K, Sefer Torah K, Tablet 
K, or Casebook K, could the consumer accurately identify the KSA cer-
tifying the product? 
                                                                                                                      
 418. Interviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer watch-
dogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5).  
 419. Id.  
 420. Id.  
 421. Jacob Sullum, Kosher Cops, in IDEAS ON LIBERTY (Foundation for Economic Edu-
cation), July 1993 (arguing that kosher fraud laws are a form of subsidy for kosher con-
sumers that warrants a second look), available at http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=2759 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003). 
2004]                          KOSHER WITHOUT LAW 579 
 
 One consumer relayed a story that demonstrates the effects of hav-
ing too many marks. She needed to buy flour and was choosing be-
tween Gold Medal, which is certified by the OU, and Robin Hood, 
which is certified by the COR.422 This consumer explained that she had 
no brand preference, and the Robin Hood flour was a few cents 
cheaper.423 She could not recall whether the COR certification was ac-
ceptable.424 Ordinarily, she would use a cell phone and call a rabbi she 
trusted to ask about the mark in question; however, she did not have 
the phone with her that day.425 As a result, she bought the OU certified 
product and spent the extra few cents on piece of mind.426 
 It is not clear that the proliferation of KSAs and marks is as bad as 
industry participants make them out to be. After all, an actively func-
tioning subindustry market would limit unacceptable KSAs through 
two mechanisms. First, vertical integration would act to suppress the 
expansion of business by KSAs not accepted by mainstream Orthodox 
KSAs. Second, sophisticated and involved observant kosher consumers 
would reject the unacceptable KSAs. Within the Orthodox world, for 
example, there is a controversy over the acceptability of the marks used 
by the Triangle K and Half Moon K, two KSAs that purport to use Or-
thodox standards for supervision and certification.427 The general 
knowledge about this and other like controversies, even if consumers 
heuristically can only accept the binary reliable/not reliable shorthand 
rather than appreciate the shades of gray of kashrus implicated, sug-
gests that sophisticated kosher consumers cannot be fooled and that 
many other consumers simply do not care. In addition, if a new KSA 
trademark is so similar to an existing one as to create confusion, the 
KSA whose mark is being infringed is free to sue.428 
 While most of the concern about the proliferation of marks is merely 
the fight over who controls the definition of kosher, the concern about 
the likelihood of confusion is not entirely misplaced. As explained 
above, when there are too many trademarks to recognize the marks, 
                                                                                                                      
 422. To view this Canadian mark, see supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 423. Interview with a consumer (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 
5).  
 424. Id.  
 425. Id.   
 426. Id.    
 427. The administrator of KOA, which issues the Half Moon K, is a respected Orthodox 
rabbi who contracts out to many supervisors. Anshe Sholom B’Nai Israel Congregation, 
Kashrut Clarifications, at http://www.asbi.org/koshletter11-02correct.html (last modified 
Dec. 4, 2002). Standards among supervisors vary so much at this point that the entire 
mark is suspect. Some kosher consumers will rely on a Half Moon K when the particular 
supervisor is known and accepted. Id. 
 428. The OK did just this in the KOA case. See generally Donel Corp. v. Kosher Over-
seers Ass’n of Am., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8377, 2001 WL 228364 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 2001) (perma-
nently enjoining the KOA from using the letter K inside of a circle). 
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they become useless to consumers.429 Somewhat like broadcasting fre-
quencies, too many marks creates noise. In the face of so much certifi-
cation noise, then, consumers are reduced to the handful they do know. 
Yet this problem seems to have a self-correcting solution to the extent 
that consumers are informed about the standards a given KSA uses or 
at least informed by a trusted authority which KSAs are acceptable. 
Consumers who care about stringent standards will gravitate to a 
handful of big certifying KSAs. If most consumers felt this way, then 
the number of KSAs would decrease in response. If not, then the prolif-
eration of KSAs represents an emerging need among various kosher 
consumers for divergent standards in kashrus supervision and certifi-
cation. Because this market cure depends on kosher consumers and the 
rabbinical authorities, they rely upon having access to the standards 
used by KSAs. Then, proposals aimed at solving the legitimate prob-
lems proliferation creates for kosher consumers might want to involve 
forcing disclosure when the market fails to do so.  
(c)   International Fraud or Theft of Intellectual Property 
 One KSA representative identified international fraud as an in-
creasing problem within the kosher food industry.430 The current sys-
tem of kosher certification depends on the existence of strong protection 
for intellectual property rights. The difficulties parallel threats to intel-
lectual property rights in general that have been found overseas.431  
 In particular, some Chinese manufacturing plants were found to 
have transferred or copied kosher certificates from one plant to another 
without the knowledge of the original certifying KSA and presented 
them to KSAs of vertically integrated products.432 The KSA that raised 
this issue has become an advocate for KSAs to incorporate technologi-
                                                                                                                      
 429. For an argument that trademark cases dealing with confusion over KSA marks 
ought to be determined based on a marketplace study of the sophistication of the consum-
ers, see Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, KOA Is A.O.K.: The Second Circuit’s Recent Kosher 
Trademark Decision Further Illustrates That the Patent and Trademark Office Must An-
swer to a Higher Authority, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 203, 212-15 (1998). 
 430. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 431. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994); WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT 
OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 118 (1995); Glenn R. 
Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and 
Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081 (1996); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Preju-
dice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intel-
lectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1 (2001); Peter K. Yu, Toward A Nonzero-Sum 
Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Me-
diators, Business Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 
(2002).  
 432. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).   
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cal aspects such as counterfeitproof seals and bar codes into its certifi-
cates to prevent this type of fraud.433  
(d)   Left-Out Consumers 
 As explained above, the market of kosher consumers consists of 
various groups who keep kosher for different reasons. Nonetheless, it is 
only one group, the observant Jewish consumers, that engages in vig-
orous private monitoring and information sharing. The other kosher 
consumers free ride off the efforts of these other consumers; they bene-
fit from the presence of other actors within the vibrant kosher food in-
dustry, but lack the network connection to the information distribution 
chain.  
 KSAs and kosher consumer watchdog groups are aware of the exis-
tence of these proxy users and regularly cite to the general statistics 
about the size and growth of the kosher food industry, which aggre-
gates all kosher consumers.434 Likewise, the litigants and scholars ad-
dressing the constitutionality of the kosher fraud statute refer to proxy 
usage of kosher as a justification of a secular purpose for the law.435 But 
while the kosher fraud enforcement might aim to protect this proxy us-
age, the KSAs and consumer watchdogs do not consider these consum-
ers as their intended audience. Professor Joe Regenstein, a food scien-
tist who serves as head of the Cornell Kosher Food Initiative, has pro-
posed that kashrus supervisors and certifiers could also specifically in-
vestigate and certify for the benefit of proxy users with little added 
cost.436 This suggestion has not been well received within the KSA 
world.437 
 Any proposal directed towards curing kosher fraud or otherwise pro-
tecting kosher consumers needs to be honest about protecting these 
left-out consumers. While ideally they might be best off creating their 
own private market certification systems, this might not be practical 
for various reasons.438 Until such a time, it is important to balance the 
                                                                                                                      
 433. Id.  
 434. See Scope and Size, supra note 167. 
 435. See Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1364 (N.J. 1992) (“We 
remain unpersuaded by the repeated contention that the laws of kashrut have become 
secular norms.”); ACLU Fights Florida Program with Outdated Notion of Kosher, KOSHER 
TODAY, Sept. 1999, at 1, 14 (“One national Orthodox Jewish organization, Agudath Israel 
of America, is strongly advocating a national law to promote protection for kosher consum-
ers . . . . Although such a law would no doubt benefit Orthodox Jews, it would also protect 
the millions of Americans who buy kosher for . . . reasons that are unrelated to religion.”), 
available at http://www.koshertoday.com/kosher%20today%20archives/1999/0999/all%20 
text.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
 436. Telephone interview with Professor Joe Regenstein, head of Cornell Kosher Food 
Initiative (Sept. 9, 2002). 
 437. Id.  
 438. Reasons include the start-up costs involved, the lack of a cohesive core group with 
connections linking one to the other, and other difficulties.  
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vulnerabilities of these consumers with a recognition of the incentives 
for these parties to take action to protect themselves. 
C.   A Proposal for Kosher Fraud 
 Even though they capture some instances of fraudulent behavior, 
kosher fraud statutes are not particularly efficient at solving the prob-
lems that kosher consumers face in 2003. Therefore, efforts to revive 
the kosher fraud laws simply by curing the constitutional defect are 
misplaced.439 At the same time, an inappropriate legal response would 
be to eliminate any form of specialized consumer protection for these 
consumers.  
 Simply discarding the statutes without a substitute solution is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that these statutes are 
a subsidy that these consumers have gained in the political process, al-
beit one that has been lost in the judicial process. The resource alloca-
tion, regardless of form,440 is almost a given. While this Article does 
suggest that this form of subsidy is imperfect, that does not mean that 
there is not a substantial window where state action could help the 
consumers in question.441 
 Second and more important, eliminating kosher fraud statutes 
without shifting the resources to aid kosher consumers would be im-
prudent, because it penalizes those private actors who aim to establish 
mechanisms that would help themselves. If the solution in cases like 
the kosher fraud example were that no particularized state assistance 
should be available, it would create the perverse incentive for inaction 
by those parties closest to and most able to discover the harm. At that 
point, the equilibrium could tip and trigger a situation where the con-
sumers change their behavior such that they actually will require addi-
tional state resources to monitor and sanction, and that this need could 
be grounded in general theories of civil enforcement (tort and crime) 
about providing social welfare where private markets have failed. Ac-
cordingly, even to those who might object to consumer protection laws 
that are merely rent-seeking subsidies for various consumer groups, it 
might be appropriate to acknowledge and accept rent-seeking behavior 
from these groups if the absence of such laws would induce the type of 
                                                                                                                      
 439. See Pataki Legislation Would Govern Labeling of Kosher Foods, THE RECORD 
(Bergen County, N.J.), Feb. 27, 2003, at A05 (reporting how Governor Pataki “acknowl-
edged that little about the food labeled kosher would change and that the new legislation is 
designed specifically to meet constitutional objections”). 
 440. This does not mean to imply that it would have been equally easy for the parties 
to obtain through the political process any form of subsidy that transfers the same amount 
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 441. The characterization of the kosher fraud statute as a form of rent-seeking is not a 
normative one. 
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private ordering that would lead to the development of a more legiti-
mate foundation for such laws.  
 This raises the important question whether the private ordering of 
kashrus—the certification intermediaries, the consumer watchdogs, the 
consumer information-sharing networks, and so forth—depends on the 
current state of legal affairs. How much would a change in kosher 
fraud statutes affect private behavior? If it would not change private 
behavior, then perhaps any form of kosher legislation might simply be 
rent-seeking subsidization.442 While no one can be certain, the evidence 
suggests that, in the year 2003, the kosher food statute only works in 
preventing willful fraud to the extent it is integrated within the exist-
ing private enforcement system, and that changes in these laws would 
have little effect on that private regime.  
 This does not mean to suggest that kosher fraud laws may not have 
played a foundational role in shaping how the supervision and certifi-
cation industry developed.443 Merely, once the house of kashrus certifi-
cation was built, some of the original beams are no longer needed for 
support. Indeed, it may be the case that many instances of “Order 
Without Law” should add the addendum “but only after the existence of 
law at a time prior to private ordering supplanting it.” The relationship 
between law and private ordering is a dynamic one; more or less law 
may be an appropriate response within this dialogue.444 
 With these concerns in mind, this Article attempts to offer an alter-
nate proposal of consumer protection legislation that could complement 
rather than duplicate private efforts because, unlike other private 
groups that eschew judicial enforcement of contract or tort, many ko-
sher food industry participants and kosher consumers advocate in favor 
of such laws.445 Two particular information-based areas in which the 
state could assist kosher consumers are: (1) connecting different kosher 
consumers to the existing private network of information and (2) re-
quiring disclosure of standards when parties seek to use the kosher la-
bel. The New Jersey kosher disclosure statute offers an example of this 
second approach to information-sharing.446 Each solution suggests that 
                                                                                                                      
 442. Scholars employ the term “subsidization” in many different ways and often mean 
to convey negative connotations. Yet it is possible to imagine that nearly every form of gov-
ernment action is a form of subsidy in that it unavoidably transfers resources back to the 
populace in a manner that is disproportionate to what the state of affairs would be absent 
the activity. A full discussion of subsidization (including the legitimacy of various forms of 
subsidies) is beyond the scope of this Article and best reserved for a future date. 
 443. The instrumentality of these laws in shaping this private ordering is best left for 
another time and perhaps another scholar.  
 444. Inquiries into the potential for and existence of nonlegal regimes ought not to ig-
nore the role of law as precursor to order.  
 445. Interviews with various KSA representatives, consumers, and consumer watch-
dogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5); see supra Section III.C.2.(c).   
 446. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 45A-21.1 (2003).  
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the problems to be cured are particular coordination failures within the 
private monitoring, sanctioning, and information-sharing systems. This 
Section explains why a voluntary information bank might be a prefer-
able solution to the kosher fraud problem and why the move towards 
mandatory disclosure might be misguided.  
1.   Networking Opportunities 
 While KSAs and kosher consumers have been successful at identify-
ing fraudulent actors within the kosher food industry and ultimately 
sanctioning these parties, there is still a significant lag in the distribu-
tion of information about past violations. Kosher fraud enforcement has 
this same problem. When fraud (or mistake) is discovered, how fast 
does news travel to each individual kosher consumer who may have 
been a victim (or may still experience harm) from the conduct discov-
ered? A small group of vigilant consumers can adequately police the 
kosher food industry. Their ability to sanction through reputation 
harms depends on other consumers learning of their discoveries, but 
there are groups of kosher consumers systematically excluded from this 
loop. This occurs both because: (1) nontraditional consumers are not 
linked to the same social and religious networks as observant Jews, 
and (2) many nontraditional consumers are not linked one to another. 
 Information dissemination is dependent on key events (the Sabbath, 
holidays, other special meetings) that revolve around the synagogue 
and religious life. Information is particularly slow crossing community 
lines even within the Jewish world, let alone outside of it. In one in-
stance, Orthodox members of the Baltimore Jewish community discov-
ered that some food being sold as “kosher-for-Passover” was not.447 This 
information was slow to cross from the Orthodox community to the 
non-Orthodox observant community and the nature of the problem was 
time-sensitive.448 There is no evidence that alternative, or proxy-using, 
kosher consumers regularly receive reports of kosher fraud or mistake, 
with or without kosher fraud statute enforcement. As it was noted 
above, KSAs and watchdog groups consider their audience to be tradi-
tional Jewish consumers. 
 Of course, the information is out there, in various different places, 
should nontraditional kosher consumers seek it out. The cost for them, 
though, is far greater. With the exception of the proxy users who are 
members of other tight-knit, religious communities, such as Muslims, 
most nontraditional kosher consumers do not belong to a shared com-
munity. Thus, they cannot engage in the same healthy free riding ac-
                                                                                                                      
 447. Rona S. Hirsch, Kosher Cooperation: A Local Kosher Certification Group Promises 
to Notify Non-Orthodox Leaders When a Kosher Crisis Surfaces, BALT. JEWISH TIMES, May 
1, 1998, at N1, available at 1998 WL 11325864.  
 448. Id. 
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tivity. In addition, they are not necessarily in a position to judge the 
credibility of the information they find. While a quick search for kosher 
food supervision on the Internet produces many results, these consum-
ers are less able to separate the wheat from the chaff.  
 Any state protection seriously aimed at helping kosher consumers 
would first attempt to solve part of this crossover problem. If kosher 
fraud protections are fulfilling some general public welfare purpose, 
then it may be appropriate to focus on the left-out consumers. Even if 
the laws are simply subsidization for the traditional Jewish parties 
seeking them, perhaps these parties should be held accountable to the 
larger base of kosher consumers. This obligation may follow from the 
fact that they justify the need for such laws with arguments about pro-
tecting unaware consumers or empirical data that aggregates these 
consumers into the whole.  
 Beyond the crossover issue, even KSAs and traditional kosher con-
sumers attempting to harness technology encounter coordination prob-
lems. There is a body of literature debating the involvement of the state 
in coordinating technological growth and development.449 What one 
source can be used as a bank for information about fraud and mistake 
within the kosher world? Currently, kosher consumers can find differ-
ent pieces of the puzzle in different places, including websites of KSAs 
and consumer watchdog groups. Yet no single source has emerged as 
the central bank for up-to-date kashrus information. Part of the diffi-
culty is that centralizing information would require the recognition of 
one source as the authority for messages about what is happening in 
the kosher food industry.450 Given the highly politicized battle about 
what is kosher, and the fact that the competing sites all have vested in-
terests in defining their own standards as kosher, the parties are in-
volved in a coordination game: if there is one recognized source that is 
agreed upon, all KSAs and consumers are better off, but the individual 
payoff is even greater if one party’s site can be selected as the one. 
 The solution, then, would be to use the state as the recognized bank 
for the industry. This would answer part of the crossover issue from 
                                                                                                                      
 449. For a discussion of network externalities, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME 
THEORY AND THE LAW 208-12 (1994); see, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of 
QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, 
and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 772-73 (1995); Mark A. Lemley & David 
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 450. See the various claims made by such sources. For example, kashrut.com declares 
itself to be “The Premier Kosher Information Source on the Internet” and kashrusmaga-
zine.com uses the title “The Source for Reliable Kosher Information.” Scharf Associates, 
Kashrut.com, Home Page, at http://www.kashrut.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2003); 
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ited Oct. 18, 2003). 
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traditional to nontraditional consumers,451 while also offering a coop-
eration-based strategy for the competing industry participants. The 
battle for standards (and constitutional quandary) would be solved by 
the fact that the state would not make any statement about the accu-
racy of the information it posted. Instead, the state could have a volun-
tary registration for private parties, who would submit their kashrus 
standards (or a statement of who they are), and send reports about in-
stances of fraud or mistake. The website could list the reports and iden-
tify the party who made the report, with a link to the kashrus stan-
dards that party wishes to offer. The registration requirement could 
prevent spamlike submissions that could flood the site. In addition, the 
threat of libel liability would deter private actors from submitting falsi-
fied information. An alternative to voluntary reporting could be a state 
hired source gatherer who collects the data to report.452 This implicates 
the fact that the source gatherer would act as a filter to the information 
provided, but the filtration concern would exist in any form. At some 
point, some person would choose what information gets posted and 
what does not.  
 There are several concerns that this proposal raises that need to be 
addressed as well. First, even with a disclaimer, there is the potential 
that the state could be liable for transmitting a libelous report. This 
could be solved by immunizing the state from liability based on some 
minimum registration requirement that limits access to the site to es-
tablished institutions or organizations.  
 Second, the systems would have to attract reporting from the rele-
vant parties with the information, while not creating incentives for 
harmful free riding. While it seems that these parties ought to welcome 
a cooperation-based solution to their difficulties, some might still hold 
out hope of a noncooperative strategy. This seems a more likely concern 
than the fear that parties would lose their incentive to investigate and 
share information on their own because private monitoring of behavior 
has been quite unrelated to the efforts of the state up to this point. One 
might view the efforts to collect and consolidate kashrus information 
not as a coordination game, but rather as a competitive enterprise be-
tween different watchdog groups. This process would constitute a 
subindustry in itself that is separate from the supervision and certifica-
tion market. Though usually run as nonprofit, the watchdogs still com-
                                                                                                                      
 451. Note that this proposal does not solve the lack of free riding ability from group or-
ganization. It addresses only the cost of disclosing the information to these parties. 
 452. If the state gathers information from other collaborative sources, it may raise a 
question of misappropriation if such information constitutes hot news under International 
News Services v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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pete for advertisements and subscriptions.453 Because these sources 
usually provide far more than data about kashrus, a state information 
bank would not be a perfect substitute. But these groups, as opposed to 
KSAs who report information about their own marks and clients, may 
choose not to share with a centralized state information bank. If so, the 
state would then simply be one competitor among many and not a solu-
tion to a coordination game. Nonetheless, by including a state sanc-
tioned information bank, the proposal still would meet its first goal of 
widening the audience of consumers who are privy to this data. 
 This proposal is modest. It recognizes that the strength of kosher 
supervision and certification lies in the efforts of private supervision 
and certification, monitoring, and sanctioning. This proposal does not 
seek to remove the legal protections afforded to kosher consumers or 
KSAs through the private law remedies of tort, contract, and trade-
mark or the public law remedies of criminal or civil enforcement con-
cerning consumer protection and welfare.  
2.   Disclosure Models—New Jersey & Other Options 
 After the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down its kosher fraud 
statute,454 the New Jersey legislature enacted the “Kosher Food Con-
sumer Protection Act,” a statute that requires any dealer using the 
term “kosher” or “kosher for Passover” to post a disclosure of the 
standards used and to keep records that enable the attorney general 
to ensure compliance with this requirement.455 The standards are ob-
tained via a questionnaire that asks the certifier to answer a list of 
questions meant to capture how stringent the supervision and certi-
fication is.456 This system shifts the state’s regulatory eye from food 
manufacturers and retailers toward KSAs and certifiers. Though the 
disclosure statute’s obligations fall upon “dealers,” it is only with the 
aid of the supervising and certifying KSA that a “dealer” would be 
able to fully complete the paperwork necessary to comply with the 
statute. 
 Other jurisdictions looking for kosher consumer protection in the 
wake of constitutional attack on the kosher fraud statute, including 
Baltimore and South Florida, plan to adopt disclosure statutes based 
                                                                                                                      
 453. For a general discussion of why nonprofit management may resist consolidation, 
see Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting Strate-
gic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1089, 1122-23 (2001).  
 454. Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.J. 1992). 
 455. N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:8-63 (2003); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, §§ 45A-21.2, -21.4 
(2003). 
 456. Interviews with a KSA representative and consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for in-
terview clarification see supra note 5).  
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on the New Jersey model.457 The impetus for the disclosure statute 
came from the recommendation of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
suggested in Ran-Dav’s County Kosher.458 One might be suspicious of 
the utility of any proposal that uses the kosher fraud statute as a 
starting point and deviates from it with the primary goal of avoiding 
constitutional invalidity.459 Nonetheless, it would be premature to 
examine the effectiveness of the kosher disclosure statute in solving 
problems facing kosher consumers. Reports from industry partici-
pants are mostly favorable; then again, reports about the kosher 
fraud statute from the same individuals have always been favorable 
too, even though they admitted the laws were arcane.460 
 At the same time, the disclosure model seems to address several of 
the concerns about difficulties facing kosher consumers noted above. 
Mandatory disclosure can help consumers facing a market that is in-
creasingly flooded with KSAs that use kashrus standards that are not 
acceptable to the Orthodox mainstream. It can also help the nontradi-
tional consumers who are not networked into the Jewish chain of in-
ternal information sharing and may only care about one or two kashrus 
standards for their proxy use.  
 One difficulty, though, that the New Jersey kosher disclosure stat-
ute creates is through its regulation of private-label food.461 Private-
label food is the mechanism by which supermarkets and other local or 
regional establishments offer their own product lines, without manu-
facturing their own food.462 One manufacturer will prepare private-
label food for a number of supermarkets, but expressly use different 
                                                                                                                      
 457. Interview with a consumer watchdog (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5).  
 458. 608 A.2d at 1376. 
 459. There was a general sense among the interviewees that the state “shouldn’t have 
five rabbis in a plant.” Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watch-
dogs (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see supra note 5). This reflects a general ten-
sion within the Jewish world about whether it is better to have strong separation of church 
and state or not. This controversy is particularly visible in matters of education and the 
debate over vouchers for parochial schools. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706-07 (1994) (holding that Satmar Hasidim’s special school district 
was unconstitutional); Nacha Cattan, Court Ruling Buoys Yeshiva Voucher Bids, Aguda 
Meets with Allies in Illinois, FORWARD, July 5, 2002 (noting that Agudath Israel of Amer-
ica, a right-wing Orthodox group, and the OU are provoucher whereas the American Jew-
ish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League oppose 
the vouchers, resulting in the submission of amicus briefs on both sides of Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)), available at http://www.forward.com/issues/2002/ 
02.07.05/news1.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). 
 460. Interviews with various KSA representatives and consumer watchdogs (Fall 2002) 
(for interview clarification see supra note 5). 
 461. Interview with a KSA representative (Fall 2002) (for interview clarification see 
supra note 5). 
 462. Id.  
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“private label[s]” for each client.463 The New Jersey model requires that 
kosher retailers present a paper trail that may obliterate the principle 
of the private label.464 
 While this problem can be fixed with minor tweaking, it suggests 
that the mandatory disclosure might intrude on an equilibrium created 
in a fairly functional subindustry for kosher supervision and certifica-
tion. More importantly, it raises the question why existing voluntary 
disclosure within the kosher food industry is insufficient. In a competi-
tive market, food manufacturers and vendors confident in the kashrus 
of their food would volunteer this information so consumers would 
choose their products. KSAs also would widely disclose the standards 
they use to supervise and certify products. This reality is borne out to 
some degree, as noted above. KSAs regularly have to divulge standards 
when working with other KSAs in the vertical food chain and are will-
ing to answer consumer inquiries.465 Given this policy of limited disclo-
sure, the costs of disclosure fall primarily on the consumers who care to 
find out.  
 Has the market somehow failed such that mandatory disclosure is 
necessary? Industries that produce nondisclosure strategies have char-
acteristics whereby participants effectively can cooperate one with the 
other and engage in cartel like behavior.466 As the previous Section ex-
plained, KSAs have demonstrated no evidence of coordination that 
would suggest that the lack of full disclosure to consumers is the result 
of a strategy of cooperation.  
 To the extent KSAs do not disclose their exact standards to consum-
ers, they offer reasonable explanations such as the need to protect cli-
ent trade secrets, the lack of any clear document(s) to provide, or that 
the standards can be too complicated to explain to lay consumers (so 
that disclosure would unnecessarily worry consumers who lack the 
knowledge to understand the information disclosed). While these ex-
planations might sound like excuses, the fact that even sophisticated 
kosher consumers readily accept some veil of ignorance about the stan-
dards used and prefer to rely on whether they trust a particular KSA 
                                                                                                                      
 463. See Kosher Private Label in Sharp Increase, KOSHER TODAY, May 1997, available 
at http://www.koshertoday.com/kosher%20today%20archives/1997/0597/main%20text.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
 464. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 45A-21.3 (2003). 
 465. Interviews with various KSA representatives (Fall 2002) (for interview clarifica-
tion see supra note 5).  
 466. Scholars have written extensively on mandatory disclosure within the corporate 
law context. See, e.g., George J. Bentson, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An 
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 
VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Dis-
closure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 
J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2001). 
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suggests that mandatory disclosure is neither necessary nor even de-
sirable. 
 Given the recent creation of the kosher disclosure statute, it 
would be imprudent to discredit its utility without a chance to gather 
evidence and observe its impact; nonetheless, the fact that it departs 
from the amount of disclosure the private market has generated sug-
gests that these statutes might have some unintended consequences. 
Mandatory disclosure might increase the costs of kosher food, kosher 
food supervision, and certification by requiring those parties to bear 
the costs of compliance without conferring an equivalent benefit be-
cause this standard of disclosure has not been requested nor been de-
sired by the consumers.467  
V.   BEYOND KOSHER FRAUD 
 While this analysis suggests a solution for the specific problem of 
fraud in the kosher food industry, it offers far more than that to those 
interested in studying consumer protection laws as well as those study-
ing legal responses to the behavior of private market actors. Examining 
what works (and does not work) in the context of kosher fraud can 
serve as a model for other food industries or general areas of consumer 
product safety and authentication. Beyond the realm of consumer pro-
tection, the case study of kosher fraud identifies some relevant ques-
tions and answers about how law should and should not adjust to the 
behavior of private parties. This Section discusses applications outside 
of kosher fraud and then ties together the ramifications for legal theory 
in general that the study produced. 
A.   Consumer Protection Examples 
 The tale of the kosher food industry—particularly the role the 
kosher fraud statutes and other consumer protection laws have 
played—demonstrates the extent to which legal solutions should be 
based on nonlegal efforts to solve the difficulties of fraud and mistake. 
Yet, the experience of the kosher food industry, from its humble 
beginning to date, is not a unique story—it is just closer to the end of 
the book than other fledging, novel industries might be. It is analogous 
to other subindustries within the overall market for food and offers a 
framework for analyzing specialized legislation aimed to assist 
particular consumers or markets. In addition, the case of kosher food 
certification can be used to examine the need for legal support of other 
                                                                                                                      
 467. It should be noted that while the disclosure statutes were requested as a matter of 
legislative subsidy, the move towards disclosure came from an idea of how to make kosher 
fraud enforcement pass constitutional muster, rather than an original exploration of op-
tions that would help consumers. Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 
1366 (N.J. 1992).  
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product certification efforts, such as safety labeling. First, this Part will 
apply the lessons of the kosher food industry to develop a template for 
other specialized areas of food regulation, before tackling the issue of 
consumer protection and private efforts to monitor and sanction for 
safety. 
1.   Other Food Subindustry Applications 
 Though kosher was one of the first ethnic food industries to estab-
lish widespread labeling, the kosher model is worthy of study by mem-
bers of those ethnic food industries who wish to find manners in which 
they can integrate their own standards and create an identification 
system within the food industry as whole. While the information-
sharing proposals above would help kosher-proxy users obtain informa-
tion at the outset, it seems that proxy-using consumers ultimately may 
be better off with their own private ordering obtained through internal 
monitoring, certification, and sanctioning that rely on their own com-
munal sanctions. To the extent these groups can overcome internal and 
external barriers to self-certification, the kosher model presents an ex-
ample of what a well-functioning supervision and certification subin-
dustry looks like, and when state protection might be necessary to fill 
in the gaps. At the same time, this analysis forces us to recognize the 
dichotomy of theories for food regulation and its dual role within con-
sumer protection laws: special interest subsidization and general legis-
lation on matters of public health and welfare. 
 There are three emerging food industries that particularly could 
benefit from the lessons of the kosher model. These markets are halal 
food, allergy-safe food, and organic (or nongenetically modified) food. 
This Section will discuss each one briefly to extrapolate what the 
kosher experience may suggest in each context. 
(a)   Halal Food 
 As described above, Halal supervision and certification in the 
United States is in its infancy.468 Supervision and certification is pri-
marily left to local establishments and Halal Certifying Agencies 
(HCAs) have not taken a strong hold in the nationwide market for 
packaged food.469 Yet like in the kosher world, Muslims can rely on 
their religious and social communities to monitor and sanction fraudu-
lent actors. The foundations that create the private ordering in the 
Jewish world exist within the Muslim world too.  
                                                                                                                      
 468. See discussion supra Section II.C.2. 
 469. Id. 
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 The lack of many HCAs may be attributed to several factors. First, 
the halal laws only apply to animal-sourced food;470 unlike kosher, the 
vast majority of food does not need any certification at all. Accordingly, 
there is less demand for a comprehensive network of halal supervision 
and certification. Use of the kosher proxy is another reason for the slow 
growth—to the extent Muslims find kosher sufficient or food providers 
think that kosher supervision will appeal to halal consumers—it cur-
tails demand for yet another form of supervision. Because the cost of 
supervision is fixed, it seems logical that the most efficient form of su-
pervision might be a KSA that works in conjunction with an HCA, with 
each maintaining a reputation within its own religious community.471 
 Nonetheless, halal consumers are increasingly turning to methods 
of labeling and policing that mirror the kosher experience. At the same 
time, a handful of states have enacted halal fraud statutes that mirror 
the kosher fraud laws.472 Just like in the case of kosher, the critical 
mass needed to gain special subsidization occurs roughly at the same 
time the critical mass needed to create a private system of supervision 
and certification emerges. And just like with kosher, the laws present a 
constitutional problem: the state must define what halal means or refer 
to some religious understanding of the concept. Like kosher, halal has 
no meaning independent of religion. New Jersey has avoided this diffi-
culty by enacting a halal disclosure statute, which is analogous to the 
kosher disclosure statute.473 
 These statutes may serve to express state approval of its Muslim 
constituencies, but it is unclear how they will help Muslims combat the 
fraudulent sale of halal food or how they apply to problems that may be 
unique to halal consumers. The biggest problems facing kosher con-
sumers today, such as mistakes and proliferation of marks, are the dif-
ficulties that come with having such widespread supervision and certi-
fication on many different products by many different organizations. 
Perhaps the issue for halal consumers is how to find strategies for 
growth within the United States. Given the prevalence of international 
halal supervision, perhaps the key is identifying legal rules that en-
courage trade in halal certified food products between the European 
                                                                                                                      
 470. Id.  
 471. For political reasons, reputable organizations may fear joint faith efforts to super-
vise and certify foods. 
 472. CAL. PENAL CODE § 383c (Deering 2003) (including “‘halal’ meats and meat prepa-
rations,” sale and labeling regulations, false representations, punishment, and halal de-
fined); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 637/1 (West 2003) (“Halal Food Act”); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 750.297f (2003) (including the possession, sale, exposure for sale, labeling, advertis-
ing, and so on, of halal food products); MINN. STAT. §§ 31.658, .661 (2002) (“Halal food re-
quirements”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-98 to :8-103 (West 2003) (“Halal Food Consumer 
Protection Act”). In addition, the Texas legislature is considering passing a halal food act 
as well. Eileen E. Flynn, Muslims Back Bill to Regulate Labeling of Islamic Foods, AUSTIN 
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 8, 2003, at B1.  
 473. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-100 (West 2003) (“Halal; disclosure”). 
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Union or Middle East and the United States. Without having empirical 
data on the needs of halal consumers and the operation of this market, 
these are simply guesses. The kosher model demonstrates to halal us-
ers a method for achieving supervision and certification labeling. This 
model also suggests that if consumers within the same ethnic industry 
(kosher) need to reassess how law complements their private efforts 
over time, then surely proxy users developing their own industries 
ought to identify their own specific needs rather than simply copying 
existing legislation that provides a template. 
(b)   Allergy-Safe Food 
 Beyond the constitutional dimension, if the kosher and halal exam-
ples engender skepticism toward state standard setting, it is because 
the proven or potential ability for functional private ordering makes 
such legislation seem like rent-seeking subsidization. But some con-
texts possess stronger policy arguments for requiring government 
standard setting and even government certification. The labeling of al-
lergy-safe food is one such area. As noted above, the kosher proxy is not 
only imperfect but also occasionally dangerous for allergic individuals. 
Accordingly, it may be the case that special allergy-safe legislation is 
needed.474  
 There are three aspects that set allergy-safe consumer protection 
apart from the examples of kosher and halal. First, like the majority of 
government commodities regulation, labeling for allergy-safe products 
can rely on purely scientific standards. For example, government label-
ing requiring that nondairy products actually contain no dairy pro-
teins475 would create a baseline that seems acceptable within our gen-
eral frame of public health regulation. This is analogous to government 
requirements for unadulterated food products (such as milk) except in 
this context, the costs may be greater and less people may benefit.476 
The theory for the regulation remains the same. 
 This leads to the second distinction: there may not be enough con-
sumers who are sufficiently connected to be able to gain access to the 
production process and create a private system of labeling.477 Thus, it 
                                                                                                                      
 474. See the recent discussion about bans on peanuts in airplanes and schools to create 
allergy-safe environments. A. Wesley Burks, Jr., M.D., Back to School: Peanut Allergies 
and Peanut Free Zones, ALLERGY & ASTHMA ADVOCATE, at http://www.aaaai.org/ pa-
tients/advocate/1999/summer/backtoschool.stm (Summer 1999) (on file with author). 
 475. This is not the current standard. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 476. The strong dairy lobby would likely protest.  
 477. See generally Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co., 235 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1951) (injuries 
from allergic reactions to products are not compensable as a matter of law). Interestingly, 
the group of allergic individuals disproportionately consists of children, see Sampson, su-
pra, note 194, so one might think that this fact justifies increased government action. Of 
course, usually the parents of these children are the actual consumers (in an economic 
sense) of the food in question.  
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might be that the allergy-safe context presents precisely the appropri-
ate conditions to justify government standard setting rather than rely-
ing on protections aimed at cultivating strong private certification in-
termediaries.  
 Lastly, unlike kosher and halal consumers, there is no element of 
choice.478 Allergic individuals have not chosen to restrict their diets. 
While viewing allergies as a medical infirmity, government certification 
on behalf of involuntary consumers seems much more like a type of 
health insurance.  
(c)   Organic or Nongenetically Modified Food  
 Given a regulatory framework that puts kosher (and halal) on one 
side and allergy-safe labeling on the other side, the question is what 
lesson is emerging for the developing industries of organic479 or nonge-
netically modified food (non-GMO)?480 Several identifying questions 
have emerged through the analysis of kosher and attempts to apply it 
to other cases. Scholarship on organic or non-GMO food abounds;481 ac-
cordingly, this Part sketches the tripartite approach that stems from 
the kosher model and briefly applies it to organic or non-GMO indus-
tries. 
 First, what determines the standards?482 Are they based in science 
or religion? Note that this question forces a critical distinction within 
the religion/science divide. Imagine that a group of people seeks to eat 
                                                                                                                      
 478. The depiction of religious beliefs as choice invites a theological debate that is be-
yond the scope of this Article. While one might argue that observing religious diets is a 
choice, due to free will, this proves too much. Highly allergic individuals can also choose to 
eat foods that produce an allergic episode.  
 479. See Gutman, supra note 104, at 2381-84 (advocating a system of private labeling 
for organic akin to kosher and warning that a national standard could prevent the devel-
opment of successful certification). 
 480. See J. Howard Beales III, Modification and Consumer Information: Modern Bio-
technology and the Regulation of Information, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 105, 111 (2000) (com-
paring the likelihood of private market labeling for nongenetically modified food to the ko-
sher example); Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 501-02 (2002); Kelly A. Leggio, Comment, 
Limitations on the Consumer’s Right to Know: Settling the Debate Over Labeling of Geneti-
cally Modified Foods in the United States, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2001). 
 481. See, e.g., Sally J. Kelley, Agricultural Law: A Selected Bibliography, 2001, 55 ARK. 
L. REV. 303, 340-46, 362-63 (2002) (listing articles and books discussing food and food regu-
lation). 
 482. Not all private efforts in the name of gaining state or local enforcement of particu-
lar standards are immune from antitrust law under Noerr-Pennington immunity as estab-
lished by United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and Eastern Railroads 
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See Allied Tube & Con-
duit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 510-11 (1988) (subjecting National Fire Pro-
tection Association’s exclusion of plastic conduits in its National Electric Code, which was 
then adopted by state and local governments as law, to antitrust laws); Am. Soc’y of Mech. 
Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 577 (1982) (holding that ASME’s safety code 
exclusion of safety device in boilers that was incorporated by reference into federal regula-
tions and state and local laws could make ASME liable for antitrust violations).  
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only foods that appear in plays written by William Shakespeare. This 
would be a form of secular religion by using a body of literature as the 
textual basis for the dietary restrictions. But what about a group that 
excludes from their diets certain foods within the animal kingdom—or 
even all such foods—and defines the animal kingdom based on scien-
tific classifications? Does the underlying source make these dietary re-
strictions science rather than secular religion? Or is the science cate-
gory reserved only for those parties who have a scientifically accepted 
reason for their diet?  
  Next, we would ask whether the relevant consumer group is volun-
tary or involuntary. Lastly, we examine whether there is a critical 
mass belonging to a shared community that could mobilize to create a 
private regime of norm enforcement.  
 While there is no constitutional dimension483 to the fight over or-
ganic, the politics are the same as kosher: which orthodoxy will prevail? 
There is no scientific definition of organic; thus, an organic diet is a 
form of secular religion. On the other hand, the debate over labeling 
genetically modified (GMO) food can find its roots in science. That is, 
there may be debate whether GMO foods are harmful or inferior to 
non-GMO food, but there is a scientific basis for identifying what con-
stitutes GMO food. The key is whether science requires more than that, 
and if so, what the evidence about GMO food demonstrates. As a result, 
it might be the case that organic and non-GMO food regulation should 
differ.  
 Consumers seeking both organic or non-GMO food are voluntary. 
But the last part of the inquiry is not clearly answered. It appears that 
there is certainly a critical mass of consumers interested in organic or 
non-GMO food. The residual question is whether these consumers ac-
tually share a community such that they can sufficiently rely on certifi-
cation intermediaries.484 The unintended consequences485 of the Na-
tional Organic Program, which sets criteria for organic labeling and 
USDA accreditation of certification intermediaries,486 may demonstrate 
                                                                                                                      
 483. Despite being held constitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), a district court has declared the filled-milk 
statute unconstitutional as applied to the product and company in Milnot Co. v. Richard-
son, 350 F. Supp. 221, 225 (S.D. Ill. 1972), and it is no longer enforced. Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397 (1987) (demonstrating how 
the powerful dairy lobby successfully prevented competition from milkfat substitutes in the 
markets for milk and cheese). 
 484. See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and the Future of Environ-
mental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1993) (examining the success (and pitfalls) of 
environmental certification and arguing for a private-public, hybrid system of regulation).  
 485. See, e.g., Marian Burros, U.S.D.A. Enters Debate on Organic Label Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at F1 (reporting that organic proponents are at odds with the 
U.S.D.A. for what they perceive as a weakening of the National Organic Program).  
 486. The National Organic Program, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/ (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2003). 
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a lack of shared community (or ideals) by the critical mass of diverse 
consumers (and other interests) that sought the regulation. This may 
also be reflected in the lack of any source as starting point for defining 
organic. Accordingly, there may be some form of regulation of organic 
food that can be more appropriately viewed as steeped in a theory of 
public welfare rather than subsidization, despite signs that the existing 
regime is the latter. 
 Beyond the tripartite approach, which offers an analysis when food 
regulation appears to be based in consumer protection theories of social 
welfare rather than subsidization, the kosher fraud model is useful in 
another way. It also demonstrates that when interest groups do focus 
on food regulation as subsidization, even more important than the defi-
nition fight may be the nature of the protection afforded. Factors to be 
considered include the resources afforded and the extent to which the 
enforcement complements, rather than duplicates, private monitoring, 
labeling, and information-sharing. Each subindustry may find a differ-
ent equilibrium based on its own private landscape.  
2.   Lessons for and from Consumer Safety 
 Consumer safety through private product certification and labeling 
actually predates the kosher model. Founded in 1894, Underwriters 
Laboratories Inc. (UL) is a nonprofit organization that tests and certi-
fies products in a host of industries, including household appliances, 
wiring, and commercial equipment.487 Underwriters Laboratories does 
not compare competing products; it simply identifies that a minimum 
standard has been met.488 Today, the UL mark can be found on ap-
proximately 17 billion products.489  
 The Consumers Union, another nonprofit organization involved in 
consumer safety, was established in 1936.490 Unlike Underwriters 
Laboratories, the Consumers Union does not certify products.491 
Rather, it tests products and provides information for consumers 
through its magazine, Consumer Reports.492 In addition, the Consumers 
Union serves as an advocate for consumer protection before legislatures 
and courts.493 
                                                                                                                      
 487. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., Home Page, at http://www.ul.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2003); see ECOS Elecs. Corp. v. Underwriters Labs., 743 F.2d 498, 503 (7th Cir. 
1984) (holding that UL does not act to restrain trade simply by certifying a competing 
product). 
 488. ECOS, 743 F.2d at 500. 
 489. Underwriters Laboratories Inc., supra note 487. 
 490. About Consumers Union, at http://www.consumersunion.org (Link About CU) (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2003). Also, a new kosher consumer group called the “Kosher Consumers Un-
ion,” is based at: http://www.kosherconsumer.org.  
 491. About Consumers Union, supra note 490.  
 492. Id.  
 493. Id.  
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 There are lessons to be shared between the kosher model and the 
area of consumer protection more generally. First, each has its own 
fight about standards: what is required of a manufacturer or retailer to 
deem his or her product kosher or acceptable? While everyone wants 
some baseline that is acceptable, how can the government leave room 
for private markets to set their own standards?494 Since law trumps, 
the focus should be on setting appropriate minimums that are prem-
ised in some scientific superiority.  
 What consumer decisions will be deemed involuntary? Does this de-
pend on whether a particular product is a necessity? How widespread it 
is? Allergic individuals are a captured market. What other consumer 
markets mimic this setup? And what of the requirement that examines 
whether a critical mass of consumers within a shared community ex-
ists? How does this get identified in the context of general consumer 
safety?  
 There is a critical mass supporting consumer safety regulations. 
However, due to a lack of shared community, the process of information 
sharing and recall is far weaker in the nationwide safety context than 
within the kosher model. In this regard, consumer safety can learn 
from kosher fraud. What does the state need to do to mimic the results 
of smaller, cohesive social networks? Perhaps the answer is that prod-
uct recall information needs to be posted in places like synagogues, 
churches, and mosques, not to mention schools or health clubs. 
 Using this tripartite approach to discover when there might be regu-
latory failure that justifies consumer protection laws and when such 
legislation is mere subsidization, might lead to different outcomes in 
different industries depending on the nature of the consumers involved. 
General consumer fraud protection statutes are littered with applica-
tions to different industries; do we really want bifurcated consumer 
protection laws that depend on the political power of the consumer 
group involved rather than the actual likelihood of harm?495 The very 
characteristics that make the kosher food industry so successful at in-
ternal monitoring and sanctioning—unified goals, cohesive communal 
                                                                                                                      
 494. See Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2193, 2214 (1989) (arguing that product liability laws preclude some bar-
gains that would be advantageous to consumers). 
 495. The automobile industry is replete with federal safety standards that reflect the 
respective strength of the industry lobbies and consumers. For a discussion of the treat-
ment of the implementation of mandatory airbags versus passive restraints, see Motor Ve-
hicle Manufactures Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983), and consider the role of the automotive industry in treatment of the enactment 
(or lack thereof) of fuel efficiency standards for SUVs and lightweight trucks. See Martin 
Wolk, America’s Showdown on Gas Mileage: Will SUV-Makers Improve Gas Efficiency 
Themselves . . . Or Be Forced To?, MSNBC News (June 8, 2003), at http://www.msnbc.com/ 
news/581511.asp?cp1=1. This does not mean to imply that such standards are ineffective 
at protecting consumers. See Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of 
Regulation: Disclosing the Auto Safety Payoff, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87 (1985).  
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links, and so on—are the ones that give its participants the clout to ob-
tain legislative subsidies.496 This creates an inherent tension in the fact 
that consumer protection legislation creates a prima facie presumption 
of political power and rent-seeking behavior. 
B.   Extrapolating from Kosher 
 The kosher fraud example presents a model that is somewhat 
unique compared to previously explored industries and private groups 
within social norm literature. Whereas other examples feature groups 
that have eschewed courts as an instrument for enforcement of con-
tract or tort law,497 participants in the kosher food industry have both 
engaged in extensive private monitoring and sanctioning as well advo-
cated in favor of specialized state civil and criminal penalties to aid 
them in efforts to combat fraud within the kosher food industry. In or-
der to extrapolate from kosher, one must first acknowledge the leap 
from what previous scholarly works have argued to a theory supporting 
the kosher case and the proposal offered above.  
 First, scholars have demonstrated that private groups can establish 
methods of dispute resolution and sanctions that do not require legal 
enforcement of contracts.498 These case studies show how nonlegal 
mechanisms may be more efficient than traditional contract law,499 yet 
the legitimacy of the private efforts need not be linked to their potential 
superiority; rather they can be accepted on a strong freedom of contract 
theoretical basis. That is, the private monitoring and sanctioning sys-
tems present an acceptable or even favorable alternative to the tradi-
tional law of contract precisely because the norms and understandings 
of the parties they govern create them. Consent is the key. At any 
point, an actor can choose the law, which is why it is meaningful to 
study when and why they do not.  
 From a libertarian perspective, one might think that some private 
groups likewise should be allowed to self-police and opt out of the legal 
system mechanisms that combat tortious conduct as well. In fact, the 
classic “Order Without Law” circumstances described just that—parties 
                                                                                                                      
 496. See generally United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (sug-
gesting that constitutional protection ought to be more stringent when the political process 
fails discrete and insular minorities). For a critique of footnote four as a useful tool for con-
stitutional law, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 
(1985). 
 497. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1 (cattle ranchers); Bernstein, supra note 3 (diamond 
merchants). 
 498. Compare the kosher model with the behavior of Japanese firms who voluntarily 
subjected themselves to strict liability rules to attract buyers. J. Mark Ramseyer, Products 
Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Experiment, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1823 (1996).  
 499. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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rejecting private law options in the face of tortious behavior and creat-
ing their own order.500  
 It is not particularly controversial to note that parties do not take 
advantage of the legal enforcement mechanisms available to them in 
all circumstances. The question when and why some private actors re-
ject private law remedies presents an interesting area for study that 
scholars have grappled with for some time.501 Are private sanctioning 
systems adequate or even superior compared with engaging in legal 
battles? Are legal remedies somehow flawed? After all, it is one thing to 
determine that some private actors within a particular community find 
alternative dispute resolution preferable because it has unique advan-
tages; it is another to discover that the law itself simply does not vindi-
cate the rights in question at all or very well.502 The key to this inquiry 
is choice. Similar to the contractual model’s reliance on consent, do par-
ties opt out of private law remedies because they choose an internal en-
forcement mechanism they prefer or because they feel that the current 
law and its application give them no choice? 
 Taking this one step further, assuming that the choice question is 
resolved favorably, what of state civil and criminal prosecution in the 
wake of private organizations, groups, and industries that would prefer 
to opt out and self-police? Are private systems creating superior 
mechanisms for enforcement? Are there other public policy difficulties 
implicated from privatizing policing?  
 In the kosher fraud example, the parties have turned to a complex 
system of private monitoring, certifying, and sanctioning in order to 
combat the problems of fraud and mistake. Kosher consumers have re-
jected private law remedies. At the same time, state civil and criminal 
enforcement activity floats in the background despite its limited effec-
tiveness.  
 It is important to recognize that this Article’s proposal—that state 
resources could better serve consumers of kosher food through informa-
tion-sharing devices rather than kosher fraud statutes—runs counter 
to the expressed desires of the general class of parties it seeks to help. 
This Article aims to convince kosher consumers, in general, and indus-
try participants that its proposal deals better with problems facing the 
kosher food industry today than existing legal regimes, and it serves as 
an invitation for other proposals linked to curing demonstrated prob-
                                                                                                                      
 500. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1697 (1996) (criticizing the belief that social norms are efficient and demonstrating how 
the state can limit the impact of inefficient norms). 
 501. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1. 
 502. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1185 (1996) (discussing how parties “opt out” from various forms of state services and 
whether these individual or community based opt out decisions suggest that the legal rule 
ought to change).  
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lems within the industry. If accepted, then the opt-out solution is easy. 
Kosher fraud statutes are constitutionally suspect, so industry partici-
pants could simply drop their current efforts to reenact variations of 
the kosher fraud statute in favor of a strategy favoring other legal al-
ternatives. While this Article demonstrates that nonlegal sanctions can 
be more effective and preferable to tort and criminal law, it reserves 
the question whether and when the state should permit private market 
opt out from tort or some criminal law in other circumstances for future 
analysis. 
 Yet despite hopes that the evidence and arguments presented above 
will convince private actors to forgo seeking specialized civil or criminal 
enforcement options, any theory attempting to link the kosher fraud 
example to other case studies of nonlegal monitoring and sanctioning 
might also want to recognize the hurdle that lack of consent or choice 
presents. If the goal of the state is to truly assist the group that the en-
forcement subsidy seeks to help, then it might seem appropriate for 
someone to conduct an independent examination of the existence of 
private enforcement, such as nonlegal monitoring, sanctioning, and in-
formation sharing, before formulating what form of subsidies would be 
most effective. But this seems to suggest that the state would know 
what private parties need better than they do themselves. This prob-
lem is due to the forced dichotomy that occurs when groups couch their 
arguments for consumer protection subsidies in terms that appeal to 
sensibilities of the state’s role in ensuring public welfare. How is the le-
gitimacy of consumer protection laws affected by their underlying justi-
fications for enactment? Would our political discourse be better off or 
perhaps worse off if subsidization requests were more transparent?  
 This raises a global question that this Article does not attempt to 
fully answer: why do groups seek subsidies that are largely inefficient 
or appear outright unnecessary? Solving this larger public choice query 
would be an important step toward closing the gap between the subsidy 
sought through the legislative process and the perfect subsidy to com-
bat the problem identified. This suggests that the normative value of 
subsidies might need to be linked to their ability (or lack of ability) to 
fulfill some particular intended goal. 
 And even more broadly, the kosher fraud example suggests that 
there might be the need for a metatheory when tort and criminal law 
theories of public interest or social welfare policy collide with public 
choice and norm theory understandings of subsidization, consent, 
and opt out. How can we view criminal and state civil enforcement of 
consumer protection law through both the lens of public choice and the 
lens of traditional theories of criminal law? The tension produced by 
this intersection clouds the picture of what appropriate legal protection 
for kosher consumers and consumers in general should look like. 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 While the constitutionality of the kosher fraud statute has cap-
tured the attention of the courts, government officials, scholars, and 
the community of kosher consumers in general, this focus is mis-
placed. Extensive private ordering (monitoring, certifying, sanction-
ing, and information sharing)—so much that it has created a robust 
subindustry of supervision and certification—identifies and includes 
much of the behavior that the kosher fraud statute aims to prevent. 
There is no evidence that state kosher fraud enforcement plays a sig-
nificant role in preventing willful kosher fraud; nor is there evidence 
that enforcement addresses the problems facing kosher consumers 
today. As a result, this Article has demonstrated that legal efforts to 
aid kosher consumers, thus, would best serve to complement the ex-
isting nonlegal sanctions by facilitating voluntary information-
sharing where the private market solutions fall short. 
 In the process of analyzing kosher fraud statutes and examining 
consumer protection laws more generally, this Article has identified an 
inherent tension these regulations present. On one hand, specialized 
consumer protection laws are rooted in criminal law theories of public 
interest or social welfare. They are situated within the realm of tradi-
tional state functions, such as punishing wrongdoing, making determi-
nations of just behavior, maintaining a monopoly on the use of force as 
a means of dispute resolution, and solving collective action problems 
among a disjointed populace. At the same time, these regulations can 
also be viewed through the lens of public choice and norm theory un-
derstandings of subsidization, consent, and opt out. That is, the laws 
demonstrate how small, cohesive interest groups capable of sophisti-
cated private ordering, like kosher consumers, can succeed within the 
political process to obtain special protection through statutes and regu-
lations that may not even be well suited to achieve their purported 
goals.  
 This Article has offered a tripartite approach for categorizing food 
regulation laws within the context of these two competing theoretical 
approaches, laying the foundation for an analysis of the legitimacy of 
these laws and suggesting the need for more empirical research regard-
ing subsidization and norm enforcement.  
